End of a Civil War

The LTTE might be vanquished, but the grievances of the Tamil community remain. 

The death of Vellupillai Prabhakaran signals the end of the civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For nearly three decades since its formation, the LTTE had relentlessly pursued its aim of achieving a separate state (Eelam) to be carved out of the northern and eastern areas of Sri Lanka. In the course of its single minded drive to achieve "Eelam", the organisation ruthlessly decimated other militant organisations and voices among the Tamils – many of whom were willing to accept autonomy or federal rights for the Tamils. But by accepting no compromises and by continuing to use tactics such as assassination of perceived "enemies of the cause" and violent retribution, the LTTE brought about its own doom. 

Despite a systematic shelling and bombing campaign that killed or incapacitated thousands of civilians, the Sri Lankan army did not receive anything more than token disapproval or humanitarian appeals from the international community. The Sri Lankan government's ruthless drive to vanquish the "terrorist" LTTE were never halted in the final phase of war by an international community tired of "terror" – a stigma that the LTTE carried for its past actions. The LTTE's own cynical moves to use Tamil civilians as a shield, a fact that was brushed aside by the organisation's propagandists, only alienated them even further in the eyes of the international arbiters such as the United Nations or India. The events leading up to the end of the battle – with the Sri Lankan army's capture of the last remaining areas of the Vanni region under LTTE control, and the killing of the outfit’s senior representatives and leaders – are murky. Questions remain about the way the LTTE leader and founder, Prabhakaran, his family members and the organisation’s political representatives were killed and war crimes by the Sri Lankan army cannot be ruled out. But the general lack of sympathy for the vanquished among the international community is itself a consequence of the LTTE's intransigence in its ways and means. 

Thousands of Tamil civilians now live in "appalling conditions"– as the visiting UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon called them – in internment camps after displacement because of the war. Despite claims by the Lankan government about commitment to "early resettlement", its actions in restricting access to these camps by humanitarian agencies and its callous treatment of the displaced people in the camps in the name of security do not inspire confidence. These actions in tandem with the triumphalism displayed by the Sri Lankan polity would only make one more sceptical about the Lankan government's claims of bringing about a democratic solution to the problems of the Tamil minority after the defeat of the "terrorist" LTTE. A lasting peace after the defeat of the LTTE would remain a chimera if the Sri Lankan polity refuses to acknowledge the plight of the displaced Vanni residents or indeed of the genuine grievances of the Tamil community. 

The LTTE's inflexibility and rejection of any compromise, say a federal solution to the conflict, its dwindling legitimacy internationally and the internal split, with the defection of erstwhile eastern commander, Vinayagamurthy Muralidharan, were ultimately responsible for its defeat. Several moments capture the cynical single-mindedness of the LTTE. It rejected an offer from the ex-president Chandrika Kumaratunga, which provided powers of devolution even greater than what the Thirteenth Amendment in 1987 (that provided for provincial councils) envisaged. After a ceasefire agreement in 2002, the LTTE signalled a willingness to discuss a federal solution, but backed out of peace talks for no valid reason. It also engaged in violent acts in violation of the agreement (something which the Lankan government was also guilty of). It even called for a boycott of elections by the Tamils, an action that helped hardliner Mahinda Rajapaksa become the president of the country with the support of other Sinhala chauvinist parties and thus resulted later in the recently concluded violent phase of the civil war. 

The intractable positions taken by the LTTE were partly due to the enthusiastic material and arms support that the organisation received through funding and donations from the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora over the years. After the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York, the LTTE, which had been proscribed in 32 nations, found its material support drying up because of tough actions against its sympathisers in many countries where tolerance for support to "terror" outfits became negligible.

Among the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and in the vast diaspora of Sri Lankan Tamils, there is a deep sense of despondency following the defeat of the LTTE. Many of the latter’s sympathisers are still in denial about the death of the LTTE leader. These sympathisers should introspect about the reasons for the bloody end to the war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Far from realising the aspirations of the minority Tamils who aimed for self-rule, the LTTE's actions have only resulted in a traumatised Tamil population disaffected both by the "Eelam cause" and with the government ruling from Colombo. 

There remains no excuse now for the Sri Lankan government to avoid addressing the grievances of the Tamils now that the LTTE is vanquished. Anything short of a federal setup that promises political rights for the oppressed Tamil population would only lead to a further festering of the deep wounds from years of marginalisation and alienation of the Tamils. In the provision of relief to the displaced Tamils and in their re-settlement, the international community, through its various humanitarian agencies, must play an important role. Also, the international community must be vigilant and should pressurise the Sri Lankan government to fulfil its promises to arrive at a political solution to the conflict that takes account of its root causes. In the absence of this, the seeds would be sown for another radical organisation – one that would have learnt from the past mistakes of the LTTE – espousing complete separation. 

Draft of an Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Death of a cause

Vellupillai Prabhakaran is dead and officially dead. 

The sequence of events that led to his and his family's death were never relayed coherently by the Sri Lankan government's agencies. That led to widespread suspicion about "cold blooded murder" and others. Adding intrigue was the LTTE's international head suggesting that his leader was alive and well. So what really happened? 

DBS Jeyaraj presents a story on the sequence of events that ultimately led to the LTTE's downfall. It is the best coherent account that I have read so far and it confirms a lot of my own suspicions about what must have transpired. 

I have no sympathy for the LTTE's virulent and megalomaniac leader who led "his" people to the humanitarian catastrophe that was triggered in this round of conflict in the long civil war that has continued with patches of peace for nearly 30 years. He is ultimately responsible for the gory death that he and his followers were subjected to and for the loss of limbs and lives due to the shelling and "hostaging" that the Lankan government and the LTTE respectively indulged in. 

Having said that, the Sri Lankan government's actions in the final waning days of the battle can only be seen as "war crimes", cloaked in the dubious paradigm of "war on terror". It is just that the LTTE indulged in terrorism, in indiscriminate violence and stymied any course correction in the past, that prevents me from outrightly condemning the Lankan government's actions in annihilating the LTTE's leadership.

One only hopes that the supporters of the LTTE come out of denial (of their leaders' and their "Eelam" cause's death) and utilise the sympathy for the suffering of their people in Lanka to bring about a viable political solution. 

For the much traumatised and physically assaulted Sri Lankan Tamil populace, the end of the war is a relief, even as their travails due to displacement, starvation, malnutrition, handicapping, alienation, and other suffering, continues. The Sri Lankan government has to use its legitimate state authority to alleviate most of these through humanitarian relief in co-ordination with the international community. And it has to use it's polity's triumph to bring in much needed structural changes in its nation-state set-up. That has to be the international community's prerogative as well - to turn in some screws and push in some envelopes for a better culmination - atleast a federal rights set-up for the Tamils. 

Anything less and the stage is set for another round of ethno-nationalist mobilisation - this time a newer form of an LTTE that learns from its mistakes in the past but is even more virulent in its single minded determination to attain a Tamil nation of its own. And that means more violence and more suffering. Please, oh Please for the sake of humanity, No!

A decisive mandate

The United Progressive Alliance manages to win emphatically in the 15^th Lok Sabha elections despite losing many of its coalition parties before the polls. Yet another spell of years in opposition awaits the Bharatiya Janata Party, while the left suffers its worst defeat in many years.

