Showing posts with label Nepal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nepal. Show all posts

Monday, June 21, 2010

Breaking a consensus

The non-Maoist coalition repudiates an agreement that saved Nepal from a constitutional crisis.

An EPW Editorial.

Sunday, February 14, 2010

Back to Constitution Writing

The Nepali Maoists' reiteration to focus on Constitution writing is a significant boost to the process.

Read on for an article that I wrote for the Newsclick website.

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

The farce continues..

Another short comment on the ongoing happenings in Nepal.

Prolonging the farce that the current regime in Nepal is; prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal (who lost two Constituent Assembly constituencies, no less and was nominated to the CA) recently elevated foreign minister and Nepali Congress leader, Sujata Koirala to the post of deputy prime minister - the second person to occupy the post besides Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) leader Bijay Gacchadar. Koirala's only claim for her current status was the fact that she was being propped up to the post by senior NC leader and father Girija Prasad Koirala. Sujatha Koirala also managed to emulate and even worsen her superior Madhav Nepal's (of the Communist Party of Nepal - Unified Marxist Leninist - UML) performance in the CA elections by losing the elections in her own constituency (Koirala finished a poor third behind MJF and UML candidates in the CA constituency of Sunsari, while Madhav Nepal finished second in both Kathmandu-2 and Rautahat losing to UCPN(Maoist) candidates).

With this dubious elevation, Madhav Nepal has added further disgrace to an already sketchy arrangement - which clearly suggests a reactionary gang up against the legitimate winners of the CA elections - the Nepali Maoists. The elevation was done despite vehement disapproval from Koirala's own partymen - the NC leader senior leadership. Monarchy is said to have been abolished in Nepal, but non-representative dynastic politics is still quite a presence as Koirala's elevation points out. The elevation also means that the reactionary take-over of power in Nepal is now formally complete - Nepali President Ram Baran Yadav (who was never a republican and got his post due to his loyalty towards GP Koirala and also because of NC-MJF machinations), CA losers Madhav Nepal and Sujata Koirala, and a symbol of "corruption and opportunism"- deputy PM Bijay Gachchedar, in key posts of power.

The breaking down of the erstwhile "Constitutional Monarchy" system and the entry of the Maoists within the democratic fray (out of the peoples' war) meant a reorientation of the popular class based support to the various political parties in the country. The support to the monarchy and other anti-democratic sections has obviously accrued to the Nepali Congress (to the detriment of such parties as the Rashtriya Prajantra Party and its offshoots), while also shifting toward the Madhesi parties to some extent (owed to the deterrent value offered by the MJF toward the Maoist plan of structural economic changes in the Terai). This is reminiscent of the shift of royalist and princely sections gradually toward the Congress following independence in India (as well as toward the Jan Sangh and later the Bharatiya Janata Party). The reactionary actions by the Nepali Congress over the period of time following the CA elections pretty much conform to the patterns of change of support base.

Opportunistic moves such as Sujata Koirala's elevation, in the near parliamentary past had discredited the UML leadership of Madhav Nepal and that apparently resulted in his shock defeat (as well as his party's poor third position in the CA polls). Surely these maneuvers in Nepal with a reactionary bloc seizing power were not what the people intended when they voted in the CA polls for change. There has to be a greater mass mobilisation by progressive forces in Nepal to pressurise CA members to end this farce that has been set up in the name of government.

Cross posted at www.pragoti.org

Thursday, October 08, 2009

Deadlock in Nepal

A stasis has persisted in Nepal ever since the formation of the new government led by unelected-but-nominated (to the constituent assembly) prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal of Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). The rather ineffectual government, which hosts - apart from Madhav Nepal - other unworthies such as foreign minister Sujata Koirala (who has aspired to become the Deputy PM after demands by Nepali Congress patriarch (and father) G P Koirala) and discredited Madhesi leader Bijoy Gachchadar as vice premier has been so poor in its governance that there prevails virtual anarchy in various parts of the country. Ethnic clashes, demands, violent actions, strikes and disruption of economic activity has been the order of the day since the formation of the new coalition government whose very raison d'etre for existence has been its anti-Maoist position. The government has not even been to able to introduce the yearly budget - a sign of utter incompetence and inaction. Buttressed by staunch Indian support, the Madhav Nepal government has been unable to firm up a consensus with the Maoist opposition over the latter's demand to discuss the president's unconstitutional action in reinstating (former) army chief Rukmangad Katuwal after his dismissal by elected former Maoist prime minister Pushpa Kumar Dahal, in the Constituent Assembly.

The Maoists, who have privileged this issue as a case of establishing "civilian supremacy" have been unremitting in their efforts to discuss the issue in the CA and rightly so, for there remains no moral argument against such a discussion. The resultant disruption of parliamentary activity by the Maoists has taken quite a toll on the already ineffectual governance, not to mention the rather destabilised process of writing the Constitution - stipulated to be completed by next year. Apparently the government led by the UML and the NC is reluctant to discuss this issue or put it to vote in the CA fearing that the legislators belonging to the UML in particular would be loath to take a pro-President position when push comes to shove. And that would threaten the very legitimacy of the government in itself.

Apart from the political stasis, there has been also been attempts to shift the goalposts from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Maoists and the other major parties, prominent of which are the NC and the UML. Madhav Nepal has already start to sound forked tonguish on the question of integration of the Nepali Army and the Maoists' PLA. In a recent interview with The Hindu, the PM tragi-comically suggested that he was yet "to go deeply" into the agreement (CPA) that he was a signatory of! Apparently it is the reactionary pressure that is telling on this slip-shod approach to a vital issue of the peace process.

All that seemed to be a matter of the near past, when some diplomatic parleys between the representatives of the three major parties - the Maoists, the UML and the NC got underway during the Dashain festive season. Encouraging remarks about a break in the deadlock through a joint resolution were being mooted by all representatives. But the central question - allowing a discussion on the president's move and a decisive resolution on civilian supremacy, that saw no acceptable answers. The NC and UML are still distrusting of the Maoists and consider that the question of civilian supremacy is settled.

All this is pushing the Maoists themselves in an insurrectionary direction. Already under pressure from a two-line struggle featuring what could be termed as a battle of ideas between a section of "dogmatists" represented by senior Maoist leaders Mohan Baidya and CP Gajurel and (for want of a better word), the pragmatists, represented by Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, the Maoist leadership is keen on a different strategy to achieve a Constitution of their liking and which involves their return to power. Deadlock on the question of "civilian supremacy" is only taking the Maoists further to where the dogmatists in their ranks would want them to be - something that can turn nasty with the incumbent government even wanting to use repression. And that would be disastrous for the fledgling republic which is still faced with other social questions that were kept under wraps in an unitary and hierarchical state for long and that have being now raised in the form of various social upsurges - on ethnicity, on caste, on land ownership and what not.

In all this, the Indian role has also been negative. The current ambassador's fishing in troubled waters; nay mudding the waters even further by throwing in new interpretations of the CPA - Rakesh Sood suggested in a recent interview that integration of the PLA tantamounted only to an integration into Nepali society - an absolutely facetious remark considering that the UN recognised the combatants of the PLA at par with the Nepali Army when it brokered the ceasefire which preceded the CPA. Ostensibly, the more independent foreign policy of the erstwhile Maoist led government was not to the liking of the South Block, which saw any maneuver by the Maoist led government to be responsive to a Chinese regime (that was in turn using soft power to cozy up with the government due to its Tibet-related considerations) as being tantamount to a bandwagoning with the northern neighbour (and "competing" power). The Indian actions only gave further grist to the dogmatist mill among the Maoist sections; witness the actions of Maoist cadre and sympathisers against Indian priests in Nepal.

For three years since 2005 and the coming together of the mainstream political outfits and the Maoists against the erstwhile monarchy till the formation of the Nepali republic, things were progressing quite well for a nation with a blighted past. There were indeed more than a few hiccups as was expected between parties representing various class interests and the irreconcilability of those sections' interests playing itself out politically. But the Maoists made most of the important compromises - they gave up their "peoples' war" and agreed to work toward a "21st century system" of democracy; accepting a multi-party system that went against their given dogma. They agreed to work democratically to realise their aims - that of building a "new democratic" Nepal on the long march toward socialism. They even achieved a multi-class alliance of sorts in their efforts to do so, only for reactionaries to put a halt to all these in cahoots with sections of the Indian establishment.

The breaking of the deadlock would herald a return to the peace process inaugurated path, and a political settlement of sorts leading to the building of a visionary Constitution could be achieved. Will Madhav Nepal show the sagacity to achieve this? Will the UML in particular, be willing to act as a leftist party and defy its NGOised inner demons? Will the republican sections of the Nepali Congress realise the futility of giving leeway to the reactionary old guard and change course? And how long would a consensual approach toward achieving political aims be acceptable or indeed be made palatable by a pragmatic Maoist leadership to dogmatic sections of the party? Answers to these questions will determine the rate of change toward progress in Nepal. The leftist in India here is waiting for the right ones.

