Deadlock in Nepal

A stasis has persisted in Nepal ever since the formation of the new government led by unelected-but-nominated (to the constituent assembly) prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal of Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). The rather ineffectual government, which hosts - apart from Madhav Nepal - other unworthies such as foreign minister Sujata Koirala (who has aspired to become the Deputy PM after demands by Nepali Congress patriarch (and father) G P Koirala) and discredited Madhesi leader Bijoy Gachchadar as vice premier has been so poor in its governance that there prevails virtual anarchy in various parts of the country. Ethnic clashes, demands, violent actions, strikes and disruption of economic activity has been the order of the day since the formation of the new coalition government whose very raison d'etre for existence has been its anti-Maoist position. The government has not even been to able to introduce the yearly budget - a sign of utter incompetence and inaction. Buttressed by staunch Indian support, the Madhav Nepal government has been unable to firm up a consensus with the Maoist opposition over the latter's demand to discuss the president's unconstitutional action in reinstating (former) army chief Rukmangad Katuwal after his dismissal by elected former Maoist prime minister Pushpa Kumar Dahal, in the Constituent Assembly.

The Maoists, who have privileged this issue as a case of establishing "civilian supremacy" have been unremitting in their efforts to discuss the issue in the CA and rightly so, for there remains no moral argument against such a discussion. The resultant disruption of parliamentary activity by the Maoists has taken quite a toll on the already ineffectual governance, not to mention the rather destabilised process of writing the Constitution - stipulated to be completed by next year. Apparently the government led by the UML and the NC is reluctant to discuss this issue or put it to vote in the CA fearing that the legislators belonging to the UML in particular would be loath to take a pro-President position when push comes to shove. And that would threaten the very legitimacy of the government in itself.

Apart from the political stasis, there has been also been attempts to shift the goalposts from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the Maoists and the other major parties, prominent of which are the NC and the UML. Madhav Nepal has already start to sound forked tonguish on the question of integration of the Nepali Army and the Maoists' PLA. In a recent interview with The Hindu, the PM tragi-comically suggested that he was yet "to go deeply" into the agreement (CPA) that he was a signatory of! Apparently it is the reactionary pressure that is telling on this slip-shod approach to a vital issue of the peace process.

All that seemed to be a matter of the near past, when some diplomatic parleys between the representatives of the three major parties - the Maoists, the UML and the NC got underway during the Dashain festive season. Encouraging remarks about a break in the deadlock through a joint resolution were being mooted by all representatives. But the central question - allowing a discussion on the president's move and a decisive resolution on civilian supremacy, that saw no acceptable answers. The NC and UML are still distrusting of the Maoists and consider that the question of civilian supremacy is settled.

All this is pushing the Maoists themselves in an insurrectionary direction. Already under pressure from a two-line struggle featuring what could be termed as a battle of ideas between a section of "dogmatists" represented by senior Maoist leaders Mohan Baidya and CP Gajurel and (for want of a better word), the pragmatists, represented by Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, the Maoist leadership is keen on a different strategy to achieve a Constitution of their liking and which involves their return to power. Deadlock on the question of "civilian supremacy" is only taking the Maoists further to where the dogmatists in their ranks would want them to be - something that can turn nasty with the incumbent government even wanting to use repression. And that would be disastrous for the fledgling republic which is still faced with other social questions that were kept under wraps in an unitary and hierarchical state for long and that have being now raised in the form of various social upsurges - on ethnicity, on caste, on land ownership and what not.

In all this, the Indian role has also been negative. The current ambassador's fishing in troubled waters; nay mudding the waters even further by throwing in new interpretations of the CPA - Rakesh Sood suggested in a recent interview that integration of the PLA tantamounted only to an integration into Nepali society - an absolutely facetious remark considering that the UN recognised the combatants of the PLA at par with the Nepali Army when it brokered the ceasefire which preceded the CPA. Ostensibly, the more independent foreign policy of the erstwhile Maoist led government was not to the liking of the South Block, which saw any maneuver by the Maoist led government to be responsive to a Chinese regime (that was in turn using soft power to cozy up with the government due to its Tibet-related considerations) as being tantamount to a bandwagoning with the northern neighbour (and "competing" power). The Indian actions only gave further grist to the dogmatist mill among the Maoist sections; witness the actions of Maoist cadre and sympathisers against Indian priests in Nepal.

For three years since 2005 and the coming together of the mainstream political outfits and the Maoists against the erstwhile monarchy till the formation of the Nepali republic, things were progressing quite well for a nation with a blighted past. There were indeed more than a few hiccups as was expected between parties representing various class interests and the irreconcilability of those sections' interests playing itself out politically. But the Maoists made most of the important compromises - they gave up their "peoples' war" and agreed to work toward a "21st century system" of democracy; accepting a multi-party system that went against their given dogma. They agreed to work democratically to realise their aims - that of building a "new democratic" Nepal on the long march toward socialism. They even achieved a multi-class alliance of sorts in their efforts to do so, only for reactionaries to put a halt to all these in cahoots with sections of the Indian establishment.

The breaking of the deadlock would herald a return to the peace process inaugurated path, and a political settlement of sorts leading to the building of a visionary Constitution could be achieved. Will Madhav Nepal show the sagacity to achieve this? Will the UML in particular, be willing to act as a leftist party and defy its NGOised inner demons? Will the republican sections of the Nepali Congress realise the futility of giving leeway to the reactionary old guard and change course? And how long would a consensual approach toward achieving political aims be acceptable or indeed be made palatable by a pragmatic Maoist leadership to dogmatic sections of the party? Answers to these questions will determine the rate of change toward progress in Nepal. The leftist in India here is waiting for the right ones.