Belying expectations of a fragmented verdict, the mandate of the 15th Lok Sabha elections has been decisive in favour of the Congress party led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The alliance has managed to win 261 seats, with the Congress itself winning 206 seats, its best tally since the 1991 elections when the party had won 244 seats. A mix of local state-level factors and a preference for the UPA alliance nationally can be seen as responsible for the victory, from initial observations. The UPA managed the win defeating not only the Left anchored "Third Front- TF" coalition of regional parties and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) emphatically, but despite the breaking away of several partners (who formed the Fourth front -FF) from the alliance before elections. 

The UPA alliance won the most number of seats in 17 out of 29 (including the National Capital Territory of Delhi) states. Excepting the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa, the performance of the regional and left parties in the Third Front ranged from underwhelming to disastrous. The NDA won overwhelmingly in Bihar, Karnataka and Chattisgarh but was defeated in many a major state by the UPA in direct fights.

Mix of factors for UPA victory

The Congress, in its manifesto as well as during its campaigning emphasised the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Bharat Nirman programme and other social and welfare measures, not to mention th

e farmer loan waiver scheme. From the indications available, this has elicited a favourable response, which has played out well in different states, irrespective of whether the Congress party (or the UPA) has been in power. Also, minorities have voted for the UPA enthusiastically, explaining the wins for the Congress party and its allies in states such as West Bengal, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. The performance of the party in states such as Gujarat - the Congress won 43% of the vote as compared to the 39% it garnered in the 2007 assembly elections– and in Madhya Pradesh – 40% as compared to 32% in the assembly elections in 2008) suggests the resonance of its national agenda.

The broad geographical distribution of mandate for the UPA points toward an undercurrent favouring the Congress party in general, but local issues have also mattered significantly. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, the implementation of populist and welfare measures by the state government has meant that the alliance has bee

n victorious for a second consecutive Lok Sabha election. The state assembly elections' results has given a majority mandate for the Congress party.

In the left ruled states, high-handedness in administration, the unpopular industrialisation and subsequent land acquisition drive, and the unity of the opposition in West Bengal, and the perception of inadequate levels of governance by the state government and factionalism in the ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Kerala has 

helped the UPA. In Tamil Nadu, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has done particularly well, on the might of its populist schemes while the incidents in northern Sri Lanka have complicated the verdict – resulting in some losses to senior Congress candidates.

The presence of the Maharashtra Navanirman Sena has dented the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance and helped the UPA in Maharashtra, while the "honeymoon period" enjoyed by the Congress governments in Rajasthan and Delhi has meant big wins for the party. In Uttarakhand and Punjab, the Congress has managed to defeat the ruling BJP and Shiromani Akali Dal(SAD)-BJP alliance (possibly facing anti-incumbency) respectively, garnering the majority of the votes.

The Congress party's decision to go it alone in Uttar Pradesh after being unable to arrive at a seat-sharing understanding with the Samajwadi Party has also paid unexpected dividends. The Congress party has garnered 21 seats (vote share of 18%)-

 its highest tally for years in the state. While the reasons for this astounding performance would be clearer only after a closer and detailed look at the vote shares in the state, the underwhelming performance of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) suggests a shift of some of its targeted social base - particularly the upper castes and the Muslims - to the Congress Party. Overall, the Congress party managed to increase its vote share from 26.4% in 2004 to 28.5% in 2009 and a seat increase from 145 to 206.

State wise Seats Tally

(source: Election Commission Web Site)

The BJP thwarted again

The BJP tried to focus on “national security” as its core issue and attempted to make the elections a referendum between personalities pitting its prime ministerial candidate L.K.Advani against the UPA leadership and prime minister Manmohan Singh. The NDA since 2004 had shrunk and the BJP was left only with the Janata Dal- United (JDU), the Shiv Sena the SAD and other minor parties as its allies. The erstwhile NDA allies - the Telugu Desam Party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) had all left the NDA citing the communal politics of the BJP. This had made the NDA's prospects dimmer even before the elections and expectedly, the NDA managed a tally of only 159 seats, way behind in second place to the UPA. The BJP's overall tally was reduced to 116 (18.8%) from 138 (22.2%) in 2004. Both the defection of erstwhile partners as well as the reduction in the party's overall vote share is indicative of the lesser resonance of the party's communal Hindutva agenda, which came again to the fore in the run up to the elections.

The BJP managed to win with reduced margins in its strongholds such as Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, but won handsomely in Chattisgarh and Karnataka. The performance of the JDU was most significant as Lalu Prasad's Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Ram Vilas Paswan's Lok Janshakti Party were trounced badly. It is too early however to suggest that the politics and efficacy of caste alliances in the state has been overcome, as many claim to be the reason for the JDU-BJP alliance which pitched its state government's “development record” as the agenda for the elections.

The Left's worst performance in years

The “third front” - an assorted set of regional parties, and anchored by the Left Front (LF) performed dismally. Though the BJD shrugged off its alliance with the BJP and managed to win the majority of seats both in the Assembly as well as in the Lok Sabha elections in Orissa and the AIADMK managed to improve its tally (from zero previously) in Tamil Nadu, the defeat of the left parties in Kerala, West Bengal and the underwhelming performance of the BSP dragged the TF's tally down. The TF contested directly against the Congress and its allies in most of the states where the front was “viable”.

In West Bengal, the left suffered a historic defeat, polling much fewer votes than in the 2006 Assembly elections and wilting against the united opposition of the Congress and the Trinamul Congress. Reduced to merely 15 seats (43.3%) from a previous tally of 35 (50.7%), the left's loss could be attributed much to its state government's series of policy and governance disasters since 2006 as the opposition fought the elections considering it as a referendum against the long standing Left Front government. Issues such as the land acquisition for industrialisation, high handedness of the administration, minority angst after the Sachar committee findings are the discernible reasons, apart from the fact that the idea of a “third front” did not really appeal to voters. The Lok Sabha election results point to a possible defeat of the left front for the first time in 35 years in the upcoming assembly elections in 2011.

Infighting in the left and governance issues resulted in a UPA victory which was also bolstered by minority support in Kerala. The BSP was not able to replicate its 2007 assembly election performance managing a reduced vote tally, suggesting the non-realisation of the “wider castes and minority support” that the party hoped to garner.

Overall, the idea of the “third front” - an amorphous alliance of motley regional and left parties without a common agenda beyond an anti-Congress, anti-BJP position, was rejected in general by the voters.

Conclusions

The increased tally of the UPA despite the division in “secular votes” because of the presence of the “third front” and the improved performance in the Congress even in BJP strongholds are pointers toward a good conjuncture of local and national issues favouring the UPA. The UPA contested the elections on its national record of initiating programmes such as the NREGA and other social and welfare measures and pitched its state governments' populist record. The BJP failed to inspire confidence in its national security and personality based platform among the electorate, while the alliance of convenience that forged the third front did not materialise in any gains for the parties in it.

Article (Commentary) written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The UPA triumphs

In what was anticipated to an extent by exit polls (and was not believed by some -including me), the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) has managed to win a near majority with the Congress emerging as the single largest party in the 15th Lok Sabha elections. The Congress has nearly won or is leading in 200 seats and the UPA is short of the majority by merely 10-15 seats. 

The victory of the Congress has been particularly helped by strong performances in the states where their primary fight was against the so called "Third Front". In West Bengal and Kerala in particular, the Congress was able to notch a very impressive victory in alliance with the Trinamul Congress and other parties of the UDF respectively. 