Cross-posted from www.pragoti.org

Thursday, May 07, 2009

On the crisis in Nepal


A crisis has been precipitated in the republic of Nepal. The prime minister Pushpa Kumar "Prachanda" Dahal of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has resigned, following presidential actions rejecting a cabinet decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff, Rukmangad Katuwal from his post. Earlier, the government was reduced to a minority after withdrawal of support from the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). This article will strive to comment on the developments and put things in perspective. 

The Peace accord between various political actors in Nepal in 2005 paved the way for the transformation of the country into a republic. The integration of the Maoists within the political mainstream was the most important step in this culmination, as it were the Maoists who had concretely addressed the demand for the formation of a new republic with a new Constitution to go along with it. Other parties, inevitably fell in line judging the public and civic mood and the currency of the demand. Following this was constituent assembly elections, where the Maoists emerged as the single largest party and eventually after the declaration of a republic, a coalition government involving all major actors except the Nepal Congress was formed. 

Complex Issues

Two of the issues that were seen to be the most complex in the run-up to the writing of the Constitution were the integration of the Maoist armed cadre into the Nepali Army and the resolution of the federal question with all the major actors having varying positions on these issues. Having said that, vis-a-vis the former, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Nepal government and the Maoists in 2006 laid the scope for control over the Nepali army and on the integration of the Maoist combatants (of the People's Liberation Army - PLA) within the Nepali army (Article 5.1 and sections). A special committee has already been given the task of going about this process, which is still on. Yet Rukmangad Katuwal, seen as a loyal supporter of the erstwhile monarchy, decided to violate this agreement (Article 5.12) by going on for recruitment into the Nepali army, unilaterally extending the tenure of senior army officials and also withdrawing the Nepali army's participation from the National Games because of the PLA's participation. 

Civilian supremacy over the army is a sine qua non in all democracies and the blatant violation of the CPA was not surely going to be condoned by the Maoist led government. The government therefore sought Katuwal's explanation, and his response was that of defiance. Added to these incidents were rumours of a soft coup in the making, engineered by the Army. The government therefore decided to terminate Katuwal's posting, an action that was opposed to by the opposition NC which possibly sees the defiant army chief as a power centre stolidly opposed to the Maoists. As does, the Indian establishment, which sees a formal balance of power that keeps the Maoists in check necessary to continue its hegemony in Nepali affairs and to blunt any growing proximity between the Nepali nation and China strategically.

Unconstitutional actions

Questions have been raised by some commentators as to whether the Maoists acted in the manner that could be construed as"extreme". Prominent Indian analyst on Nepal affairs S.D.Muni, while calling into question the Chief of Army staff's actions, in the same breath suggests that the Maoists' action of removing the CoAS is "extreme". He writes that the CoAS's actions were in violation of the CPA and the civilian government was within its rights to demand an explanation from Katuwal for his actions. But, he stops at that and suggests that the Maoists were immature in removing the CoAS. This writer finds such an argument untenable. For the smooth transition of the infant republic into a Constitutional democracy, feudal remnants such as Katuwal had to be removed, as threats such as "soft coups" and other dangers were imminent and harmful. 

Even more problematic was the Nepali president Ram Baran Yadav's decision to overturn the cabinet's decision to remove the CoAS. The correct constitutional position for the president to take was to reply back to the cabinet to re-think the decision, but the actions by Yadav smacks of yet another violation of correct parliamentary procedure.

The UML

The UML found the action to remove the CoAS as non-consensual and has even suggested that the president's actions were necessitated. This writer finds the UML's positions egregious. For one, Katuwal has been in the habit of asserting the Nepali army's "independence" from civilian control, thereby showing no regard to the concept of civilian supremacy over the army. This reminds one of the just overthrown era of monarchy where the army was subordinate only to the royalty and not to the elected civilian government. For the infant republic the continuation of such feudal remnants was untenable and therefore the action by the Maoist led Government cabinet to remove Katuwal from his post was democratic and true to republican ethos. As an analogy one could point out the US head of state whenever elected to power has the prerogative to remove the Army Chief of Staff. 

The UML by not acquiescing to this decision was acting in a sectarian and juvenile manner. One can ask a question as to whose interest the UML was representing when it decided to withdraw support to the government over the issue of removal of the CoAS. The further moves by the UML to try to form a government with the Nepali Congress (strictly on the basis of an anti-Maoist position) and to endorse the president's actions make it amply clear that the UML has lost the plot completely. 

A counter argument could be made that the Maoist, in the name of left unity, could have tried to build a consensus with the UML before the removal of the CoAS. But this argument seems petty because the removal of the CoAS` was a matter of principle, and required no coaxing of the UML to achieve it. It is evident that the UML had other considerations in mind. Was the party pressurised by Indian authorities to go ahead with their folly? Atleast that is what is being alleged by some sections of the Maoists. 

One of the chief grouses that the UML had with the Maoist was that the latter was unable to control and stop the high-handedness exhibited by its youth organisation, the YCL. The YCL has been repeatedly accused and rightly so, of intimidation, violence against UML cadre. This was seen by UML leaders such as senior communist Madhav Kumar Nepal as one of the biggest roadblocks for left unity. To a certain extent these grievances were legitimate. But the action to withdraw support to the Maoist led government when the easiest thing to do for an avowed left party was to act on principle suggests that this action by the UML was cynical and lame.

Indian role

Coming back to the Indian role in this whole issue: the Indian ambassador's moves to pressurise the Nepali polity to retain Katuwal was a blatant expression of interference in Nepali affairs. Any self respecting Nepali, let alone a Maoist or any other leftist politician would have bristled at this interference, which however is part of a long legacy of intrusion in Nepali affairs. No wonder, the Maoists have openly accused the Indian bureaucrats of playing a meddlesome role. For this Indian, the Indian ambassador's actions are even more galling because the Indian establishment had played a positive role in the culmination of Nepal into a republic from a highly unpopular and illegitimate monarchy. 

Is this latest trend of negative influence- direct meddling, scheming with other political parties to push the Maoists into a corner and thereby endangering the peace agreement as well as the constitutional building process,related to the fact that India wants to retain its levers of influence? In other words the current Indian establishment is uncomfortable with the Maoists' stated intent of asserting a sovereign and a truly independent domestic and foreign policy. While, on the other hand during the time when the Left Front supported the Indian government the stated intent was not to meddle with the Nepali polity but to maintain healthy relations with whichever political dispensation which was in power.

This writer after his visit to Nepal just after the constituent assembly elections had warned that a derailment of the republican process of constitutional building and overcoming of some challenges such as the Army-PLA integration could be possible because bad habits such as treating Nepal as part of a geopolitical game between neighboring powers were still in place in the strategic calculuses of India and China. This fear seems to not have been misplaced.

It is imperative that the unconstitutional move of the Nepali president has to be overturned. The independent civil society in Nepal has reacted to the president's moves by demanding a judicial decision on the actions, both by the Nepali president as well as by the CoAS. Prominent civil society activists including Shyam Shrestha, Devender Raj Pandey and Krishna Pahadi who were involved in the anti-monarchy protests in Kathmandu in 2005, have now been arrested for protesting against the president's actions. This suggests that the Maoists have gained sympathy of independent and republican voices in the country. 

What needs to be done

By resigning from government on moral grounds, the Maoists made a gesture that has been appreciated by several sections of the Nepali populace. Even though the performance of the Maoist led government in various spheres of governance has been below expectations, the many challenges before the writing of the Constitution were being whittled down one by one, before the series of actions by Katuwal. 

The Maoists have to realise that the building of the constitution and the regaining of the momentum for the same is an imperative that cannot be foregone. By mobilising public opinion against the actions of the president, the army chief, the erstwhile coaliton partner UML, the Maoists can achieve an overturning of the unconstitutional actions by the chief executive as also convince the other prominent left party, the UML to fall in line on the path of propreity and left unity. The onus is on the UML to take a stance regarding this. Otherwise the party, with its recent history of poor political posturing and incorrect decisions, would be on the path to self-destruction, by having lost its leftist moorings and by opening the possibility of a rupture in its ranks. 