Cross-posted from www.pragoti.org

Bold return by President Zelaya

Dithering US action prevents removal of the de facto regime even as president Zelaya returns bravely back to the country.

Ousted Honduras president Jose Manuel Zelaya made a dramatic return to his country on September 21st by taking refuge in the Brazilian embassy in capital Tegucigalpa after secretly travelling and defying the de facto government's ban on his entry. Zelaya was removed in a military coup and sent to exile on June 28th this year, apparently for trying to bring about a referendum on term limits coinciding with scheduled presidential elections in November 2009. Since then, despite outright condemnation and rejection of legitimacy by all Latin American nations through the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) - for most of them, coups have been a historical blight - and even by the United States, the European Union and the UN General Assembly, the coup plotters and the "interim government" led by Roberto Micheletti has brazenly refused to re-instate Zelaya.

Jose Manuel Zelaya is a leader of the Liberal Party which is considered to be a moderate party in the Honduran polity. He managed to garner sufficient support from the poor due to welfare measures such as increases in minimum wages to the tune of 60%, free primary schooling and lowered prices for transportation. The Honduran elite - the country was a military dictatorship till as late as 1982 - had perfected a system where the US trained military basically remained a paramount force meddling with the democratic institutions, helped by the fact that democratically elected presidents were given only a single term to rule. Zelaya tried to change this constitutionally and recommended a non-binding referendum for a new constituent assembly coinciding with the November elections to gauge public opinion on the term limits, after the Supreme Court refused to allow a binding referendum through a technicality. This move by Zelaya was offered as an excuse to stage the military coup and a puppet was installed after Zelaya was forced out of the country.

The Honduran economy is atypical of most Latin American countries, with a minimal oligarchy controlling and owning much of it. Zelaya's attempt to address this imbalance by following pro-poor measures, marking a shift to the left despite being elected from a conservative platform turned the oligarchy against him. The coup was initially supported by business circles as well, but international censure and halt in diplomatic ties has hurt businesses - export ones in particular - since the June 28th coup and many businessmen have left the country. The attitude of the US government toward the coup has been the most intriguing. While the Barack Obama presidency has been quick to condemn the coup and to call for Zelaya's return, the administration has been curiously ambivalent about the steps to be taken for the same. The US administration has yet to declare the coup as a "military" one, for if it did so, various levels of aid to the Honduran government would have to be cut. Sections in the US polity and administration are loath to let Honduras become closer to other leftist states in Latin America- Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). These sections prefer a far more pliant and right wing regime in Honduras, as a prop to halt the sweeping left wing consolidation in the continent and as a counterweight to the ALBA project and hence the dilly-dallying by the Obama administration when it comes to outrightly declaring the Honduran coup as a military one.

Considering that the US has for long played an agent provocateur role in many of the coups in Latin America for years now - some of the coup plotters in Honduras have a disreputable background for having played a role in others such as the attempted Venezuelan coup in 2003- the Obama administration's attitude marks some kind of a change. But as a case of old habits dying hard, the US administration refuses to walk the talk and put up palpable pressure on the de facto Micheletti regime. The US administration has taken a middle path - cutting nominal aid to the tune of a few million dollars, but retaining other significant quantities of aid, helping the de facto regime in many ways.

The bold move by Zelaya to return back - reportedly in the trunk of a car after hiking through border passes secretively - to Tegucigalpa and his refuge in the Brazilian embassy is a significant step in the process of restoring the elected president. Apparently he was helped in this endeavour by the ALBA. The presence of the recognised president in the capital is a major blow to the de facto regime's claims of legitimacy, and whose response has been to shut down independent media outlets, and throwing tear gas shells in the embassy complex, threatening to storm it besides continuing the daily repression against coup protesters. More than a 100 casualties have been reported since the coup as the military has clamped down heavily on protestors, only for the new Latin American phenomenon of new social and political movements mobilising even stronger anti-coup protests in Honduras. Zelaya's move to approach the Brazilian embassy is portentous since Brazil is seen as a major Latin American and international player without carrying a baggage of outright hostility toward the US. Lula Da Silva, the Brazilian president has also pooh-poohed the de facto regime's taunts and threats to storm the embassy.

The growing internal discord and unambiguous antipathy among the international community - barring a dithering and calculating US - suggests that there remains only two options for the de facto regime currently; either step down with the protagonists in the coup seeking asylum in some other country or to continue repression while alienating the Honduran population even further. Either ways, it would only strengthen the progressive movement in the country.

Having said that, recent reports indicate that the business elite is ruing its support for the coup, upset particularly by the losses that it has had to incur due to the cutting of diplomatic ties and aid by various nations. The business elite has thus sought a compromise which would essentially bring back Zelaya but with very many reduced powers and retention of the coup plotters in positions of power (Michelleti as a "life long Congressman" is one of the demands). Besides this, the powerful elite also wants to halt any eventuality that would shift the locus of power to the left and for Zelaya to return merely as a figurehead. Another demand by the elite asks for a "peacekeeping force" of about 3000 soldiers from conservative led nations to prevent Zelaya from hurting the status quo. This turn of events toward a figurehead leftist president back in power with the channels of power still remaining in conservative hands surely fits into the US scheme of things for Honduras and the social and political movements of the poor who are orchestrating the return of Zelaya through protests must be cautious not to let such a culmination to pass.