The results in West Bengal in particular must be shocking to the Left Front, as this is the lowest tally that the LF has won in a parliamentary election in 40 years. As I am writing this, the tally is near-abouts 15-16 seats, much lower than the 35 the LF won last time and atleast 7-10 seats lower than what was expected to be the seat tally of the ruling front in West Bengal. The bad showing could have been expected from the reverses suffered by the LF in the panchayati and local body elections. But the extent of the losses was something quite un-anticipated. A serious introspection will now be in place in the Left to identify the reasons. The incidents in Nandigram and Singur have surely had a bearing but accentuating this has been a near strong wave of support for the Congress throughout the country. 

The National Election Survey of the CSDS will bring out empirical findings that will establish the reasons for the Congress victory. But my tentative assumptions are the following - a) the Congress' emphasis on its "social" achievements - particularly the National Rural Employee Guarantee Act and how it played out in the states where it was in power and wasn't, and b) the gravitation of minorities and weaker sections toward the party, particularly in states such as Uttar Pradesh where the Congress was marginalised by regional parties overtime. 

Personally, I am upset by the fact that the Left has lost its position as a pivot for articulating concerns of the weaker sections in the parliamenat as it's ability to maneover the numbers on issues is lost in the current configuration as desired by the democratic mandate. While for many who have favoured unbridled and greater emphasis on "reforms" including easier financial flows, privatisation, greater liberalisation,  and even labour reforms, this is music to their ears. The stock market will react favourably and enthusiastically. The upper middle classes, particularly who have not endorsed the "hard" right wing communalism espoused by the BJP will remain enthused. 

But my concern is for those who have lost their jobs and social securities because of the insecurities of the recession environment, or those whose jobs and livelihoods have been affected by contractualisation. If the Congress interprets its victory which was enabled because of its emphasis on welfare measures rather than a plan for more "economic reforms" as a mandate for the kind of economic reforms that the more opulent section of the masses favour, then it will be wrong and undemocratic for it to do so. And I say this even as I am humbled by the verdict vis-a-vis some of my projections (in the earlier post for e.g. in Tamil Nadu). 

The UPA should live upto its self chosen moniker - "Progressive" and not favour monopolisation or cartels or select lobbies of big capital. It has to protect ordinary livelihoods and keep its emphasis on welfare and increasing the purchasing power of the general populace and creating a demand driven growth. It remains to be seen how the Congress party would be able to manage its inclinations to honour the mandate versus the urge to satisfy the purse strings that it is beholden to or is close with. 

As for the BJP, while its loss has not been tremendous in terms of seats (as I write this ..the party's tally seems to have come down by around 10),it is amply clear that the people of India have rejected communalism significantly again. It remains to be seen how the RSS reacts to this consecutive loss of the BJP and as to how its remaining alliance partners such as the Nitish Kumar led JD(U) (who seems to have performed very well winning or leading in nearly 33/40) will want to continue to be associated with the BJP. But those are questions for later. I would want to savour the loss of an increasingly Hindutva spewing and unrepentant BJP whose mascots such as Narendra Modi have still shown no remorse for the gruesome incidents in Gujarat. And I end on a good note with that!

Tamil Nadu exit poll projections.

CNN-IBN and NDTV have come up with interesting theories following their exit polls from the state. The former suggests that there is a strong possibility of a sweep for the DMK led front, while the latter suggests that the swing away from the DMK led front has been garnered more by the DMDK than by the AIADMK led front and thats why the DMK led front will still come out on top. 

V.Venkatesan at Law and Other Things suggests a reason for such a culmination, which for me is surprising. Because every news report from Tamil Nadu tells me that the case is quite in favour of the AIADMK led front vis-a-vis the DMK led front. His theory is that the state voters in TN prefer to reflect their choice differently in national elections than in state elections. And since the AIADMK led front this time did not consist of a big national party in its alliance in contrast to the DMK led front containing the Congress, the vote share of the latter is predicted to be higher. I differ in this assessment qualitatively. 

First of all, the trend for victories has been attributed more to the "conglomeration of alliances" rather than allying with the national party alone. If I remember correctly, the AIADMK was in alliance, not just with the BJP but also with other smaller parties in the state (PMK, MDMK, JP, TRC then) in 1998.  

In 1999, the shift of the PMK and MDMK brought votes to the other alliance (this time the BJP, the DMK, the MDMK and the PMK). Later in the 2001 assembly elections, the front forged by AIADMK along with virtually the entire set of small parties except for the BJP which was in the DMK led front. And the AIADMK swept the polls then. 

Only for this to reverse, cometh 2004 (Lok Sabha), as the both the fronts switched parties again, with the BJP now supporting the AIADMK and all other smaller parties part of the DMK led front, resulting in a greater vote share for the DMK led front. 

Again there has been a switch in 2006 in the assembly elections, but what added intrigue was the presence of the DMDK, complicated things making the DMK only the single largest party with the Congress supporting from outside. 

The presence of the DMDK has meant that the switch of the smaller parties to either front comes with a lesser transfer of vote share to the core votes of the big parties (AIADMK or the DMK). That could explain a smaller transfer of votes (or swing) this time around and the possibility of a sweep is not going to be there in the direction of the "larger" front as has been before except for the 2006 Assembly elections. 

In essence, I don't quite agree with the conclusions of a sweep in the favour of the DMK+. Even if voters have been swayed by the Sri Lankan incidents, the vote should have been the other way around - to the AIADMK led front as the CPI, the PMK and the MDMK were the biggest mobilisers on the issue and the Congress was seen to be inactive vis-a-vis the issue.

So, there is a contradiction in the CNN-IBN's findings, I presume, which explicitly mentions a pro-LTTE position across the state (I doubt if it is indeed a pro-LTTE position in itself- its more likely a pro-Sri Lankan Tamil position). Plus I have serious issues with both the methodology and the % vote share to seat conversion methods used by both channels. But thats for another post. 

Anwyays, there are merely 7 more hours for the tallies to be started and I could have egg on my face. I am sticking my neck out and still predicting a 24-15 margin in favour of the AIADMK+. Lets see.

On the crisis in Nepal

A crisis has been precipitated in the republic of Nepal. The prime minister Pushpa Kumar "Prachanda" Dahal of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has resigned, following presidential actions rejecting a cabinet decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff, Rukmangad Katuwal from his post. Earlier, the government was reduced to a minority after withdrawal of support from the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). This article will strive to comment on the developments and put things in perspective. 

The Peace accord between various political actors in Nepal in 2005 paved the way for the transformation of the country into a republic. The integration of the Maoists within the political mainstream was the most important step in this culmination, as it were the Maoists who had concretely addressed the demand for the formation of a new republic with a new Constitution to go along with it. Other parties, inevitably fell in line judging the public and civic mood and the currency of the demand. Following this was constituent assembly elections, where the Maoists emerged as the single largest party and eventually after the declaration of a republic, a coalition government involving all major actors except the Nepal Congress was formed. 

Complex Issues

Two of the issues that were seen to be the most complex in the run-up to the writing of the Constitution were the integration of the Maoist armed cadre into the Nepali Army and the resolution of the federal question with all the major actors having varying positions on these issues. Having said that, vis-a-vis the former, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Nepal government and the Maoists in 2006 laid the scope for control over the Nepali army and on the integration of the Maoist combatants (of the People's Liberation Army - PLA) within the Nepali army (Article 5.1 and sections). A special committee has already been given the task of going about this process, which is still on. Yet Rukmangad Katuwal, seen as a loyal supporter of the erstwhile monarchy, decided to violate this agreement (Article 5.12) by going on for recruitment into the Nepali army, unilaterally extending the tenure of senior army officials and also withdrawing the Nepali army's participation from the National Games because of the PLA's participation. 