A massive show of public antipathy toward Indian (or for that matter Chinese or American) interference in Nepali political affairs should be re-assuring for the polity to adopt sovereignty and independence as guiding principles as partners in the republican polity and also act as a bulwark against continued meddling of the sort that transpired over the issue of the army chief's removal. In India too, the Indian people and intelligentsia should caution against debilitating actions of the kind that the Indian ambassador indulged in and the Indian establishment must be forced to let the Nepali polity take its own course of actions. Nepal can be a vital conduit for trade between India and China and a cordial relationship with the newly growing up republic is in the best interests of both ordinary Nepalis and ordinary Indians, especially living close to the borders of the country. It makes no sense for the Indian establishment to act in cahoots with feudal remnants in Nepal giving an ostensible reason of "stability". The examples of military over-reach in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the preponderance of the Sri Lankan army in Sri Lanka is enough to caution the Indian state from endorsing a similar denouement in Nepal. And that too, when the popular mood in the country is for a federal democratic republic and where a social revolution is being played out democratically.

Monday, December 22, 2008

Maoists attack Himal media

The Maoists in Nepal came to power by winning an outright (constituent assembly) election, defeating discredited parliamentary opponents and helping in the overthrow of the hated monarchy. They did this by graduating from a guerilla struggle and by debating their every move to enter into a multi-party democratic system. They opened up to the media, built international bridges with civil society and solidarity organisations in south Asia, who were equally enthralled about the removal of a feudal autocratic institution - the monarchy as much as the ordinary Nepali citizen.

There has indeed been a lot of goodwill for the Maoists and for the democratic community to build a fresh, egalitarian constitution. No one expected that process to be smooth as the contradictions between the polity was bound to be laid out to the fore and each of the parties were to undergo a certain transformation in the new political game. If the UML had to adjust to the presence of a larger left party which was slowly but surely hegemonising their constituency, the Nepali Congress had to accommodate sections of the erstwhile monarchist right among its already hotch-potch coalition of liberal, social democrats and feudal sections. The Maoists, on the other hand had some catching up to do in a new liberal polity, where it had to subordinate itself to the rules of the "competitive game". They had "suffered birth pangs", as was seen in the way there was a disconnect between an accommodative leadership which was keen on fostering a broad coalition of democracy, and an assertive and confrontational mass organisation such as the YCL which was intent on building and retaining the hegemonic space, not to mention the more difficult transformation from a guerilla outfit involved in a people's war to a democratic political party.

At times, this disconnect created a rift between the Maoists and other political parties - in particular, the UML. But for the sake of a longer vision of a constitutional republic, these were in a way sorted out. Even then, time and again, the illiberal character of the mass organisations of the Maoists (admittedly in a chaotic socio-political system) has raised heads. One such incident is the simply unacceptable attack of the Himal media premises in Kathmandu where journalists affiliated to the weekly Nepalitimes, the Himal Khabarpatrika and others in Himalmedia were attacked by people who were identified as Maoist members of their restaurant workers union and others related to YCL (again).

As a report by Prashant Jha who writes a weekly column with Nepalitimes and is a consulting editor with Himal Magazine points out, it is not the case that the magazines have covered the Maoists favourably or indeed they have been objective about reporting on issues that are dear to the Maoists. But that is not a "grievance" to be addressed in this manner - violent targetting of the media offices and their journalists. Or is any other greivance enough to justify or legitimise a violent attack. After all, the modus operandi reminds this Indian journalist about the fascist attack by Hindu right wing groups in India - the Shiv Sena attack on Outlook magazine or the NCP goons' attack on Marathi journalists.

Clearly the "birth pangs" for the democratic Maoist party in a liberal polity, have continued. And this is untenable. Hegemonising public space by violence and intimidation will only backfire as the international community will obviously react with disgust and so too would other members of the media fraternity in the fledgling constitutional republic.

This writer, who has been sympathetic and supportive of the Nepali Maoist project in Nepal to achieve an egalitarian, developed and constitutional republic of Nepal, free from exploitation and international meddling, unequivocally condemns the violent attacks on the press, orchestrated by elements affilated to the Maoists.


Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Perennial Misery


How can Bihar end the flood disaster that visits its people year after year?


Submerged railway tracks near Madhepura, 250 km from Patna. (Photo courtesy PTI)

The breaching of embankments in the upstream areas of the Kosi river, in Kusaha village in Nepal, has resulted in yet another round of floods in north Bihar, in the districts of Supaul, Saharsa, Araria, Madhepura, Katihar and Purnia.

The disaster this time is much larger than usual. More than three million people have been affected and a million have been forced to seek higher ground.

The tragedy of floods ravaging this populous area is that the phenomenon is a regular occurrence. This time though, there is now enough information that the Kosi floods could have been avoided if there was coordinated action to prevent the breaching of the embankments. Yet this was not to be.

The Kosi is known to be a dynamic river that carries heavy sediment loads along with its flow. The river has therefore undergone several course changes in its history. The upstream management of embankments in the Kusaha area of Nepal was India’s responsibility (that of the government of Bihar to be specific). If the heavy silt load in the river and its meandering flow gnawing at the embankments had been monitored and acted upon, it would have been possible to prevent the breach that finally took place. Once the embankments were breached, then the Nepal police, fearing a greater inundation of living areas, cut a chasm in the path of the river to redirect the surging waters away from villages in the area. The result was that the Kosi began to flow through older stream-ways that it used to take in the past and this ended up in a flooding of vast tracts in and around north Bihar.

Negligence, lack of coordination between the government of India and Nepal, and sheer laxity of the state government in handling a perennial problem were the proximate causes of the Kosi catastrophe, which has been exacerbated by heavy rain in the region. Hundreds of thousands remain marooned in the area. The loss of property in the 16 affected districts includes destruction of 3,00,000 homes and of a swathe of crop area. Flooding by the Kosi is, at the time of writing (September 5), still under way and there is a danger of an epidemic of water-borne diseases. Quick evacuation, deployment of a larger number of boats for movement to higher ground, provision of relief (including medical supplies and food) and construction of facilities such as temporary homes are priority concerns for a state government that is struggling to cope with the enormity of the disaster. The National Disaster Management Authority should help to expedite relief efforts and coordinate work of the relief agencies along with the army. Yet, considering that the flood situation has been described as a national calamity by prime minister Manmohan Singh, relief efforts by the central and state agencies remain woefully inadequate.

Relief and rehabilitation after a disaster of this magnitude do pose a major challenge to state and society, but what of the future for the Kosi basin and other flood-prone areas of Bihar? The recurrence of the problem suggests that the strategy of controlling the flow of water through artificially constructed embankments and bunds is problematic, simply because their maintenance is too difficult a job to carry out with certainty. Frequent breaches have only made flooding even more disastrous than what the natural process of flooding would have entailed.

Much of the misery that visits the people of north Bihar every year could be mitigated if the strategy of dealing with floods was not merely reliant upon the “hold or break” approach of managing rivers. One school of thought feels it is necessary for the water resources ministry and the disaster management authorities in both the central and state governments to study the issue from a newer perspective that places much more emphasis on strategies such as proper flood plain zoning, retaining the natural drains of the river in its course-ways, constructing flood-proof facilities in the very vulnerable areas and disseminating information about flood management, sanitation, and water usage. In a nutshell, the prescription is for reducing the dependence upon culverts, embankments and other artificial structures to regulate the flow of the rivers through the region and to manage the natural outflows of the water, including by temporary cultivation on the flood plains.

Another school of thought suggests that flood avoidance is incumbent upon building high dams in Nepal to check the flow of the rivers in Bihar. But this remains a difficult task to undertake, for it would mean that Nepal would have to manage large volumes of water in reservoirs which would also be subjected to rapid silting. However, Nepal would be able to receive considerable income if the water in the reservoirs could be used to generate hydropower. The presence of a newly elected democratic government in Nepal should make it much easier for the governments of the two countries to negotiate a solution to the flooding problem.

In the end, disasters such as the floods in Bihar should not be considered as one-off incidents that are forgotten after the floods subside. A comprehensive change in perspective in viewing flood management is necessary to prevent recurrence of this tragedy that the people of Bihar have been experiencing for decades.

Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Monday, August 04, 2008

Setback for the left in Nepal

Article written for The Post, Lahore

Just as the trust vote in India saw dramatic intrigue featuring some dubious moves that ultimately mattered in the result (the government won the vote), the presidential election in post-monarchy Nepal came about with a thrilling climax. There was equal intrigue, deceit and backstabbing, sudden friends and instant enemies made in the presidential elections story, which saw the Maoists outsmarted, just as the leftists in India were unable to stop the nuclear deal’s operationalisation.


The Maoists had won the elections in April but the win was nowhere decisive. This resulted in a situation where the formation of a new government was put off till alliances were created that would ensure a numerical surety for whomsoever who had the majority claim. Initially there were attempts to generate consensus among the seven party alliance for the major executive posts (president, vice-president, prime minister and speaker). That consensus was elusive. The main losing parties in the constituent assembly elections, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified-Marxist-Leninist (UML) – were nowhere willing to partake in a consensual understanding with the Maoists. So after much haggling and drawn out processes of talking between every political party, some kind of understanding was worked out between the two largest leftist forces in the country, the Maoists and the UML. The idea was for the UML to get the post of president while the Maoists would retain the chief executive post of prime minister. It all looked hunky dory at this point of time till the UML announced its preferred choice for president.