The attention devoted to the natural resources rich region of West Asia and the paradigm of "clash of civilisations" adopted by the erstwhile US administration gave some kind of a break for the Latin American nations in helping the leftist project in these countries. The renewed emphasis by Barack Obama to contain this project by refocussing US energies in this region can emerge as a challenge both to the ALBA as well as the fledgling social and left projects in countries such as Honduras for example. By continuing to articulate an alternate pro-poor vision, and by continuing to emphasise a transformation of the polity into more popular democracies, the social and left movements in various countries in Latin America (and even beyond) can resist conservative takeover through US help.

Portions of this piece also constitute the draft of an editorial written for the EPW

The Fizzle and Fuzzy Logic

Crossposted from Pragoti .

A rather unseemly debate is underway publicly over claims made by a senior member, K.Santhanam of the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) that the results of the thermonuclear test in 1998 were a "fizzle". K.Santhanam's claims suggest that the estimated TNT output of 43 KT, made by the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre, which monitored the blasts (alongwith the DRDO) and whose findings were asserted by then Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman R. Chidambaram, was an overestimation. K.Santhanam's claims have come 11 years since the blasts and the reason attributed for the delay is that being a public servant, it was not possible for him to com out in the open with the negation of the official results.

The 1998 nuclear blasts during the BJP led NDA regime featured a series of tests - two on a high and low yield fission bombs and one "thermonuclear" fission-fusion bomb - the hydrogen bomb. The thermonuclear test was the showpiece of the nuclear blasts, which immediately preceded a retaliatory sequence of tests by neighbouring Pakistan (which were suggested to have low TNT yields themselves).

Right after the tests, the claims of high yield made by the AEC and the Indian defence establishment were questioned by independent sources including seismologists, nuclear physicists and weapon experts. As this article by Praful Bidwai suggests, the claims were suspect right after they were made and independent sources affirmed that the yield was overestimated based on seismological data.

K.Santhanam's article co-written with former bureaucrat Ashok Parthasarathy in The Hindu, made even more startling revelations - suggesting that the decision to uphold the yield estimates of BARC after the tests was made by a "voice-vote". The article also produced a point-by-point rebuttal of R.Chidambaram's assertions that the yield estimates were accurate and that the thermonuclear test was a success.

The Frontline's science correspondent R.Ramachandran's article in The Hindu then went to explicate the veracity of the BARC and former AEC Chairman's claims. The important suggestion in this article was that the on-site radioactive test following the nuclear blasts at the test-site revealed the presence of radioisotopes, which was most probably the products of high-energy neutrons produced by fusion reactions and hence the veracity of the claim.

Technical evaluation of the claims and counter-claims aside - what is relevant is the rationale for the statements made by K.Santhanam and other detractors of the thermonuclear test (including other nuclear scientists and ex-mandarins, Homi Sethna, PK Iyengar and others). The detractors suggest that the failure of the thermonuclear test necessitated a further round of testing and that this was needed because a fusion bomb was to be the core of a credible minimum deterrent (CMD), fitting in with India's nuclear doctrine. Rebuttals of this suggestion immediately followed by defense analyst K.Subrahmanyam (in the Indian Express for e.g.) who argued that there was no need for a thermonuclear component in the CMD and that fission bombs would do the needful .

In essence what flows from the arguments of both the detractors of the 1998 thermonuclear test- many of whom opposed the Indo-Nuclear Deal from a standpoint that the deal curtailed the weaponisation programme and the proponents of the success theory (or even so called neutral observers who oppose the need for a further test) is a common understanding of the need for a nuclear weapon oriented defence doctrine. That much is clear.

The former argue for a even "greater" deterrent - witness the claims made by K.Santhanam that the absence of a thermonuclear bomb creates a gap between India and its "great power rival" - China; thereby bringing in the "China bogey" into the nuclear "game" - something that was ludicrously tangled as a reason for the 1998 tests by then defence minister George Fernandes. In essence, the logic behind the claims made by K.Santhanam is that the minimum in the CMD is not enough and only the presence of a thermonuclear bomb would help attain that status and this is justified when the gap between India and China in their respective "nuclear arsenals" are considered.

Can there be an even more Strangelovian argument? First of all, the nuclear doctrine in China was never focussed toward India, but toward the US and the USSR - a legacy of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet split. That the difference in the arsenals is thrust as an argument to justify a stronger deterrent makes that argument only even more self-serving is clear - as such a strategy would entail that the Indian defensive deterrent is directed at China's capabilities and therefore that would mean that China could now claim that its arsenal is necessitated due to India's doctrine. What can be more ridiculous than this?

It however needs to be mentioned that the rejection of a greater deterrent argument does not mean that there should be a retention of the status quo vis-a-vis the nuclear arsenals of India and China; but that normatively there needs to be a stronger impulse toward a nuclear disarmament regime that targets vertical proliferation among the Nuclear Five and a binding commitment among them to disarm.