Civilian supremacy over the army is a sine qua non in all democracies and the blatant violation of the CPA was not surely going to be condoned by the Maoist led government. The government therefore sought Katuwal's explanation, and his response was that of defiance. Added to these incidents were rumours of a soft coup in the making, engineered by the Army. The government therefore decided to terminate Katuwal's posting, an action that was opposed to by the opposition NC which possibly sees the defiant army chief as a power centre stolidly opposed to the Maoists. As does, the Indian establishment, which sees a formal balance of power that keeps the Maoists in check necessary to continue its hegemony in Nepali affairs and to blunt any growing proximity between the Nepali nation and China strategically.

Unconstitutional actions

Questions have been raised by some commentators as to whether the Maoists acted in the manner that could be construed as"extreme". Prominent Indian analyst on Nepal affairs S.D.Muni, while calling into question the Chief of Army staff's actions, in the same breath suggests that the Maoists' action of removing the CoAS is "extreme". He writes that the CoAS's actions were in violation of the CPA and the civilian government was within its rights to demand an explanation from Katuwal for his actions. But, he stops at that and suggests that the Maoists were immature in removing the CoAS. This writer finds such an argument untenable. For the smooth transition of the infant republic into a Constitutional democracy, feudal remnants such as Katuwal had to be removed, as threats such as "soft coups" and other dangers were imminent and harmful. 

Even more problematic was the Nepali president Ram Baran Yadav's decision to overturn the cabinet's decision to remove the CoAS. The correct constitutional position for the president to take was to reply back to the cabinet to re-think the decision, but the actions by Yadav smacks of yet another violation of correct parliamentary procedure.

The UML

The UML found the action to remove the CoAS as non-consensual and has even suggested that the president's actions were necessitated. This writer finds the UML's positions egregious. For one, Katuwal has been in the habit of asserting the Nepali army's "independence" from civilian control, thereby showing no regard to the concept of civilian supremacy over the army. This reminds one of the just overthrown era of monarchy where the army was subordinate only to the royalty and not to the elected civilian government. For the infant republic the continuation of such feudal remnants was untenable and therefore the action by the Maoist led Government cabinet to remove Katuwal from his post was democratic and true to republican ethos. As an analogy one could point out the US head of state whenever elected to power has the prerogative to remove the Army Chief of Staff. 

The UML by not acquiescing to this decision was acting in a sectarian and juvenile manner. One can ask a question as to whose interest the UML was representing when it decided to withdraw support to the government over the issue of removal of the CoAS. The further moves by the UML to try to form a government with the Nepali Congress (strictly on the basis of an anti-Maoist position) and to endorse the president's actions make it amply clear that the UML has lost the plot completely. 

A counter argument could be made that the Maoist, in the name of left unity, could have tried to build a consensus with the UML before the removal of the CoAS. But this argument seems petty because the removal of the CoAS` was a matter of principle, and required no coaxing of the UML to achieve it. It is evident that the UML had other considerations in mind. Was the party pressurised by Indian authorities to go ahead with their folly? Atleast that is what is being alleged by some sections of the Maoists. 

One of the chief grouses that the UML had with the Maoist was that the latter was unable to control and stop the high-handedness exhibited by its youth organisation, the YCL. The YCL has been repeatedly accused and rightly so, of intimidation, violence against UML cadre. This was seen by UML leaders such as senior communist Madhav Kumar Nepal as one of the biggest roadblocks for left unity. To a certain extent these grievances were legitimate. But the action to withdraw support to the Maoist led government when the easiest thing to do for an avowed left party was to act on principle suggests that this action by the UML was cynical and lame.

Indian role

Coming back to the Indian role in this whole issue: the Indian ambassador's moves to pressurise the Nepali polity to retain Katuwal was a blatant expression of interference in Nepali affairs. Any self respecting Nepali, let alone a Maoist or any other leftist politician would have bristled at this interference, which however is part of a long legacy of intrusion in Nepali affairs. No wonder, the Maoists have openly accused the Indian bureaucrats of playing a meddlesome role. For this Indian, the Indian ambassador's actions are even more galling because the Indian establishment had played a positive role in the culmination of Nepal into a republic from a highly unpopular and illegitimate monarchy. 

Is this latest trend of negative influence- direct meddling, scheming with other political parties to push the Maoists into a corner and thereby endangering the peace agreement as well as the constitutional building process,related to the fact that India wants to retain its levers of influence? In other words the current Indian establishment is uncomfortable with the Maoists' stated intent of asserting a sovereign and a truly independent domestic and foreign policy. While, on the other hand during the time when the Left Front supported the Indian government the stated intent was not to meddle with the Nepali polity but to maintain healthy relations with whichever political dispensation which was in power.

This writer after his visit to Nepal just after the constituent assembly elections had warned that a derailment of the republican process of constitutional building and overcoming of some challenges such as the Army-PLA integration could be possible because bad habits such as treating Nepal as part of a geopolitical game between neighboring powers were still in place in the strategic calculuses of India and China. This fear seems to not have been misplaced.

It is imperative that the unconstitutional move of the Nepali president has to be overturned. The independent civil society in Nepal has reacted to the president's moves by demanding a judicial decision on the actions, both by the Nepali president as well as by the CoAS. Prominent civil society activists including Shyam Shrestha, Devender Raj Pandey and Krishna Pahadi who were involved in the anti-monarchy protests in Kathmandu in 2005, have now been arrested for protesting against the president's actions. This suggests that the Maoists have gained sympathy of independent and republican voices in the country. 

What needs to be done

By resigning from government on moral grounds, the Maoists made a gesture that has been appreciated by several sections of the Nepali populace. Even though the performance of the Maoist led government in various spheres of governance has been below expectations, the many challenges before the writing of the Constitution were being whittled down one by one, before the series of actions by Katuwal. 

The Maoists have to realise that the building of the constitution and the regaining of the momentum for the same is an imperative that cannot be foregone. By mobilising public opinion against the actions of the president, the army chief, the erstwhile coaliton partner UML, the Maoists can achieve an overturning of the unconstitutional actions by the chief executive as also convince the other prominent left party, the UML to fall in line on the path of propreity and left unity. The onus is on the UML to take a stance regarding this. Otherwise the party, with its recent history of poor political posturing and incorrect decisions, would be on the path to self-destruction, by having lost its leftist moorings and by opening the possibility of a rupture in its ranks. 

A massive show of public antipathy toward Indian (or for that matter Chinese or American) interference in Nepali political affairs should be re-assuring for the polity to adopt sovereignty and independence as guiding principles as partners in the republican polity and also act as a bulwark against continued meddling of the sort that transpired over the issue of the army chief's removal. In India too, the Indian people and intelligentsia should caution against debilitating actions of the kind that the Indian ambassador indulged in and the Indian establishment must be forced to let the Nepali polity take its own course of actions. Nepal can be a vital conduit for trade between India and China and a cordial relationship with the newly growing up republic is in the best interests of both ordinary Nepalis and ordinary Indians, especially living close to the borders of the country. It makes no sense for the Indian establishment to act in cahoots with feudal remnants in Nepal giving an ostensible reason of "stability". The examples of military over-reach in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the preponderance of the Sri Lankan army in Sri Lanka is enough to caution the Indian state from endorsing a similar denouement in Nepal. And that too, when the popular mood in the country is for a federal democratic republic and where a social revolution is being played out democratically.

Tragedy in the Vanni

Tragedy in the Vanni

The Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government push the Tamils of the Vanni to a fate worse than death.