Madhav Kumar Nepal is one of the senior-most communist leaders of not only Nepal, but the subcontinent. Coming of age in the Jhapa movement, he had steadily grown in the ranks of the party before eventually becoming the main leader of the UML in the mid- and late 1990s. He had however lost out in the recently held CA elections in both the constituencies where he had been fielded by his party. That in one stroke meant that he had lost moral authority to lead his party and he promptly resigned from the general secretaryship of the UML. Over the past few months since the elections, he had been replaced from the leadership by other leaders such as Jhalanath Khanal and had gradually faded away from the limelight, before the decision by his party to suddenly pitchfork his name for the post of president.

The Maoists were deeply uncomfortable with the idea of Madhav Nepal as the president for many reasons. For starters, they perhaps wanted someone who was not part of the old political guard that dominated Nepali politics in the 1990s and the 2000s; which ruled out Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress and Madhav Nepal for the largely ceremonial post. The Maoists were also keen on pitching a Madhesi face for president, to mark a symbolic break in the history of Nepal with a name from the plains for the highest (if purely ceremonial) constitutional post in the country. They were also thinking of arranging the executive posts (president, vice-president, prime minister and speaker) in a manner that various identities were represented in them; a Madeshi, a person from the hills, a janajati (roughly translating to a tribal identity) and a woman. And this idea was what motivated the Maoists to suggest the name of Sahana Pradhan, a senior UML woman leader for the post of president, but the UML were adamant on getting Madhav Nepal the post.

When the understanding between the UML and the Maoists led to a deadlock, the latter thought it best to propose a new understanding with the largest Madhesi party, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and get a Madhesi face elected as president. And the candidate was Ram Raja Prasad Singh, a veteran and militant republican from the plains. It seemed that the Maoists’ new coup wrought out with the alliance with the MJF would catapult Singh to president, but it was not to be.

The rug was pulled out from the Maoists’ feet by last minute machinations worked out by the NC, UML and surprisingly by the Madhesi parties too, as all these players ganged up and rejected the primary Maoist candidate by putting up Ram Baran Yadav, a veteran Nepali Congress leader from the plains. And the MJF got the vice presidential post nomination, with Parmanand Jha named as the joint candidate of the newly formed front of these parties. In one sweep, two Madhesis were elected president and vice-president and although the Maoists’ idea of ensuring representation of a prominent name from the plains succeeded, the persons finally elected were a “soft” monarchist from the Nepali Congress and a former judge from the plains representing the MJF. Surprisingly, neither of these posts were occupied by anyone closer to the Left, even though the Left parties in Nepal had enjoyed nearly two-thirds majority together in the constituent assembly.

Eventually, the Maoists were checkmated in the plain old game of Kathmandu power politics. They were still determining whether or not to join the government and to take the prime minister’s post, which according to the mandate was rightly theirs. A unity government with Left domination had proven to be a mirage, with the UML and the Maoists unable to get over their differences, much of which were got to do with their leaders’ ego, in this writer’s opinion. The UML was not able to think beyond minor considerations of getting their senior-most leader accorded a ceremonial post, while the Maoists were being too calculating in their approach to get a configuration of executive posts to their liking.

The machinations wrought out by the various parties against the Maoists could be used by the latter to get more support from the people who are already tired with the shenanigans that have accompanied government formation since the elections and declaration of a republic. To get more popular support from the people by pointing out the machinations, would require the Maoists to sit in opposition. But that would mean that the levers that the Maoists would hold in the creation of an egalitarian and progressive constitution will be considerably weakened.

It is a new dilemma for the newly entered force into mainstream polity. The Maoists had a lot at stake while they were entering the mainstream. They had to pacify their radical constituency which had sacrificed a lot in ensuring power for the radical party, whose armed wing was barracked and is still awaiting a decision to either integrate with the armed forces or accept a new “security” role. Criticisms have emanated about their tactics to integrate completely into mainstream polity at the cost of their stated aim to achieve a revolution in Nepal immediately. But so far, the Maoists were consistent in manoeuvring the various political steps to be taken in Kathmandu toward achieving a progressive constitution and toward laying the foundations of a radical democracy, before this new setback that they received. Lack of consensus, primarily with the UML has been the main reason for the setback to not just the Maoists but to the Left in Nepal.

It is high time that the Maoists sat down and had long and elaborate talks with the UML about their vision and the need for unity. Or else all gains made so far in constructing an agenda for genuine change from the discredited parliamentary and unitary system in the newly declared republic will come to nought.

Saturday, July 05, 2008

Nepal Political Diary III

A visit to the Kathmandu valley, the political and cultural centre of Nepal after the constituent assembly elections brings the author in touch with leaders of the major political parties, public intellectuals, and the representatives of commerce and industry. This is the third and final part of the author’s diary of his travels in Nepal during May.

The three team members in front of Darbar Square in the night



As we entered the Kathmandu valley and made our way into the three adjoining cities of Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan, it was abundantly evident that we had reached the political and cultural centre of Nepal. We parked ourselves at a hotel near the historic Darbar Square, close to the tourist district of Thamel, as Prashant Jha, consulting editor of Himal, helped fix our political itinerary of meetings with leading lights of the major political parties, public intellectuals and the representatives of commerce and industry.

Madhesi Concerns

The first of our series of meetings was with Upendra Yadav, chairman of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF). He gave us an overview of the “discrimination” faced by the Madhesis owing to “Pahadi racism”, as he put it. Reeling off statistics about Madhesi under-representation in Nepal’s politico-economic-administrative structure, he made a case for a single autonomous state to be carved out of the Terai region and “self rule” that would help address the concerns of the Madhesis. When reminded that the Tharus and other sections of the inner and outer Terai had reservations about a single Madhes state, Yadav was dismissive; according to him, this was part of a “conspiracy to divide Madhes”. It “was in the Tharus’ interest to have a separate Madhes and they were misled by the Maoists during the elections”, he argued.

On the caste question and the question of radical land reform Yadav was evasive, saying that social and economic transformation was secondary to the ushering in of a truly federal structure. Indeed, he did not believe that the Maoist model of economic redistribution was necessary in the Terai; all that was required was the infusion of investment and scientific inputs in agriculture. Yadav scoffed at the allegation that India had a role to play in stoking the Madhesi identity issue, saying that India had always sided with the Nepali ruling classes of pahadi origins.

Regarding the Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party (TMLP), the other Madhesi outfit that had done quite well in the constituent assembly elections, we were told that the TMLP was dominated by an upper caste leadership in contrast to the backward caste dominated MJF. But clearly, the strong performance of the Madhesi parties had ensured that the issue of identity and representation was going to be high on the agenda of the deliberations in the constituent assembly. The Maoists in particular had a federal model of autonomy that addressed headlong the questions of ethnicity and representation as well as redistribution.

Leading Figure of the CPN(M)

With Dr.Baburam Bhattarai at his residence

In the immediate, what kind of political and economic system did the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)] have in mind for the republic of Nepal? A twohour conversation with Baburam Bhattarai, senior standing committee member of the politburo of the party helped clarify what the Maoists had in mind on the political and economic fronts.

We started our conversation with Bhattarai on the Maoist handling of the identity issue. Bhattarai felt that by taking up the cause of the janajatis and the dalits, the Maoists had won their staunch support, in the process empowering them in the course of the political struggle. On being asked as to why the Madhesi parties had halted the sweep of Maoist forces in many parts of the Terai, he mentioned that the people’s war was concentrated in the hills; it will take the Maoists some time to consolidate their presence in the Terai. The Maoists had articulated the issue of representation for the Madhesis along with radical social and agrarian reform and that was why the underprivileged such as the dalits and the landless had voted for them, even in the Terai. The Madhesi parties were particularly strong in one area of the Terai, Bhojpura, contiguous with the Bhojpuri-speaking parts of Bihar in India, but he was confident of “politically addressing the concerns of these people and winning them over”.

The conversation drifted towards larger questions: the “triangular ordering of the three contending class forces in Nepal, that of the monarchy representing feudalism and the comprador bourgeoisie, the parliamentary parties representing the small and weak (national) bourgeois class, and the revolutionary forces, the proletariat, the semi-proletariat and the poor peasantry, represented by the Maoists”. This “triangular class contention turned into a bipolar one after the initiation and development of the people’s war; the parasitic reactionary classes were polarised on one side, and on the other side were the progressive forces – the bourgeois class represented by the parliamentary parties and working people represented by the Maoists”. The Maoists had always emphasised a combination of mass and military approaches keeping in mind the “balance of (aforementioned) class forces”.