Which takes us to the argument about India's nuclear doctrine itself. The very opaque nature of the Indian nuclear lobby's functioning (or in essence the defence establishment's) suggests that the presence of destructive weapons of the nuclear variety in the subcontinent is latent with terrible danger. The argument for a "minimal deterrent" is poor because the presence of nuclear weapons has never deterred a conflict (Kargil for e.g.) or war like confrontation leading to the brink of danger. The infighting among the sections of the nuclear lobby coupled with the strategic community's high stakes "great power game", creates a situation where neighbouring countries would only want to react in a similar Tandava nritya to establish nuclear parity. Indeed, the "nuclear doctrine" as established now is an untenable one for the security and peace of the subcontinent.

What would be a more credible, moral and ethical imperative would be the complete disarmament in both India and Pakistan and there is no better time for the same than the present. There is a commonality of interests in both these states (and definitely among the societies) to eradicate extremism. That the nuclear defense doctrine in India is predicated on the assumption that there could be a extremist takeover of the nuclear establishment in Pakistan suggests that the eradication of extremism is of the highest priority. If this commonality of interests could also translate into an understanding on eradicating the nuclear threat perceptions through disarmament, that would mark a logical culmination - also a very instrumental one because it will cut down the expenditure burden of these third world developing countries.

But would the "realism" driven strategic establishments in both these countries even work toward such a culmination? That would mean that these establishment would have to rethink the entire paradigm of their defense/IR strategies. It would mean that these establishments would have to think beyond a paradigm that suggests an intrinsically given clash of power interests, rather than the true fact that the rivalry is an dependent variable wrought through the interests of ideologically driven sections in both the respective nations.

To explain this further- consider that in 1998, the BJP government ordered nuclear testing, immediately after it came to power. The rationale offered, by then defence minister George Fernandes was that the test were necessitated because of hostile neighbours, both of whom had committed aggression against India (in a leaked out letter to the US president Bill Clinton). What is worth noting is that the BJP included the nuclear option in its election manifesto not because of these "defensive" reasons, but because the nuclear option was always in its ideological firmament - as early as the early 1950s, the BJP's precursor, the Jan Sangh had demanded the development of nuclear weapons!.

Similarly, Pokharan-1, which featured the first successful nuclear weapon testing by India, was done during the Indira Gandhi regime, who justified the same as necessitated against China; coming only a decade after the border war between the nations. As a domino effect, Pakistan immediately embarked upon nuclear weaponisation and proliferation processes through largely covert means (the dreaded AQ Khan network);these were themselves facilitated by a pliant imperial regime run by Ronald Reagan as is depicted by the excellent book, "Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the global nuclear weapons conspiracy".

In other words, far from being just a result of power games intrinsic to the anarchic international order, the nuclear weaponisation (and proliferation) syndrome was effected due to ideological impetuses from ruling establishments, buttressed by an ineffectual and incompetent non-proliferation regime.

What this article therefore calls for, is a doing away with a few things - the power based IR strategic thinking and therefore the nuclear defense doctrine and therefore nuclear weapons itself. That, as the cliche goes, makes the world far better.

Breaking from the past

Unprecedented turnout of voters effect landmark change in general elections in Japan.

In what must be a major landmark in Japanese politics, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) which has governed Japan for more than five decades barring a very short interruption in the 1990s, was defeated comprehensively in the elections to the lower house of the Diet held on August 30th. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) managed to win 308 out of the 480 seats and formed the government with other smaller allies, the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party of Japan. The mandate fuelled by a strong 69% voter turnout was a decisive rejection of the LDP - a party whose "machine" was built through years of collaboration between big business, the bureaucracy and adherence to the politics of patronage to effect a large coalition of support.

Despite its highly developed status, Japan has suffered a multitude of social problems over the years - that of rising unemployment (nearly 6% recently), an ageing population, poor birth indicators apart from nearly two decades of stagnant growth and drop in living standards, not to mention the huge impact of the recent global economic crisis on the highly export dependent Japanese economy. These structural conditions and the LDP's refusal to initiate any change in its ways of rule and continuation of the political and administrative status quo saw an unprecedented rise in its unpopularity, expressed in its defeat in the elections. Ideologically, there is little differentiation between these two parties as both are in the centre-right of the ideological spectrum, but there is a difference in their programmatic essences.

The DPJ while reiterating its belief in the "free market system" has pledged to take up the interests of consumers, small enterprises and non-profit organisations, as a contrast to the overtly strong relations between the LDP and the big export businesses in the country. What stuck a chord with the the voting public was the DPJ's avowed insistence on reforming the powerful bureaucracy in the country in a manner that it is responsive to the democratically elected polity and not vice-versa as is the status quo. Indeed, after forming the government on September 16th, the DPJ leader and new prime minister Yukio Hatoyama named a cabinet minister in charge of a new National Strategy Bureau. The bureau would now oversee a centralised policy planning and execution apparatus that would be in stark contrast to the past, wherein the bureaucracy drafted plans for various ministries, while ministers and legislators catered to special interest groups using lobbying or behind-the-doors deals. The DPJ received a positive mandate after being contrasted with a LDP government (and party) which had been plagued with a series of corruption scandals and a reputation of fostering an opaque environment of functioning involving legislators, bureaucrats and industry groups.