Scores of dead civilians, many limbless survivors, starving and homeless people, makeshift hospitals that have been bombed and “human shields”. These are the images from the military confrontation between the Sri Lankan army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Vanni region in the north-east of the island. The Sri Lankan government’s campaign to destroy the LTTE has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that was foretold when the military solution was initiated two years ago. The government, however, shows no let-up since it is sensing victory as the LTTE is now confined to a patch of 10 square kilometres adjoining the Indian Ocean. Until earlier this week, the Sri Lankan army was shelling and bombing the territory, while the LTTE used the civilian population as a shield against the military onslaught. Nearly 2,00,000 people have fled the area and are being kept in internment camps in shabby conditions while tens of thousands are hostages in the small area under LTTE control.

Both sides to the conflict, intractable in their military aims, have remained impervious to the human tragedy they have scripted. The LTTE refuses to give up and apart from issuing one unilateral ceasefire declaration earlier this week, which was rejected by the Lankan army, it continues to use the people it professes to fight for as fodder in its military resistance. Despite appeals from the international community, the Sri Lankan government too shows no indication of halting the military campaign to ensure safety of the civilians. The government has been emboldened by the euphoric support it has received from the Sinhala populace and from the Sinhala polity’s refusal to consider any course apart from military action to resolve the ethnic conflict.

The conflict now looms over the Lok Sabha elections in Tamil Nadu as well. The Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has suddenly declared its support for an independent “Eelam” and in response, the Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (briefly) went on an “indefinite” hunger strike to demand cessation of hostilities in the island. Eelam, until now restricted to the fringe political sections of the state’s polity, has become an election issue. The government of India responded to the clamour in Tamil Nadu for intervention in Sri Lanka by sending its national security advisor and foreign secretary to Colombo and calling for a truce, but it is evident that the Indian response is not intended to go beyond tokenism. New Delhi perceives the conflict in Sri Lanka from a competitive geopolitical perspective as China is a big supplier of weapons and ammunition to the Sri Lankan government and Beijing is unwilling to pressure the Lankan government to stop its military campaign.

The efforts by the Sri Lankan government to paint the ethnic conflict as a “war on terror” have paid off because of the increasing global animus to all forms of “terror” since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. There had been a crackdown on overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting the Tamil diaspora and this has helped the Sri Lankan government isolate the rebel group and move to the verge of a military victory. The Sri Lankan government led by its president Mahinda Rajapaksa has managed to withstand criticism of its actions by promising a simultaneous political solution to the conflict involving other Tamil representatives, but this too is tokenism as no genuine effort towards a federal devolution seems to be in the offing. The tired tactic of co-option of a few ex-Tamil militants, and the adoption of draconian measures to curb any criticism of the government’s military approach in the media, civil society and the polity belie the promises made by Rajapaksa.

It is evident that a bloodbath is going to happen if the Lankan army continues on its course of wanting to obliterate the LTTE. Will a physically and emotionally traumatised Tamil citizenry really trust a government that promises an undefined political solution after its military victory? The current antipathy in the Sinhala polity towards a federal solution tells the Tamils what is in store after a Sri Lankan army victory. As for the LTTE, its strategy of dragging the remaining thousands of Tamil civilians in their area of control to mutilation and death is genocide of its own kind. It is evident that the LTTE top leadership will continue with its resistance because it fears trials for its past actions such as assassinations and indiscriminate attacks on civilian institutions. But if the LTTE wants to live up to its claim of acting on behalf of the Tamil people of the island, surrender is the only way to prevent more casualties in the Vanni. It would then be up to the international community to drive a just bargain for the Tamils if the Sri Lankan government fails to live up to its words.

Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The Lankan conflict – as is; and the way out

The civil war in Sri Lanka is drawing to a bloody closure, with the rout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) imminent. The LTTE is holed up in a small area on a beachfront adjoining the Indian Ocean. The outfit's leader is still believed to be dissolved among the thousands of residents boxed in the area. A sea of Tamils had just fled the area (called ironically the "No Fire zone") and left to the safety of "internment camps" in Sri Lankan Army (SLA) controlled territory. The LTTE remains defiant despite the impossible odds it faces while the SLA sensing and smelling victory has kept at the effort disregarding the consequences of the final bloodbath. Even as I was writing this, the LTTE declared an unilateral ceasefire, keeping in mind the humanitarian crisis in the area.

Journalists have been kept away from the Vanni and other regions of north Sri Lanka for long now, and one is therefore forced to sift through the coloured reports from the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry releases and the pro-LTTE Tamilnet to get an idea of what is really going on. While the former portrays the sequence of events as if they are engaged in a "liberation" battle, points to nearly every civilian casualty as a result of LTTE hitting the very people it is claiming to represent and using them as human shields, the latter portrays the war as genocide, suggesting that the SLA is targeting the citizenry deliberately and killing them in droves. The truth lies somewhere in between. Yes, its cliched, but that is how it is. 

The truth

Rohini Hensman writes this piece based on a visit to Colombo. She suggests that there is truth in the fact that the LTTE is cynically and rabidly using the Tamil casualties as a prop to pressurise the "international community" to force the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to call a ceasefire. She also writes that the SLA is retaliating at LTTE fire from behind the civilians and shelling at LTTE positions within civilian areas, unmindful of the consequences. In some ways, this was expected. I wrote this editorial when the conflict was taking a turn for the worse, in humanitarian terms. Independent journalist DBS Jeyaraj has been cautioning about the humanitarian catastrophe for some months now. 

What in essence is happening is that the GoSL understands that it has the upper hand not only in the military battle as it has gone on till now, but also in the soft power status across the world because of the changed international reckoning vis-a-vis the "war against terror". And hence the SLA is marching on its way to a military end to the conflict, knowing fully that the "collateral damage" is only expected, and can be managed diplomatically. The LTTE on the other hand, knows that it is militarily over-matched and the only recourse it has is to change the perception of civil war in the international community to "genocide" and no wonder the diaspora and the pro-LTTE media on the internet is desperately trying to proffer this message with tragic imagery of the conflict. The consequences of this portrayal is that ironically, both the sides have only strengthened their resolve to go through the same motions, rather than trying to minimise casualties or work out a work-around. 

The high degree of polarisation of opinion has only strengthened the ethnic differences that already exist. The GoSL apart from the war, is also becoming a illiberal, draconian regime punishing any kind of dissent, attacking the media, and maintaining illicit contractors who do the dirty job of pulverising and muscling any voice of dissidence with the war effort in the capital and beyond. Witness, the murder of prominent journalist Lasantha Wickrematunga, who had questioned the war strategies of the GoSL, to get a feel of this. For all the talk of a simultaneous political devolution of powers to the Tamil minority, and thus exploring a political solution to the "ethnic" issue while engaging in the military defeat of the LTTE, the progress on this front is negligible. The GoSL is essentially adopting a good cop, bad cop routine, with the former playing out in the statements and gestures made by president Mahinda Rajapakse such as the offer of talks with the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance leaders for e.g. The bad cop routine is diligently acted out by the president's uncouth brother, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, the defence minister who is tasked with the unpleasant duties of handling any oppositional voice against the war efforts. The GoSL has also successfully co-opted former militants such as ex-LTTE commander, Vinayagamurthy "Karuna" Muralitharan and the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party leader Douglas Devananda, both of whom are now ministers in the cabinet. These leaders might have made the jump from being leaders articulating "Tamil independence" and a "free Eelam" to now asking for a united Sri Lanka that has been rid of "fascists" of the LTTE. But it is anybody's guess, whether they have any legitimate support of the Tamil people. These former militants had done the same despicable things and engaged in the same terror acts that the GoSL has traditionally called the LTTE for. 