The phase of the people’s war, which entailed sacrifice and led to the loss of many lives, was in hindsight justified as it had achieved the abolition of the monarchy and the breaking of the back of feudalism, Bhattarai asserted. It is but obvious that over time the contradictions between the bourgeois forces and the Maoists are bound to lead to open con- flict; the Maoists were however con fident of handling this through the “continued support of the masses”. As for the masses themselves, their “expectations were huge”. This was one of the “two main challenges” of the present, the other being the “reactionary forces ganging up against Maoist rule” or sabotage of the current peace process, something that was already underway, he cautioned. “Crucial” to the writing of a progressive constitution was the “unity of the left forces” in Nepal, he emphasised.

On the question of development, he said that the primary focus in policymaking would remain “industrial capitalism – development of industrial capitalism – oriented towards socialism”. A pro-people and pro-poor government was necessary to transform underdeveloped Nepal and the Maoists were “studying the experiences of left-led governments in India”, Bhattarai said. Dependence on foreign aid routed through non-governmental organisations was a problem as these bodies were not accountable to the people. The Maoists would regulate the inflow of such aid and carefully route it to relevant areas, he said.


Bhattarai dismissed the demands to disband the Young Communist League (YCL) and expressed surprise that even a left party like the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPN(UML)] had made such a demand. He said that the Maoists were willing to work for a radical constitution through the application of consensus, but at the same time, “would not give up basic issues such as land reform, particularly in the Terai”. He expected that the “coalition of reactionary forces allied with imperialism could hinder the process of writing the new constitution”.

Left Unity: Need of the Hour

Our next meeting was with Shyam Shrestha, former chief editor of Mulyankan, a left monthly magazine with a circulation of around 30,000 copies, and an active proponent of broad left unity. “Civil society” had an important role to play in the anti-monarchy protests and the eventual mass opposition to the emergency (the jan andolan II of April 2006), said Shyam Shrestha, when we met him at his home in Kirtipur, a picturesque suburb in the Kathmandu valley. “Kirtipur was the hub of the pro-democracy protests of 1989 and it was no different in 2006”, Shrestha emphatically mentioned. Along with other civil society activists, Shrestha had helped orchestrate the mass protests against the emergency and worked towards getting the mainstream parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the CPN(UML) together with the Maoists in a united struggle against the monarchy. He gave us an overview of the days leading to the lifting of the emergency and the spontaneous protests and blockades conducted by the people in and around Kathmandu, particularly along the Ring Road and in the blue-collar areas, such as Gongabu.

With Prachanda, the CPN(M) General Secretary

A prominent left intellectual, Shrestha was wary about the Maoists’ intention to foster industrial capitalism with foreign investment, worried that they would eventually follow essentially the same economic policies as the other mainstream political parties. On the criticism that the YCL was using strong-arm tactics, he suggested that this only happened in places where the local Maoist leadership was not “mature”. Above all, Shrestha felt that a broad left unity was the need of the hour in Nepal so that a “radical constitution” can be drafted by the constituent assembly.

Left Unity: Not for Now
With Madhav Kumar Nepal of the CPN(UML)

But even as Shyam Shrestha strikes a chord for left unity, for a leading light of the CPN(UML), former general secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, this seems out of the question. Madhav Nepal is among the senior most communist leaders in the country and had a long tenure as general secretary of the party. In the course of the interview he gave us, he presented an elaborate overview of the left movement in Nepal. The CPN(UML)’s contribution to “people’s multiparty democracy” and their coming to power through the ballot were the party’s major accomplishments, he said. The party’s short-lived government in 1996 had undertaken a series of relief and development measures, enjoying the confidence of the people. However, an unfortunate split in the party had paved the way for the NC to entrench itself in power again; by the time the party reunited, it was too late to capture a majority, he pointed out.

As regards relations with the Maoists, he was committed to left unity in the country, but expressed deep anguish and anger against the activities of the YCL. He emphasised that despite the Maoist leadership’s repeated assurance to control their young cadre, the “cult of violence” unleashed against his party could not be tolerated any more. Support for coordinated action in drafting a new constitution was contingent upon the Maoist leadership containing its YCL cadre and this was the major sticking point in fraternal relations with the CPN(M), he argued. There were differences on the issue of federalism too; the carving of the country into federated regions based on ethnicity alone will not serve any purpose. Socio-political considerations and economic viability should govern any federal restructuring, apart from ethnicity, he said.

As we interacted with the people in the streets, taxi drivers, shopkeepers and others, we found that many who were formerly staunch supporters of the CPN(UML) had gravitated towards the Maoists. Despite positive memories of the short-lived CPN(UML) government in 1996, in the popular imagination, the party seemed to have lost its distinctiveness after having taken a series of vacillating and conciliatory political stands during the course of the people’s war.

Nepali Congress: Next Generation

We also met the spokesperson of the NC, Minendra Rijal. Interestingly, Rijal was critical of the Koirala leadership’s intention to continue in government. Rijal expressed his fears of a communist-led Nepal under the leadership of the Maoists. “We have no intention of letting Nepal become a communist state”, he said. The NC was also opposed to the integration of the People’s Liberation Army with the Nepal army. Rijal’s statements clearly established that sections of the NC, given their inherent antagonism towards the Maoists, were bent on destabilising the consensual peace process.

It was heartening to know that the younger generation of the NC, those who came into prominence during the jan andolan II of April 2006, were staunch republicans. One youth leader of the NC who had helped organise multiple rallies during the April movement and has been a popular campaigner since then was Gagan Thapa. We met him at a restaurant at Darbar Marg. Thapa had been active in student politics before his rise in prominence. He had actively campaigned during the CA elections, but was not given a ticket in the first past the post polls, only to be nominated to the assembly through the proportional representation route.

Gagan Thapa of the Nepali Congress

Thapa analysed the Maoist victory, saying how the areas which were under effective Maoist control during the “people’s war” phase were literally out of bounds for the NC and how the elected representatives from this region had virtually neglected any mass contact with the people. It was no wonder that the Maoists had won over large sections of people who had hitherto voted for the mainstream parties. He was critical of the NC’s senior leaders who vacillated on the demand for a republic by playing “old style conservative politics”. Only a resolution supported by party members who had participated in the 2005 movement could force the leadership to accept the demand for the declaration of a republic as one of the NC’s slogans.

There was a debate within the party whether or not to join the new government. He was frank enough to suggest that many of the old guard in the party were afraid of coming out of government as they were apprehensive that the Maoists would replace them in dispensing “patronage” once they took over the reins of power. The Maoist leadership had the strategic acumen as well as the organisational strength to remain in power for a long time by addressing the precarious living conditions of the people, he felt. He expected the NC to eventually occupy the liberal democratic space in Nepali politics. Gagan Thapa also gave us an insight into the hold of US and Indian diplomats over Nepali polity. He was concerned about international meddling in Nepali affairs during the constitutionmaking phase and asserted that the younger republican members of the NC would strive for a change in leadership and policies in the party. The Nepali Bourgeoisie During our stay, many of the main headlines and first page news in the major national dailies were about meetings between the Maoists and the representatives of commerce and industry. The main refrain was the assurances given by the Maoists about supporting national capital and forging public- private partnerships.

We met Shekhar Golchha, executive director with Golchha organisation, a big private manufacturing and trading company, the largest private employer in Nepal. We asked him about his concerns regarding the coming of a Maoist-led government to power. Golchha said that the end of the people’s war and the return to peace were positive steps. The recent verdict was for peace and he hoped that the Maoists would be able to ensure peace and stability which were necessary for business prosperity. He was under the impression, after talking to a section of the Maoist leadership, that labour-capital relations will be cordial once the Maoists came to power.

He was welcoming of the fact that the focus of the Maoists was to protect “national capital”; he wanted some amount of protection vis-a-vis foreign competition, but was also hoping for foreign investment in select areas, such as power infrastructure. He was also hopeful of expansion of the basket of goods from Nepal enjoying zero customs/import duty status in India. He was not quite appreciative of proposals for free trade and a common market as he was apprehensive of a flooding of the Nepali market with Indian goods, as companies in India had “greater economies of scale”. He also wanted foreign direct investment to be regulated and a preference for joint ventures with the participation of local firms.

Our next meeting was with Sujiv Shakya, a management consultant and president of Tara Management, a managing company handling several diversified businesses in Nepal, including the hydro power sector. Shakya was sceptical of the political processes in place under the leader ship of the Maoists. He was against any form of patronage that was inevitably a feature of Nepali polity. He did not want any form of political interference in any industrial activity and quoted the Indian experience of the last few years (laissez faire economic reforms) to buttress his argument. He particularly wanted labour reforms. The problem of implementation of big industrial projects was precisely due to the fact that it was difficult to underwrite such projects in times of political crisis. When we asked him about his opinion regarding the Maoists’ statements about the “development of industrial capitalism oriented towards socialism”, Shakya was dismissive and said that these moves were only going to encourage “crony capitalism”. We could thus get two views from the “representatives” of capital.