The LDP's traditional policies of building and maintaining a large support base through patronage and high spending infrastructure projects also wore out its course, as much of it was seen as wasteful spending helping special interest lobbies. Anger at the LDP was also directed because of the increased informalisation of employment (the LDP governments since 2005 had encouraged contractualisation of work) and the increased lay-offs of contracted workers primarily because of the global economic crisis. The DPJ put its emphasis on social security, on child support, consumer welfare and boosting internal demand in its manifesto, which was seen as a break from the patronage based offerings of the Taro Aso led LDP. The DPJ also drew a contrast from the LDP in its foreign policy outlook arguing for more nuanced external relationships - renegotiating the Status of Forces agreement with the US, closer ties with other countries like China in Asia. In comparison, the Junichiro Koizumi/ Taro Aso led LDP regimes since 2005 only got Japan much closer to the US, by taking part in the "War on Terror" through non-lethal military assistance and also pledging cooperation in security initiatives in the Indian Ocean.

The encouraging aspect of the 2009 elections was the high degree of participation resulting in the landslide defeat of the LDP. In a nation, where politics has often take a backseat in the consciousness of a highly networked populace in the industrialised nation, the sudden burst of enthusiasm to defeat the status quo marks a good beginning for greater participation in the political and civil society. It is also an encouraging sign for ideologically driven parties wishing to transform Japan into a far more egalitarian, pacifist and post-industrialist nation. In many senses, the defeat of the LDP has initiated a truly two party system in the single party dominated nation state since World War II. The DPJ's success in implementing some of its policies that are seen as sharp contrasts to the LDP will ultimately determine the stability of this system and by all accounts it is going to be a challenging time for the Hatoyama led government. Manipulating an all-powerful bureaucracy without alienating it, jump starting a two decade long stagnant economy and to address the onerous social issues in the nation - these will require herculean efforts.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

A Confident Congress

A default victory for the Congress is likely in upcoming assembly elections in Haryana

The Congress party's convincing victory in the Lok Sabha elections where it won 9 out of the 10 constituencies in the state has emboldened its state government to recommend dissolution of the assembly and call for fresh elections seven months before its scheduled completion of five years. The Congress led by chief minister Bhoopinder Singh Hooda hopes to repeat its Lok Sabha performance in the assembly elections, buoyed as it is by the scale of victory that the party achieved bucking a trend that has punished incumbent state governments before in the parliamentary elections. And the manner in which the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) - Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) managed to lose the elections resulted in the breakdown of the alliance, thereby strengthening the prospects of the Congress even more - atleast on paper.

The victory of the Congress in 2004 had much to do with voter disenchantment with the INLD rule under former chief minister Om Prakash Chautala who was seen to be overweening and tolerant to corruption, criminalisation and authoritarianism. Since then, under the leadership of Hooda, the Congress has only consolidated its support base as opposition to the party has been in disarray. After a period of dissension within the Congress with the choice of Hooda as chief minister, the party gradually steadied itself, after dissidents left the party and formed the Haryana Janhit Congress (HJC). The HJC managed a decent vote share in the Lok Sabha elections and would try again to play spoiler to the Congress' hopes in the assembly elections.

The support base of the Congress had been augmented during the Lok Sabha elections due to a deliberate strategy to woo Jat voters- Jats consititute nearly a quarter of Haryana's population - by the party. The presence of a Jat in Hooda as the chief minister helped and the conscious wooing of the Jats helped break the "monopoly" of the INLD over this community, affecting the party's fortunes dramatically. Bhupinder Singh Hooda is now seen as the undoubted leader of the Jat community in the state. Consequent to the increase in support among the Jats has been a perceptible shift of support from the Congress' traditional voter base among the poorer sections - particularly the dalits. A section of the dalits preferred the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in the Lok Sabha elections and the party would want to convert that support into seats in the assembly elections.

The lack of credible opposition to the Congress is evident in the political positions of the various parties. Haryana is reeling under a drought which has affected the peasantry and many incidents of industrial unrest has taken place sporadically during the Congress rule. Yet, the opposition to the Congress has been limited in its efforts to take up these causes and has instead focussed on personalised campaigns - a characteristic of family and personality dominated politics in the state. Sectional and caste preferences still determine support to the opposition parties - the BJP for e.g. relies heavily on the Punjabi speaking populace for support; the INLD is still an out-and-out Jat party while the HJC derives a lot of support from the Bishnois. The manner in which the Congress has managed to accommodate various sectional interests has kept it in good stead against this fragmented and disjointed opposition. The Congress has played to the gallery of these sections by refusing to take on regressive traditional systems prevalent for example in the Jat community such as the institution of khap panchayats. The absence of a better alternative to the Congress has meant that many poorer and marginalised sections of Haryana's population have kept their faith with the Congress, even if its government has not done enough for them. Adding to the Congress' advantage is the breaking down of the BJP-INLD alliance and therefore an even more fragmented opposition.

The Congress government in Haryana has been unlike other "successful" ones - in Andhra Pradesh for example, where a slew of pro-poor and populist measures were helpful in retaining power. In all likelihood, the Congress can be expected to retain its majority in Haryana in the assembly elections. Yet, that would be due to default and not because of any major achievements on its government's part in a state that still enjoys rather a dubious reputation of retarded social development.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Misplaced Symbolism

The politics of symbolism is taken too far by the Mayawati led government in Uttar Pradesh.