Broadly, there has not been much resonance for a federal solution to the conflict (after the military defeat of the LTTE), as the Sinhalese polity is pretty much prey to communalism and a sense of majoritarianism. Very little of progressivism and indeed liberal attitudes vis-a-vis the Tamil minority issue is left in the Sinhala polity, as the opposition United National Party (UNP) is opportunist, the "leftist" Janata Vimukthi Peramuna is plainly Sinhala chauvinist and the communal (Buddhist!) Jathika Hela Urumaya's policies and outlook is rabidly Sinhala supremacist. So, any expectations of a honourable political solution to the long suffering Tamil minority in the country is belied by the state of affairs as it exists now. Even a provincial delimitation of the north and the east in Sri Lanka is turning out to be a difficult proposition considering the positions of the broad Lankan polity.

India & Tamil Nadu

What of the international community? Lets start with India first. Any tremors in the northern part of Sri Lanka have always had mini-tsunami effects in the state of Tamil Nadu. But what about now? The last year or so, since the latest phase of civil war erupted, much grandstanding on Tamil solidarity has taken place in the state involving the various political actors. A supporter of the Eelam cause at one point of time, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) now takes a position that is pretty much the same as the Congress' even though now and then, the chief minister and DMK supremo M.Karunanidhi waxes poetic about his friendship with Vellupillai Prabhakaran (accused No 1 in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case). While the DMK's current position is quite politically correct - they are concerned about the humanitarian tragedy that has engulfed the Sri Lankan Tamil population and they blame the LTTE equally for the travails of the people - how it arrived at such a position is altogether different proposition. That the current positioning is related to the fact that the DMK is dependent on Congress support for the survival of its government is quite understandable considering the trajectory of the DMK's positions on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. The main opposition party the AIADMK's positions are even more interesting. The party , a historical baiter of the LTTE or of the "Eelam cause" itself, now wants a separate Eelam! That the change in positions of the both these "Dravidian" parties has got little to do with the ground situation in Lanka but more to do with their perceptions of political expediency is apparent. 

Much of the support base for the LTTE, admittedly "fringe", as S.V.Rajadurai points out in this letter, ( alternately hosted here) is engulfed in the same language of Tamil nationalism as articulated by the Dravidian parties in the 1960s. "Tamil nationalism" is a good slogan to arouse sentiments. The Dravidian parties (the DMK & ADMK) have less use for this now, for they are well integrated in the power set up both in the centre and in the state, their regional bourgeoisie and rural elite base's interests being well helped out by the parties' involvement in power structures at the centre for about 2 decades now. Yet, even in a fast urbanising Tamil Nadu, there are various sections which have grievances that have remained unfulfilled in the "silent revolution" orchestrated by the Dravidian parties. The political forces that represent these sections, such as the party purporting to represent the Vanniyars, the Pattali Makkal Katchi of S. Ramadoss or the one claiming to represent the Dalits, the Viduthalai Siruthaigal Katchi, have taken recourse to that lingua franca of "protecting Tamil" and "Tamil interests". Yet, these two parties are in opposite fronts, for the instrumentality of being relevant in the electoral arena overcomes their unity on the Eelam issue. And there is the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of firebrand speaker Vaiko, who sees his diminishing fortunes as a leader of a fading outfit, having only one crutch to stand on - uncompromising support to the Eelam cause. 

The Left in Tamil Nadu has different positions as well. The CPI has suddenly discovered a rallying point for its fortunes in the state and they were the first to articulate opposition to the war situation in Lanka. They have scrupulously avoided taking a pro-LTTE stance, but that does not mean that they wouldn't rent and share their platforms to LTTE apologist Pazha Nedumaran or the pro-LTTE parties. The CPI(M) has consistently advocated a federal solution to the Lankan issue, have always denounced the LTTE and the military solution, but somewhere among the cacophony of voices and the gaggle of alliance building, the party's position remains unheard. 

All said, the events in the Vanni has indeed evoked a response from the Tamil people in India, but that response has found itself mired in the grotesque polity that is Tamil Nadu's today. The Indian government has reacted to this gaggle of voices from TN's polity in its own measure - keeping away from the affairs of Sri Lanka understandably but providing tacit support to the cause of defeating the LTTE. Then there is also the geopolitical factor that looms over the issue. 

China & India

Much of the arms,ammunition and military hardware that the GoSL has used against its own people and its civil war adversaries have been sourced from China. It need not be reiterated that the foreign policy of the Chinese is driven by its own "pragmatic" calculations, be it its relative silence on the unjust occupation of Iraq, or in its closeness with such regimes as in Myanmar and many others in Africa. It is the same "pragmatic" calculation that drives its policy of helping the GoSL with generous arms supply, and that certainly tilted the military balance in the SLA's favour, no doubt. The Indian reaction has been a mix of "realist" alarm and "realist" angst (check Indian Home Minister P.Chidambaram's statement on the issue).

India's meddling in the northern parts of Sri Lanka has had a deleterious effect on the conflict, as was played out in the disastrous Indian Peace Keeping Force intervention or in the earlier covert training provided to the various rebel outfits. Since Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by the LTTE, the Indian establishment has understandably taken a hands-off approach vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, which had paid some dividends – good relations with the country and lessening the complications a bit in the conflict. But that doesn't mean that the bad habits of the earlier “Indian supremacy in the sub-continent” endorsers have been wiped off.

Check this from an ex-secret service officer - look at the advocacy (Point No 10 in article) for further mischief in Sri Lanka not because of genuine solidarity to the much suffering Tamil populace, but for the domination of Indian interests in the sub continent. For these elements, the China factor is alarming; it confirms their suspicion that China is engaged in a "string of pearls" strategy to engulf India and their reaction has to be cut from the same "pragmatist/realist" fold.  

International Community

The rest of the international community has took to this issue with more rigour than in the near past. Since the international animus to all forms of terror was substantiated after the 9/11 events, there had been a crackdown of overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting Tamil diaspora. That was the first bugle that sounded the death-knell of the LTTE.

Today, the large turn out of protesters among the Tamil diaspora in New York, London, Ottawa and elsewhere, many of them distraught with the slaughter of their brethren has indeed touch a chord. The UN security council in an informal session condemned the LTTE's actions and asked for the organisation to lay down arms, and in the same breath asked for the GoSL to stop the conflict that has resulted in this humanitarian catastrophe. An informal session of the UN asked for the LTTE to disarm itself and for the Sri Lankan government to address the catastrophe with the highest priority.

The gist of this write up so far is that domestically and internationally, the stress on political expediency or on “pragmatism” and realism has meant that the humanitarian crisis in the Vanni region goes on unabated with the main protagonists – the LTTE and the SLA going about their ways with impunity. Caught in the crossfire, the Tamil people of the Vanni have been either slaughtered or have been rendered limbless, homeless and much traumatised.

What is to be done?

What does this writer think is needed to be done? Domestically, the GoSL must stress an non-military end to the conflict, even if it has the upper hand, simply to avoid a major human bloodbath of remaining citizenry in the area. And the government should stop its nonsensical rhetoric of “war on terror” which has drawn a loose and very visible veil over the real ethnic problem. A very simple question can be asked that will call the Lankan bluff on the issue. Does its Lankan Army have a single Tamil officer of note fighting against the LTTE? The answer is a plain no. And that affirmatively means that this is indeed a civil war involving two ethnicities. And therefore the primary issue of a deepening ethnic divide and a long un-addressed issue of minority rights, federal powers has to be the first basis of concern. Which cannot be addressed right-away if the essence is on a “muzzle the dissent”, “crush the opposition no matter what” approach. A ceasefire and an ordered disarming of the LTTE is still feasible if the government decides to do that when it is still ahead of the military game. This should follow a massive humanitarian operation to provide shelter, medical aid to the traumatised residents of the Vanni and a plan to quickly resettle the inhabitants in their original domiciles following an armistice with the LTTE.