Towards a Vibrant Democracy

A victory poster of the CPN(Maoist)

We now needed to take some time off and so we headed to the landmark places, particularly the Narayanhiti palace occupied by the king and the new venue for the constituent assembly in New Baneswor. We were particularly struck by the proximity of the Narayanhiti palace to the huge compound housing the United States embassy. Every political leader we talked to, every journalist who had inside information about the happenings in diplomatic circles expressed concern about interference by the Americans or the Indians as had happened in the past.

Narayanhiti Palace

We were keen on travelling to the eastern parts too, but due to lack of time as well as a travel blockade in those areas, we had to cut short our visit and return to India. We took an unconventional route to Hethouda on the east-west highway and crossed the border through Birgunj into Bihar.

Red signal to the monarchy

In our 15-day sojourn which ended on May 13, we were witness to history in the making in Nepal. Our meetings with farmers, labourers, guerrillas, industrialists, journalists, politicians, and representatives of the civil society were richly rewarding. Nepal’s transformation into a republic had been facilitated by the coming together of progressives, democrats and communists and because of the peoples’ overwhelming support for such a culmination. It was the collective effort of the long suppressed citizenry that brought the monarchy down.

The talk of diplomatic intrigue and international interference worried us the most. The possibility of sabotage of the process of building a radically new Nepal should not be underestimated as the country is seen by imperialists as a launching pad of destabilisation strategies against its neighbours, even as the latter see Nepal through the lens of competitive geopolitics. There is also the presence of threats from obscurantist forces within Nepal and in India. The historic endeavour of writing a constitution for the federal democratic republic of Nepal and building a self-reliant industrial economy rests on the ability of the polity to maintain the bonhomie and consensus generated in the peace process. The long march to a vibrant democracy in Nepal has just begun.

(End)

Series of articles published in Economic and Political Weekly

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Nepal Political Diary - II

A visit to the hilly areas of the mid-west and the west is an eye-opener to what the Maoists have done to revive the fortunes of the left. This is the second of a three-part diary of the author’s travels in Nepal.

One of the remarkable features about the constituent assembly elections in Nepal was the sheer number of communist parties in the fray and the cumulative gains made by them. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of the “end of history” notwithstanding, the idea of communism is alive and well over here. For observers from outside Nepal, a visit to the hilly areas of the mid-west and the west is an eye-opener to what the Maoists have done to revive the fortunes of the left in today's world. The districts of Rolpa and Rukum in mid-west Nepal are the strongholds of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M)].



In the Dang Valley

We travelled over the east-west highway to the Dang valley from Nepalgunj taking one of the popular modes of transport, the “micro-bus” or the kia (named after the KIA brand). Dang is located in the inner-Terai, sandwiched between the Shivalik and the Mahabharat ranges. The east-west highway criss-crosses the hills between Nepalgunj and the Dang valley; as the bus goes along its path, the beautiful and picturesque landscape is a treat to one’s eyes. Along the roadside, there were wall paintings, murals, and posters calling upon the people to vote for the Maoists. Clearly, we were entering an area which had voted overwhelmingly for the Maoists.



On entering the Dang valley, we travelled to Ghorahi, a town bordering Rolpa district. We started our day in conversation with Hiramani Dukhi, a regional bureau member of the CPN (M) in the Magarat region. He had been involved in organising the janajatis, besides his work as a journalist before the emergency. During the emergency he had taken shelter in India to escape repression. He briefed us about the Magarat region and the reasons why it was considered a stronghold of the Maoists. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the CPN (M) had launched their first attack on an army garrison (in Dang) in this region and had also set up a “base area” over here. Rolpa also had a history of support for communists with some of the earliest communist victories in elections being recorded in this district. The voters had elected the Maoists because they had led the struggle
against the “feudal elements” (absentee landlords in particular). The carving of a “janajati identity-based autonomous region was also welcomed by the people”, he asserted.

PLA Camp
With guards to the PLA camp

We decided to spend some time in the nearby Dang barracks of the PLA. We were guided by two members of the PLA; one of them, Anand was the public relations officer of the battalion. The PLA fighters were ecstatic at the Maoist victory and talked eloquently about the task of building a “naya Nepal”. As we walked through pathways between pine trees and picturesque village houses, the PLA cadre told us about the local natural resource base of the region – “herbs, coal, granite, water, etc which could be harnessed to the benefit of the people”.

The PLA cantonment was elaborately organised. There were about three battalions of the fifth division in the cantonment and each battalion was sub-divided into a few brigades. The entry to the battalion camp was marked by elaborate insignia of the “communist pantheon”: pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. Make-shift tents for residence and offices dotted the hilly cantonment. Women constituted 30 percent of the soldiers in the camp. Even as we entered, a group of women were being interviewed by the local press.

We interviewed some of the PLA cadre, including women. Melina was a section commander had participated in the Dang barrack attacks in 2001. We asked her as to whether she sees a future for women as senior commanders in the unified Nepal army under Maoist rule and she promptly answered that it was this dream that motivated her to join the PLA itself. She emphasised that women in the PLA were on par with their male counterparts and there were many who had risen to the ranks of battalion commanders.

Nirman, a 22 year old health worker in the PLA, trained in para-medics and well-versed in the treatment of wounds and internal injuries, had performed a key role in the battalion. A keen poet, he had been given a “cultural award” for his poetry. On being asked about his future role, Nirman was clear that he would play his part in rural healthcare.

We were taken on a tour of the battalion quarters. Most PLA cadre in the camp understood that they would have to play paramilitary roles or even roles in the development sector once the new republic was formed. They had regular political education classes, scheduled early in the day, apart from physical training. From our interaction, it was clear that from the leaders to the ordinary cadre, all of them were imbued with proletarian consciousness. They were living spartan lives but did not quite begrudge their paltry allowances from the government.

In Rolpa

We took their leave the next morning and returned to Ghorahi, from where we set out on an arduous bus ride to Dahaban, site of the PLA divisional headquarters. Dahaban was high in the hills and there was only a recently constructed kuccha (unpaved) road for our vehicle to ply on. Driving up the hills was one bumpy experience, and yet, the buses had made life easier for the hill dwellers who used the service to transport essential items instead of using mules as they did not long ago. Plying the bus across the treacherously sloping road was a difficult experience and hence the buses ran their services (both to and fro) only in the mornings. After a bumpy, dusty and scary ride, we made it to Dahaban. All along the way, wherever there were bunches of households, we could see Maoist insignia on the walls. We were now in what use to be one of the main “base areas” in the people's war.

Dahaban was part of Rolpa-II, the constituency where Prachanda, the general secretary of the party, had won by a huge margin. Here we met two senior vice commanders, Bibek and Avinash, from the strategically important fifth division of the PLA. The fifth division was one of the most important strategic units of the PLA, having participated in several pitched battles both with the police and the army. We asked them about the prospects of integration with the Nepali army. We also asked them to elaborate on the promise of security sector reforms in the CPN (M)’s manifesto, where the Maoists had promised “professionalization” of the PLA and “democratisation” of the Nepali army. The Nepali army's democratisation was a must, as it was an army subordinate to feudal forces and it had to be restructured to serve the people. Integration with the Nepali army was bound to problematic in a few areas – for instance, in the new division of labour when the two armies are integrated, in the totally different political consciousness of the two armies, and on the question of maintaining only a compact army instead of the current bloated numbers, they said. What was encouraging for the commanders was the fact that many members of the Nepali army (25 percent, we were told) had voted for the Maoists in the proportional representation based elections held in the army to the constituent assembly.

Vice commander of the PLA, Bibek and Nabina, battalion commander
After our interactions with the two senior commanders of the PLA, we met battalion commander Nabina who had been in the PLA for 8 years, having lost her first husband in one of the military operations. She was now married to a member of the cultural troupe of the Maoists. She related her experiences, her elevation in the ranks in the PLA to become a battalion commander. We were then given a tour of the headquarters where we came upon a sub-camp of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) where arms and ammunition belonging to the Maoists had been locked up. Bibek mentioned that the keys were with the PLA commanders and “in any expediency, the weapons could be taken out”.

Up in the Hills

Our next stop was Tila, further up the hills in Rolpa district, close to where the Maoists had set up a hospital, a cooperative bank and also a model commune. Tila is right up in the hills and is connected to Dahaban by a long and winding stretch of kuchcha road, built by the Maoists and appropriately designated “Shahid path” (martyr's road).