Symbolism has always played a important part in the Bahujan Samaj Party's (BSP) politics. The essence of the symbolism used by the party is the propagation and prominence given to Dalit and social reform leaders of the past and present - from Jyotiba Phule to Bhimrao Ambedkar to E.V. "Periyar" Ramaswamy to Kanshi Ram by constructing murals, statues and other media. The Mayawati led BSP government in Uttar Pradesh (UP) has taken this symbolism to a garguantan extent - budgeted at nearly Rs 2,000 crores - to build statues and memoriums to not only the aforementioned Dalit icons but also to the chief minister herself. By no means is the UP government's usage of public expenditure for this endeavour exclusive - symbolism in Indian politics and governance across states is replete with examples of iconography and hagiography. To that extent, the exclusive negative attention in the media and derision for Mayawati's symbolism obsession is unjustified and smacks of hypocrisy. But again, the scale of grandeur and the thin line between symbolism and personality cult that the Mayawati led government has traversed calls into question the priorities of the two year old government and indeed the ever-evolving politics of the BSP.

Much of the surprising success in 2007 by the BSP in Uttar Pradesh owes to the astute political strategising and hard work done by its supremo, Mayawati. In winning the assembly elections by a clear majority in India's largest state, Mayawati turned Indian politics on its head - for the first time an avowedly Dalit party had come to power on its own. The major reason for the victory was the strategy of forging a multi-caste alliance with the strings of power in the hands of the Dalit chief minister. The victory in 2007 catapulted the chief minister into national reckoning and it was expected that her government's performance and organisational work by her party would inspire similar successes elsewhere atleast in North India. But the parliamentary elections in 2009 was a dampener, with the BSP unable to consolidate its successes of 2007. One primary reason for this lack of success was the weakening of the broad social coalition - sarvajan as the BSP calls it - in the state, partly because of inability by the Mayawati led government to keep it intact through dedicated governance and also partly because of misplaced priorities. Very little dent has been made in issues that have plagued governance in UP - criminalisation, ineffectiveness, etc and the ostentatious spending on symbolism by Mayawati has certainly not helped her recapture public minds.

Why then has Mayawati embarked upon this mega-project? For one, Dalit symbolism has its efficacy in propping up the issue of self-respect and dignity privileged by the BSP as primary issues for Dalits. The history of the BSP's politics and its political movement suggests how much symbols, visual imagery of leaders have been used to demolish the myth of caste hierarchy. The establishment of memorials and statues continues in this vein. Only Mayawati's own vainglorious attempt to place herself within the "pantheon" of Dalit symbolism, takes the politics of such symbolism too far. Also the scale of such grandeur suggests that the excess is merely an attempt to gloss over the failures of implementation of policies that strike at the very heart of the enduring hierarchy and exploitation - measures such as land reforms for one which are clearly lacking as an emphases for the UP government.

In other words, Mayawati's venture - the provision of immense public space in memoria to Dalit icons (including herself in the process) might be justified on the grounds of providing alternative iconography for subaltern and Dalit achievers. But the primacy given to such symbolism at the cost of other administrative and governance measures to address the concerns of those very subaltern and exploited peoples of the state point toward the co-option of Dalit politics within the broad feudal canvas in many parts of India that privileges the politics of symbolism over actualities of proper governance. This also explains the excessive ostentation displayed by the UP chief minister in events such as her "birthday parties", in the naming of her successor through an envelope and in the highly centralised and authoritative character of her leadership - all belying her humble beginnings and remarkable rise to her current position, attributed to the affinity shown by the Dalit people towards her and her party. The rise of the BSP in Indian politics was a great leap in progressivism and a major event in the so called "silent revolution" orchestrated by the underclasses of Indian society. The sad recourse to excessive symbolism and hagiography suggests that the BSP has taken a few steps backward. It is incumbent upon the "Dalit ki beti" (Daughter of Dalits) and the "behenji" to chart her party and movement back to its original course and a change of priorities in governance would be a good starting point.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

My interview on KPFK

Public station KPFK radio's show "Beneath the Surface with Hamid Khan" did a radio interview of me today morning. This was the first time I did a live interview ever and I am sure the nervousness shows. Please have a listen here: http://archive.kpfk.org/parchive/mp3/kpfk_090723_170130bts_hamid.MP3 .. Hamid's conversation with me begins at the 20th minute nearabouts.

UPDATE: URL Changed

Trouble in Xinjiang

Pent up frustrations result in violent riots in Uyghur capital in China

Incidents of ethnic violence involving deaths of more than 190 people, rocked Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China on the 5th of July, when rioters belonging to the predominantly Sunni Islamic Uyghur ethnic denomination attacked members of the Han Chinese community in the city. The immediate trigger for the incidents in Urumqi was the violent targetting of Uyghur migrants by Han workers in a toy factory in the southern China province of Guangdong on June 26th. Miffed by what some Uyghurs felt as Chinese government inaction in bringing the guilty Han workers to justice, protests were staged in Urumqi, which further transformed into a bloody ethnic riot with Uyghurs attacking the migrant Han Chinese population. While Xinjiang has been rocked by sporadic incidents of violence for quite some time, including terrorist bombing and other riots, the incidents of July 5th were of such an alarming order that the Chinese President Hu Jintao had to shorten his visit to the G8 summit in Rome to return back to his country.