As for the LTTE, its bluff was already called by its many a disastrous course of action. Years of acts of terror orchestrated by its megalomaniac leader, and reliance on methods that do not have any legitimate currency in a world that is tired of “terror” have ensured that the organisation is now irrelevant to the present and the future of the Tamils if it continues to exist as it does today. That doesn't mean that the acres of support that the organisation enjoys among the diaspora who have been still peeved by the injustices of the past will wither away suddenly. The LTTE has to now, utilise that support to first address the humanitarian issue in the Vanni, and next go in for a political solution that involves other Tamil representatives. It can possibly do that, by accepting an armistice and disarming itself rather than keep the quixotic fight and driving more of the Tamil citizenry to starvation and doom. The LTTE's more sinister leaders such as Prabhakaran and intelligence chief Pottu Amman can then be tried under international law for their many actions considering their surrenders sympathetically. The culmination of such a trajectory of actions is possible if the diaspora acts responsibly, in solidarity with their suffering brethren.

Other Tamil leaders who have been antagonistic to the LTTE can press for the GoSL to go about this humanely and to politically address the federal solution. International pressure can be used to bring about this culmination as well. India should play a lead role in this in dialogue with UNSC P-5. Unlike other nations, Sri Lanka has nary a strategic value for imperialism to play a debilitating role over here. India and China can open a channel of talks and play a more positive role with the already involved set of international actors such as Norway and Japan to bring this possibility of a lasting federal solution. And the position on a federal solution has to be well laid domestically within Tamil Nadu, defeating any irredentist tendency. Fortunately, the bulk of public opinion in Tamil Nadu is still rooted in such a solution, rather than any support for the Eelam cause.

Progressivism in the 21st century has to consider solutions to various complications such as “ethnic divide” and “irredentism” through means that are not arms and weapon-dependent. There remains no currency in struggles that are based exclusively on the demands of the barrel of guns, ostensibly acting for the demands of humanity and terming it battles for “self-determination” or “unity of the nation”. “Liberation through war” and “peace through war” are both oxymorons. It is high time that the LTTE and the GoSL realise this. The LTTE in this respect can learn some lessons from the Nepali Maoists for e.g and the GoSL from the Indian example of federalism as it came out in the 1950s and 60s.

Anarchic Somalia's piracy problem

The anarchic situation in Somalia has resulted in sea piracy seen as a legitimised enterprise among its coastal citizenry

Ever since the collapse of the central government led by Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, the nation of Somalia in east Africa has been subjected to lawlessness and anarchy that has ripped the nation and its society apart. The phenomenon of sea piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in coastal regions of the country is related to this breakdown as well as other factors.

The Gulf of Aden is a busy trade route for various international ships, and pirates have seized upon the traffic here to earn money through hijacking and winning ransoms or by looting ships that carry food grains or livestock. The modus operandi for pirates across the Somalian coast involves groups of armed men disembarking from “mother ships” on speed boats and taking hostages of crew members of other ships in the vicinity. Incidences of piracy in 2008 was particularly high, as big tankers such as the Saudi ship Sirius Star, or large arms carriers such as the Ukrainian Faina were hijacked. The pirates have shown increasing sophistication in their actions – through the use of global positioning systems, satellite communications, military hardware and other know-how.

The sudden surge in the incidence of piracy nearby the Somalian coast resulted in an unanimous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in December 2008 authorising nations to cooperate in their fight against piracy and to deploy naval vessels and military aircraft to interdict vessels engaged in piracy. The UNSC authorised the entry by nations' ships into Somalian territorial waters to punish those engaged in piracy activities when needed. Such an express approval for action, saw a relative decline in successful hijackings of vessels in the region, but the dramatic hijacking of an American vessel followed by an US navy rescue operation has brought back focus on the issue.

The basic rationale for the acts of piracy has been pinned down to the lucrative returns from hijacking – an estimate suggests income from piracy is higher than the entire GDP of the autonomous region of Puntland in north-eastern Somalia, where piracy is most rampant. The sophistication and brazen-ness of the actions are seen as possible only because of the lack of a central authority in control over law and order in the Somalian nation. The perennial civil war since 1991 has seen multiple authorities; warlords have controlled the capital at various times, there has been an invasion by Ethiopian armed forces and the internationally recognised transitional federal government in Somalia has been unable to establish any semblance of rule. The absence of any central rule has resulted in a complete deterioration in the economy and in the livelihoods of the already impoverished nation.

The lack of a central authority governing Somalia has also meant that the nation's coast has been used as a dumping ground of toxic waste and a source of uncontrolled fishing by international corporations with impunity. Reports and even the United Nations Environment Programme have pointed out that tonnes of toxic waste have accumulated in the Somalian coast, a process that was exacerbated by the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004. Fishing trawlers operated by European firms have systematically emptied the fishing zones, resulting in resentment among local fishing communities in the region. The pirates were believed to have started their acts on the seas as a means of dissuading international ships – particularly off the coast of Puntland – from being in the vicinity of their shores. And it is no wonder that the pirates' actions have been supported by the local public concerned about the effects of toxic dumping (including nuclear waste) on their shores and about the unauthorised and bulk fishing in their zones. Many of the locals view piracy as acts of self-defense against commercial ships entering sovereign Somalian territory.

In essence, the “piracy problem” in the Somalian coast and in the Gulf of Aden seems more than merely a lucrative enterprise. The continuing use of the Somalian territorial waters for illegal dumping and fishing by international firms– a practice that has legitimised piracy in the eyes of the locals - is a crime that has to be monitored and stopped immediately by the international community.

The security council's insistence on a security/military based solution will not solve the problem in its entirety, as the larger issue of the continuing anarchy in the country would only force the citizenry to adopt desperate measures for their livelihoods. It is untenable that 18 years have passed since a functional national government was in place in the country. Concerted efforts by the United Nations to bring in civil rule and law by engaging the warlords and various groups in talks have gone ahead nowhere, as powers such as the United States, have bedevilled such processes in Somalia driven by their own strategic concerns – for exploiting energy resources in the country or the “war on terror”. In sum, the downward spiral into further anarchy and the piracy problem are to be addressed not just by a security response by the international community, but through a different form of intervention keeping in the mind the plight of the Somalian population.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Shifting Allegiances

Whichever Dravidian party led coalition wins the most in the Lok Sabha elections; they will have a major role to play in the centre 

Yet another round of switching of allegiances, alliance building and seat sharing has taken place, as has been the norm for the past few elections – both state and national – in the state of Tamil Nadu prior to the 15^th Lok Sabha elections. The defection of the left parties and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) from the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) led Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA) which includes the Congress has changed the political “equations” in the state. The opposition Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) has now become the new lynchpin for the “grand alliance” which includes the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) apart from the aforementioned parties. 

What drove the left parties to the ADMK led front was their perception that they had to be part of an oppositional alliance to be with a chance to defeat the Congress – their “national” imperative to form an non-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), non-Congress government. As for the PMK- the party purportedly representing Vanniyar caste interests, its propensity to flow with the political wind by shifting allegiances was aided by the uncomfortable relationship it held with the DMK over the past year, despite being part of the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the centre. The MDMK had already joined hands with the ADMK before the 2006 elections. Only the more recently formed outfit – the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam led by actor Vijaykanth has decided to go it alone, willing to test the popularity of its leader in all constituencies in the state. 