View of "Shahid Path"

Our first meeting in Tila was with Rajan, the chief political activist of the Maoists in the area. The very same day, he was in negotiations with transport operators for reducing the fares for travelling on the road built by the Maoists. He gave us an overview of the work done by the Maoists in their base area up here. Over the last year, in keeping with the 12 point agreement, the Maoists had to return the land appropriated from absentee landowners and distributed among the peasants, and had to wind up their parallel justice institutions, he said, but “they were still sought after to adjudicate on issues at the local level”. Apart from the road which was built by mobilising the PLA as well as ordinary village folk, the Maoists had also made provisions for drinking water by drawing it upstream. It was such “selfless work” that won the Maoists huge support, he asserted.

Dalit Lohar family in Tila

We could sense the support enjoyed by the Maoists as we went around the village. The Magar community and the dalits had voted for the Maoists. The dalits had been at the worst end of repression during the days of the emergency, one family recounted to us. They now expected the Maoists to make life better for them, but were clear that only by “education and hard work” could their situation improve. Many youth from the village had spent some time working in India, particularly in Chandigarh.

Terrace farming in the hills in Tila, Rolpa

The land in Tila was fragmented, reflecting the patterns of ownership in the hills of Nepal. Brahmin and Chettri families owned most of the land. Absentee landownership was abolished by the Maoists, who had snatched such land and distributed it among the peasantry. But the 12 point agreement signed in 2005 had forced them to return this land back to some of the big landowners. The support base for the Maoists in the village ranged from shopkeepers to small peasants and dalits, in essence, a multi-class alliance. The royalty was scorned upon and everyone whom we met in the village was a republican.

Back to Ghorahi

Minister Krishna Prasad Mahara in a public meeting

We returned back to Ghorahi in the Dang valley after spending a day in Tila, where fortuitously we met the national information and broadcasting minister and central committee member, Krishna Bahadur Mahara who had been visiting villages close by to thank voters for electing him. Women, village elders and youngsters were listening with rapt attention to what the minister was telling them about the future goals of the Maoists. We had a quick conversation with the minister at the end of the meeting. Mahara singled out the identity issue and “people's high immediate expectations” to be the major challenges. Over the Madhesi question, he was confident that they “would go to the people, and take them along”, a refrain we heard from every senior Maoist leader on this trip. Will the CPN (M) pursue policies a la the West Bengal government, i e, encouraging private investment in industry while pursuing land reform? “Maybe”, Mahara said, even as he went on to emphasise the unique structural features of Nepal's economy.

One of the major features of Nepal's topography is the east-west highway. The arterial road travels the entire breadth of Nepal. It practically criss-crosses the entire Terai, strategically positioned a few kilometres away from its main cities. Traversing the east-west highway, one gets a glimpse of the natural beauty endowed in the many foothills of Nepal.

In the Terai Again

Butwal, a four hour drive away from Ghorahi, lies in the Awadhi speaking area of the Terai and is close to Lumbini, the birthplace of Gautam Buddha. Upon enquiring about the election verdict there, we gathered that every major party, the CPN (Maoist), the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [UML] and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) had won at least a seat each in the seven seats in the region surrounding Butwal and Bhairahawa. This clearly showed that in the plains, where the population was ethnically more diverse, there had been a mixed verdict. A journalist we met explained that the Maoists had won in areas where there were substantial rural and working class populations. But, their support base that came from the multi-class alliance forged in the hills was not quite there in the plains. The NC and UML could barely retain their support of yore, losing out to the Madhesi parties who had received a groundswell of support on the identity issue.

River on the way to Kathmandu

Armed with an understanding of the support base of the main political parties in the hills and the plains, we now made our way to Kathmandu. The capital was buzzing with political activity; practically all the elected representatives to the constituent assembly had gathered. We were distracted by the breathtaking splendour of the Narayani river flowing parallel to our course of the journey.

Article written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Monday, June 16, 2008

Nepal Political Diary -I


What are the reasons for the Maoist victory in the constitutional assembly elections in Nepal? What motivated the Nepali people to vote for such a decisive change? Having voted for the Maoists in such large numbers, endorsing their vision of a “naya Nepal”, what are the hopes and aspirations of the Nepali people? What are the main structural features of this most underdeveloped country in the world? To find out, the author, along with three friends, travelled through the hills and plains of Nepal over a fortnight in April-May after the CA elections. This is the first of a three-part diary of the visit.



Nepal is in the midst of a political revolution. After years of rule by the anachronistic institution of monarchy, a jan andolan in 1990-91 resulting in legal political parties, elections, and a parliament within the framework of constitutional monarchy, more than a decade long people's war, a second jan andolan and the restoration of parliament with the Maoists on board, the constituent assembly (CA) elections held recently marked a distinct break with the past, soon to usher in a republic [Nepal was declared a republic by the CA on May 28] and promising a “new Nepal”. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)'s [CPN(M)’s] emphatic victory in the CA elections marked a historic first: the election of an avowedly Maoist party to power, (soon to be) at the helm of a coalition government.



It is in these interesting times in Nepal when the country’s future is being crafted that I was motivated to commence a fortnight long visit to the hinterlands and urban areas of Nepal. I wanted to unravel the reasons for the Maoist victory, learn about what motivated the Nepali people to vote for such a decisive change, and be educated about the structural features of one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world. In hindsight after my return, all of these quests have been fulfilled and I bring back the immense hopes shared by the citizens of this new republic in the making, their aspirations for a truly sovereign, self-sustainable, just and respectable life for themselves.

This writer was accompanied by friends, Aparajay, Caesar Basu and Moggallan Bharti who were research scholars at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). All of us shared one common understanding: alleviation of the plight of the teeming masses of the third world is possible only by concerted people's agency and the experience of Nepal corroborated this view. We decided to travel the width of Nepal from west to east and follow the path of learning by interacting with the people first and their leaders/representatives later in Kathmandu and craft a political diary wrought out of these experiences.



Owing to reasons of logistics, we entered Nepal through different routes. While my friends from the JNU decided to enter Nepal from the west through Mahendranagar and reach Nepalgunj, I ventured to enter Nepal through the Rupaidiha border post in Uttar Pradesh leading to Nepalgunj, on April 28. From Rupaidiha, I used a cycle rickshaw to enter Nepalgunj through the main Surkhet road which seemed to be the arterial road in the town. My first impressions were that Nepalgunj was like any other town in India. On the trip in the rickshaw to the hotel, there were three chowks. Each of these had a statue right in the middle of the road; the first one was that of BP Koirala, the second was that of Pushpa Lal Shrestha (a prominent communist leader of the past) and the third one was a mere podium. A little asking and I was told that the king's statue had been broken off the podium during the days of the emergency. It was a nice introduction to the republic-in-the-making. Nepalgunj was home to four CA constituencies, two of which were won by the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and the rest were won by the Maoists.

The first of a series of meetings with various individuals was with a civil society representative and advocate, Shalikram Sapkota. From the look of the posters stuck on the walls of his office, one could gather that he was close to and somehow associated with the Maoists. Two posters dated in the early 2000s pointed out starkly that the Indian army's meddling in Nepal must be resisted. He explained that he had been a civil society activist against the royalty since the days of the emergency and had also been incarcerated and tortured by the police during the time. He was currently pleading a case for a bank manager, involving bad loans to rich individuals who had siphoned off the money and for which the bank employee was being blamed. The fact that both the bank manager and the advocate were supporters of the Maoists was important to me, as it explained that there indeed was a multi-class backing for the leftists.

Shalikram then led me to meet up with Narayan Jung 'Peter', a regional bureau member of the Maoists in Nepalgunj. Peter was having a talk with a Madhesi (dwellers of the Terai) activist, before we joined the conversation. The first question I asked Peter was how were they going to manage the Madhesi identity issue (Nepalgunj was very much part of the Terai) and implement radical economic reform (land reform, in particular) when the Madhesi elite has been elected in such large numbers through the MJF in the Terai? Peter asserted that political and other forms of representation for the Madhesi identities was ab initio a Maoist demand and that they were glad that this would be coming to fruition even if the leadership of many of the Madhesis in the constituent assembly were from the MJF and the Terai Madhesi Loktantrik Party (TMLP). He however was not forthcoming about the reform question and was also quite defensive about the clashes with Madhesi parties in the past (including in Nepalgunj), saying that there were some mistakes committed. Sensing that Peter perhaps was giving too many diplomatic answers on the Madhesi issue (due to the presence of the activist), I asked for a separate meeting the next day and he agreed to the same.