The official reaction of the Chinese government was to blame external forces for these incidents, pointing fingers at an Uyghur separatist leader (of the World Uyghur Congress) based in the United States. But just as in the Tibetan set of events last year, the riots in Urumqi must be attributed to resentment among the minority ethnic groups of China's population and umbrage against some of its government's policies. One such policy is the "Western development" initiative launched in the later half of the 1990s which involved the large scale capital investment in utilisation and extraction of natural resources in an endeavour to economically develop the western regions of China. Simultaneously there was also an influx of ethnic Han Chinese to partake in the economic benefits of the growth process in these regions, including Xinjiang. What has been resulted is the garnering of a large share of the employment opportunities by the Han migrants. This combined with measures such as teaching of Mandarin in schools in Xinjiang has not gone down well with the local Uyghur speaking people. While the Chinese government insists that these policies are meant to give better opportunities to the Uyghurs, that perception is not shared by the local indigenous population in Xinjiang. Thus despite certain concessions to minorities such as the relaxation of the One-Child policy or other social measures, resentment against Han in-migration, corruption among the ruling elite, lopsided development and employment opportunities plus perceptions of cultural suppression has seen Uyghurs increasingly getting antipathetic to the Chinese government. This resentment also resonates with the perceptions of rising inequality and government corruption elsewhere in China.

China's Constitution and its instituted 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provides for ethnic minorities the right to protect, preserve and promote their cultures. Apparently the intent to respect and provide for diversity in the Constitution and in the autonomy law has not translated fully in its implementation in Xinjiang (as in Tibet), giving rise to grievances. In the medium and long term, the Chinese government has to bring make a paradigm shift from its current policy of conflating all forms of Uyghur dissent and grievances within "separatism, extremism and terrorism" to adopt a far more accommodative approach basing itself on the stated aims of the Constitution. The relative restraint with which the Chinese government handled the aftermath of the July 5th incidents could be a starting point. Merely blaming the separatist elements in the Uyghur diaspora for "fomenting" the riots is not going to help resolve the situation that resulted in the incidents in the first place.

The danger of a Han chauvinist and nationalist reprisal and consequent repression of Xinjiang remains, but thus far the Chinese government both at the national and at the local levels have tried to restore normalcy by appealing for calm while engaging in bringing those engaged in murder and violence to justice. The relative freedom and access given to the press (both local and foreign) in covering the events after the July 5th incidents suggests a marked change from the Chinese government response to the Tibetan incidents last year.

Beyond the political measures, the Chinese have to revisit the capital intensive growth paradigm as well, not just in the western regions but elsewhere in the mainland as well. Due to objective conditions - the global financial crisis and the structural problems in the Chinese economy, the Hu Jintao regime has instituted a more populist set of policies than its predecessor, but that is still not enough to mitigate the socio-economic troubles faced by the nation.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly.

Lalgarh - Questions to the left

Lalgarh poses questions that the two main streams of the Left in India have to answer.

The Left Front led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) suffered its worst defeat in parliamentary elections since independence. The reasons for its defeat, particularly in West Bengal have got much to do with the failings in the CPI(M), reflected in its organisational problems over the years, and in the way it went about implementing policies that alienated sections of its own core support base - the rural poor in particular of late. The incidents in Lalgarh in West Midnapore district in a sense confirm both the alienation and the anger against the ruling party as well as the degradation of the left front in certain pockets of the state. On the other hand, the wanton killings of ruling party representatives by activists of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) in the region which eventually invited reprisals from the centre and state government, point to the inefficacy and immaturity of the Maoist praxis.

The incidents in Lalgarh were triggered after the attempts at the life of West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee in November 2008 near close-by Salboni by the Maoists, who have been active in the west Midnapore region for more than a decade. The subsequent reprisals engaged in by the state police, indiscriminately targetting villagers in Lalgarh for allegedly harbouring Maoist activists, was so brutal that a spontaneous movement was launched by the tribals in and around the villages of Lalgarh. Later a committee - Police Santrash Birodhi Janasadharaner Committee (PSBJC) was formed to protest police atrocities and which demanded apologies from the police besides an halt to frequent police raids in the area.

After initial suggestions of acquiescence to these demands, the state government did nothing much beyond withdrawing certain police camps from the area. The much traumatised tribals protested and resolved to keep the state administration and the police out of their lives, erecting barricades and blockades around the area. The tribals then went on to transform their movement from merely being grievance-driven to trying to implement means for livelihood on their own - by setting up primary health centres, irrigation facilities within their area - signalling their disconnect with the state administration. This further created an impasse which pitted the tribals against ruling party supporters and officials who were keen on regaining control over the blockaded Lalgarh. Eventually the gradual isolation of the tribal movement from mainstream politics - no political party took up the interests of the tribals beyond the PSBJC - resulted in Maoists taking up the demands of the PSBJC and also in controlling administrative activities within Lalgarh. This pitted the Maoists against ruling party sympathisers, fitting the pattern of late in parts of west Midnapore district. Increasing Maoist control over the tribals part of the committee resulted in the targetting and killing of CPI(M) sympathisers, office bearers and destruction of their homes and offices, in full public glare.

The following state action - mobilisation of central paramilitary forces, removal of blockades, banning of the CPI(Maoist), arrest of its spokespersons and the general environment of reprisals has killed a movement leaving in its wake the grievances and the aspirations of the tribals intact. The actions by the CPI(M) led left front administration to clear Lalgarh of "Maoist influence" have worsened the climate so badly that the alienation is complete. The hapless tribals and the PSBJC have demanded talks with the state government and so have the Maoists, but the banning of the CPI(Maoist) and resolve shown by the state government in persisting with paramilitary action has meant that a more full fledged military affair is on.