Tamil Nadu’s case resembles other north Indian states, where the main national parties – the Congress and the BJP – have been bumped by stronger regional parties to junior or insignificant roles. What characterises Tamil Nadu’s polity as being unique is that the major regional parties, the DMK and the ADMK have had no qualms about reaching an alliance with either national party to suit their ends and to add to this mockery of coalitions is the sheer desperation of other outfits in the state to fit in as partners with the more dominant of the two at any particular “election moment”. Thus the DMK as well as the PMK have now achieved a stay in the centre through being part of both the National Democratic Alliance led by the BJP as well as the UPA, while the ADMK has been in coalition with both the Congress and the BJP and now, the Left. Such a reliance on the state’s regional parties has given a greater federal hue to the centre’s functioning, but beyond this formalism, hardly much has been attributed to these outfits’ role in the centre apart from widely held views about corruption and high-handedness of their representatives in government. 

The logic of alliance building is intended to win from a simple arithmetic addition of caste/social base support enjoyed by the various parties. To an extent, the intent has indeed delivered in the near past in both the Lok Sabha and the state assembly elections; but social bases over the years are no longer set in stone in the much urbanised and socio-economically changing state. 

The political discourse during campaigning has thrived not so much on performance of the ruling/ oppositional parties as on the ability of the two main parties (and others) to use their money power and patronage networks built during days in power (at the Centre or in the state). The political contestations between the main Dravidian parties are aimed at hitting the other with charges of corruption, nepotism and campaigns against each other are greatly personalised. The ADMK aims its criticism against the DMK leader M.Karunanidhi’s all powerful family, while the DMK does the same pointing its finger toward J.Jayalalithaa’s leadership and familial misgivings. Even issues of development – material necessities of the people of the state, health, education etc – are debated through personalised vitriolic attacks aimed at each other by the leaders of these Dravidian parties and including the MDMK and the PMK. 

What has emerged as an additional issue in this election is the situation in Sri Lanka, where there is a humanitarian crisis in the Vanni region. Partly due to the peoples’ empathy for the plight of the affected people in the region and partly due to mobilisations for “support to the Tamil cause” by both ruling and oppositional sections in the Tamil polity, this issue now sees very engaged grandstanding by most political outfits. Interestingly the strongest voices demanding intervention by the Indian government in Sri Lanka are positioned in oppositional fronts – the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi is part of the DMK led alliance, while the pro-Tamil-rebels parties, the PMK and the MDMK are with the ADMK led alliance. 

The political story is even more complicated by the fact that there is no guarantee that pre-poll alliances will hold after elections, with the ADMK for example giving no indications of a steadfast anti-BJP, anti-Congress stance, much to the discomfort of the left parties. In the case of the latter, their lamentable dependence on the two highly personalised and patronage based Dravidian parties every election season raises questions about these parties’ limited praxis in the state.   

National elections are still being contested from regional platforms in this state and whatever might be the outcome, it is guaranteed that the winning set of regional parties will have a major role to play in the centre. Whether that role is progressive and addresses real issues that face the people of Tamil Nadu is questionable and that is the discomforting feature about the Lok Sabha elections in the state. 

Draft of the editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The die is caste

“Social engineering” remains the main theme in Bihar's polity as the 15^th Lok Sabha elections in the state beckon.

Bihar's elected representatives have had an important part to play in the national legislature for long. True to its recent legacy of “Mandal politics”, the state promises to deliver yet another verdict that is reliant on the correlation of various caste and community based alliances. The main political parties in the state hope to construct a winning alliance of the right combination of caste and community alliances – in other words, “social engineering”.

The performance of the major parties have depended upon their ability to maintain their respective social bases among various castes. Thus, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) led by Lalu Prasad is seen as a Yadav and other backward classes dominated party deriving support also from Muslims. The Loktantrik Janata Party (LJP) led by Ram Vilas Paswan has a primary social base that comprises of dalit communities such as the Paswans and the Dhobis. The Janata Dal (United)'s support base is rooted in the Kurmi and Koeri community, and the Bharatiya Janata Party is seen as the party of the upper castes. There has not been much of a shift in the respective social bases of these parties in the state since the last held assembly elections in 2005. The rise of the aforementioned parties in the state has coincided with the historical decline of the catch-all Congress party, which has been reduced to a near irrelevant force now.

To the further detriment of the Congress party, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in Bihar unravelled as the RJD and LJP decided to keep the bulk of Lok Sabha constituencies for themselves resulting in the Congress deciding to go it alone. The ruling National Democratic Alliance of the JD(U) and BJP have also finalised a seat sharing arrangement making the elections in the state a battle between between these two alliances even as the parliamentary left parties in the state have come together to form a cohesive United Left Bloc (ULB).

Considering that the LJP fought separately against both the JD(U) and the RJD in the 2005 elections, the coming together of the LJP and the RJD promises to shore up support for the alliance. If the combined vote share (38.9%) of these parties in 2005 is an indicator, the LJP-RJD alliance seems to be on a better footing compared to the ruling NDA (36.9%).

While the JD(U) has harped upon governance and performance of its chief minister, Nitish Kumar as talking points in the elections, the party realises the primal importance of social engineering and has embarked upon it with gusto. The party in government has addressed concerns of some communities such as backward Muslims to garner their support. At the same time, other communities, such as the Koeris and the Brahmins have had causes of resentment with the way Nitish Kumar has ruled – he is seen to be authoritarian and being too reliant on the bureaucracy. The BJP's support base among the upper castes is quite substantial and it has also managed to garner support in the relatively urban pockets of the state. “Social engineering” thus remains the operational strategy for the NDA alliance as it has fielded candidates based on caste equations, even resulting in the dropping of several sitting members of parliament .

The Muslim-Yadav base of the RJD and the dalit base of the LJP is indeed formidable and this factor is seen to favour the RJD-LJP alliance. Lalu Prasad's party might have lost the assembly elections in 2005 after 15 years of rule, but his support base had endured and so is the case before these elections. The alliance was weakened by the exit of the Congress from the seat sharing strategy, but in any case the traditional support base of the Congress, particularly the Muslims (ever since the demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992) have gravitated toward the RJD. After the break up of the Congress' alliance with the RJD – the RJD has put up candidates in the seats that it had offered to Congress, ensuring the further marginalisation of the latter. The RJD and the LJP however assure that they are firmly with the UPA and along with the Samajwadi Party have formed a bloc of parties in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

The fledgling alliance between the parliamentary left parties strives to provide a promising alternative to the identity-based mobilisations of the other main parties in the state. The Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the strongest left outfit in the state -the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)- Liberation have finally found common ground and have formed an United Left Bloc, which fancies its chances in some traditional left strongholds in the state.

Unlike other parties, the left Bloc has tried to mobilise people on the basis of issues such as relief to people affected by the Kosi floods, problems faced by public sector employees and other livelihood related issues in the lowly developed state. While the parties in the Bloc play down expectations for the upcoming Lok Sabha elections, they are confident of building an issues-based alternative to the mainstream political parties in the state and are keen on positioning themselves well for the next assembly elections. The performance of this left Bloc would ultimately determine the shift from the primordial identity based politics that has dominated the state.

Draft of editorial written in the Economic & Political Weekly . The final version can be read here.