I then interacted with a member of the UN mission in Nepalgunj, Anuraj Jha. Anuraj had a degree in conflict management and had been deployed as a United Nations monitor during the elections (the roads in Nepalgunj were dotted with United National Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and aid agency vehicles, suggesting the substantial presence of international organisations). The first question to him was about the reports of intimidation and malpractices by the Maoists during the elections. Anuraj however refused to accept that this was the primary reason for the Maoists' victory, saying that the sheer electoral dominance of the Maoists across the breadth of Nepal meant that there were other factors at play. The electoral strategy of alliances with different sections of the population, the reach of the electoral campaign machinery and the wide support of the poorest for the Maoists were the significant reasons for their victory, he emphasised. At the same time, he did not foresee the Maoists implementing “radical” policies and was convinced that they were sufficiently contained by the electoral process and by the game of power sharing in the mainstream polity. Anuraj himself had been touched by the experience of witnessing poverty in the remote areas during the few chopper trips he had made and was not surprised by the electoral result.

Confident Maoists

A free flowing conversation with Peter followed the next day, where he suggested in no uncertain terms that the Madhesi issue was being raked up by provocateurs from India and that the major challenge for the Maoists when in power would be the issue of federalism. He mentioned that it was not true that the Maoists did not enjoy support in the Terai, as a significant number of people in the mid-west (to which Nepalgunj belonged), including dalits and landless labourers had voted for the Maoists. The MJF's claim of a single Madhes federal state constituted of plain areas adjoining India (ek Madhes ek Prades) was not feasible as the tharu community preferred their own sub-federal unit as did others in the east. He also asserted that the Maoists will mobilise Madhesis not just on the basis of ethnic identity, but as communists and convince them on the necessity of a left ruled naya (new) Nepal. Peter's answers to every question were long drawn and drew a lot from history. When I suggested that the identity issue would be a hindrance to them in attempting radical land reform in the Madhesi areas, he emphatically said that such challenges were but to be expected and that the Maoists were committed to address them from within the system of multi-party democracy and federal republicanism. Peter asserted that the Maoists had seen bigger challenges during the people’s war and that their ideological commitment to multi-party democracy had evolved from a wide ranging discussion among themselves about the failures of other communist movements across the world. The Maoists therefore were better prepared to develop the correct praxis for the 21st century and would capably handle the identity issue by presenting their agenda to the people and mobilising them based on sound political consciousness, he said.

Madhesi Angst

After wrapping up my conversation with Peter, I sought to meet the local MJF leadership in the region. The MJF had won 2 out of the 4 seats in the area and one of the winners was Sarvadev Ojha, a former bureaucrat. On being asked about the agenda of the MJF, Ojha pointed out the disparity between the people of pahadi and madhesi origins. From politics to bureaucracy, the army and other institutions, madhesi representation was much lower in comparison to the overweening influence of people of pahadi origins, he said. It was therefore necessary to constitute a separate federal unit for the “long suffering” madhesis and hence the demand for a single Madhes, an autonomous state in a federal Nepal. To the question as to what kind of autonomous state and federal system was being demanded by the MJF, Ojha replied that the party had studied three different federal systems, the Swiss, US and the Indian models. They decided to demand a model on the lines of US federalism with external relations and defence as the only areas under central jurisdiction.

When asked as to how different their conception of autonomy was from that of Maoists, Ojha went on a tirade against communism and emphasised that the MJF wanted a liberal model of governance. On the question of welfare and land reform, Ojha was non-committal. Land reform was “not necessary”; the development of agriculture through scientific means and through investment was sufficient, he argued. He said that the MJF will not accept anything less than a “single autonomous unit for the Madhesis” and dismissed the Maoist claim that significant sections of people within the Terai (such as the tharus) were opposed to the MJF's version of federalism.

It was quite clear that the confrontation between the MJF and the Maoists in the constituent assembly will be on the appropriate model of federalism, and on the question of land refrom. It would require a complicated struggle to win over sections among Madhesis to implement basic land reform measures, let alone “land to the tiller”, considering that the MJF represented the interests of the big landowners.

Mainstream Parties Sidelined

As I strolled around the streets of Nepalgunj, one thing was palpably clear. The underclass and blue collar working sections of the city had more or less voted for the Maoists. From rickshaw pullers to street vendors, the Maobadi triumph was the common refrain. The striking aspect of this refrain was the enormous expectations of the Maoists by these people. Voters from these sections clearly had aspirations of education for their children, jobs that provide a decent living, and dignity. They had voted for decisive change as they were unimpressed with the mainstream parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [UML]. How was it that the NC, an established party that had virtually decided the course of Nepali democracy and had acted as a stabilising and guiding force, performed so poorly in these areas? This was the question that I had to put to the NC leadership in Nepalgunj.

The NC office was right adjacent to the branch office of the Nepali Chambers of Commerce in Nepalgunj. Krishna Man Shrestha was their district chief, but I got to talk more to other local leaders of the party at the party office. A senior leader of the party in Nepalgunj explained, in flawless English, the reasons for the NC's defeat. They were indeed defeated, but their role as the “premier” party in Nepal will not change, he emphasised. When prodded to explain the reasons for their local defeat, he mentioned that the Maoists had used extra-legal means and that the choice of candidates by the NC was incorrect. I asked about the NC's stance on the monarchy and the leader was evasive, as were others in the office. They emphasised that they merely wanted a ceremonial role for the monarch similar to the position held by the Indian president, but were non-committal about the future role of the discredited king. It was obvious that this pro-king stance of theirs had gone against them at the hustings. The NC would also ensure that no section is discriminated against in the new constitution. When asked as to how they would counter the radical policies of the Maoists and leftists (the UML), the leaders mentioned that the NC itself was a “democratic socialist” party but would want to manage industry-labour and landowner-land tiller relations rather than take sides. Sensing that the leader's answers betrayed a reformist, conservative orientation, one of the party members sitting close by asserted that the NC was also part of militant struggles for democracy in the past and its legacy as a party for democracy would endure no matter who was the ruling party in Nepal. It was a fair comment that underlined the seeping in of democratic consciousness among Nepal's political parties even at the local level.

No “left” love lost

The next stop was at the UML party office. This party was touted as the winner in the elections, but did poorly, coming third. I met a losing candidate, Shamsuddin Siddiqui, at the party's sprawling office (it was the most posh of all the party offices in the town). I expected Siddiqui to be optimistic of a leftist consolidation of power in Nepal and my first question was related to this. Siddiqui on the contrary turned out to be the most virulent critic of the Maoists among all political figures whom I met in Nepalgunj. He went on and on about the “unruly lumpens” of the Young Communist League (YCL) and how the election victory was “robbed” by the Maoists. He had nothing but scorn for the Maoists and ruled out any understanding between the UML and the Maoists. As regards local level politics in Nepalgunj, he affirmed that the loss that he had suffered was due to extra-legal tactics used by the Maoists and unscrupulous campaigning by the Madhesi parties. He rejected both the Maoist and the Madhesi version of federalism suggesting that the Maoists were playing identity politics despite being leftists and that it was impossible to accept the one Madhes demand, for there was nothing much in common between groups such as the Muslims in Nepalgunj and other plains dwellers, say in Birgunj. There was such bitterness in the UML leaders in Nepalgunj that it was indeed going to be difficult for any leftist consolidation in the country, I surmised.

Roaming Around Nepalgunj

On the streets of Nepalgunj, it is difficult to find many motorised vehicles and any kind of efficient public transport. Indian currency, as in other parts of Nepal, is used widely and the shopkeepers could instantly convert any amount of Nepali currency into Indian rupees and vice versa. Despite being part of the Terai, Nepalgunj was home to a diverse population with significant numbers of Muslims, tharus and other national minorities. Symbols of royalty were seen only on the currency notes; even better off hotels and restaurants were not displaying any kind of royal insignia (either of the deceased former monarch or the current one).

In the meantime, my friends had arrived after an arduous journey through Mahendranagar in the far west. Mid-way through their bus trip, they were asked to board another vehicle, because the bus operators felt that there were not many people to make the trip viable. From somewhere in the far-west region to Nepalgunj, they had to travel in a make-shift transport vehicle, with goats for company. What struck them about the far-west region alongside the east-west highway (an arterial highway built by the Indian government that connects the western and eastern parts of Nepal and runs parallel to the Terai region) was the stark nature of underdevelopment in these areas. We had read somewhere that the major political strongholds of the Maoists were in the hilly western areas of Nepal and here is where we needed to understand the reasons for the entrenched support that the CPN(M) enjoyed, as well as the yearnings of the citizens of these areas. Our next stop was in Rolpa district, considered to be the strongest support base of the Maoists, and where most of the major advances in the people’s war took place. Rolpa was also where the Maoists had built parallel institutions in “base areas” high in the hills.

Nepalgunj was an unremarkable town, and we did not particularly get a feel of being in a different nation. It was only after venturing outside Nepalgunj, into the inner Terai, and from there, to the heights of the hilly villages of Rolpa did we sense a new experience of the Nepal we had set out to see: hilly, beautiful, rugged and bristling with hope of change.

(To be continued)