Questions have to be raised to the Maoists as to why they insist on tactics such as assassination and what political motive does this achieve. For all the political dividends that the Maoists claim to achieve, it is the opportunist sections of the West Bengal polity that has really benefited from these strategies. Besides by inviting state repression through the means of engaging in such tactics, the Maoists have betrayed the tribals' cause putting them in harm's way in a manner that is legitimated as legal military action against "Maoist mayhem".

Compared to other regions in West Bengal, land reforms have not necessarily affected the socio-economic specificities of the West Midnapore region. For one, the region suffers from lack of irrigation resources and despite the left front getting strong mandates in the district -though Lalgarh falling under Binpur assembly segment has preferred the Jharkhand Party (Naren) more often since 1991 - there has been very little dents made in the health and education fronts. Added to this is the gradual conversion of left front hegemony into a patronage system in the local level, favouring the left front cadre, that has seen sharp antagonisms resulting in violence. This has been one of the failings of the left front in West Bengal, where despite gains from welfare measures such as land reforms and deepening of local democracy, the "party-society" institutionalisation remains a major drawback. The organisational deficiencies of the left front - local corruption, organised patronage and entrenchment of violence are all consequences of the failures of the left front to transform the rural countryside in West Bengal beyond the aforementioned welfare and democratic measures. The anger of the tribals in Lalgarh against malfeasance by the CPI(M) cadre and sympathisers in the region is symptomatic of this

All in all, the tragic sandwiching of tribals in Lalgarh between a blundering Left Front administration and the brutally violent Maoists, raises questions at both these political entities in the state.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Disputed election verdict in Iran

Power struggle between the ruling elite could be the reason for manipulation of election results to get conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad re-elected.

The statement by Islamic Republic of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei that the results to the Iranian presidential elections affirming incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were a "divine assessment" summed up the situation ironically pretty well. Conservative president Ahmadinejad, according to official results, won the elections by capturing 66% of the votes in the first round of the presidential polls defeating three of his challengers, including his chief opponent and "reformist" Mir-Hussein Mousavi who garnered 33%, enough to rule out further rounds of polling.

Various aspects of the incidents following the elections stand out- within three hours after the polling was complete, more than 80% of the almost 40 million ballots were "counted"; Mousavi trailed not only in Tehran and other cities, but also was way behind Ahmadinejad in his stronghold Azeri areas such as Tabriz; just following polling, a massive shutdown on communication devices and systems occurred and the military was on the streets, before Ahmadinejad was declared winner. Unwilling to accept the results, Ahmadinejad's opponents called foul and following unprecedented protests on the streets of Iran's biggest cities, a partial recount was finally ordered by the powerful Guardian Council.

Ahmadinejad was a strong favourite in the run-up to the polls, having established solid support primarily in the rural areas of Iran, through a mixture of strong nationalistic appeal and populism. But just as the elections were nearing, Mousavi mounted a spirited campaign basing his appeal on his previous record as the former prime minister during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and pointing fingers at Ahmadinejad's mishandling of the economy, and confrontationist foreign policy. He offered a more moderate regime which promised greater freedoms for women (hitherto denied in the Islamic regime), more civil liberties, looser controls over the state economy, a more conciliatory foreign policy while maintaining Iran's nuclear programme as contrasts to Ahmadinejad's hardline conservative rule. The set of policies and experience that Mousavi offered gradually found vast appeal particularly in the urban areas of Iran, among women, the university graduates, the "bazaar merchants" worried by inflation besides support from others who were aligned with the "reformers" such as former president Mohammad Khatami. Many opinion polls pointed to a closer outcome of results than that was officially declared, because of the strong appeal that Mousavi generated just before the elections.

If the disputed election results are indeed a consequence of manipulation, the question arises as to why even a moderate conservative such as Mir-Hussein Mousavi, part of the ruling elite is seen to be less preferred than the hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by the powers that be in Iran. Any explanation would be from the manner the political system in Iran combines Islamic theocracy with modern aspects of democracy, wherein the Islamic institutions such as the supreme leader, the guardian council, the assembly of experts wield great influence. Included in this structure is the military Revolutionary Guard (the Pasdaran) and its associated Basij voluntary militia, who are tasked with security and ideological protection of the Islamic republic. There is a power struggle ensuing between conservatives and "reformists" within the guardian council and the assembly of experts and this has weighed upon the presidential elections as well. Ahmadinejad derives great support from the Pasdaran, the Basij and among the conservative sections of which Ayatollah Khamenei has been historically seen to be part of.

Ahmadinejad's support base can be attributed to his presidency's various radical economic measures such as instituting "justice shares" for the poor in Iran's private sector. A section of the ruling elite, seen to be aligned with former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani are at odds with the radical economic agenda of Ahmadinejad and there is an alignment on economic principles with the reformists. This cohesion between pragmatists such as Rafsanjani and reformists such as Khatami was alluded to by Ahmadinejad himself in his attack against Mousavi during the election campaign. Supported by the Pasdaran and the Basij, the conservative Ahmadinejad was obliquely preferred to over his opponents, by Ayatollah Khamenei in the run up to the elections. The power struggle between the conservatives, the reformists and those with business interests such as Rafsanjani could thus possibly explain the alleged fraud that prevented a moderate conservative such as Mousavi from coming to power.

The concession by the guardian council of a partial recount is a reaction to the massive protests staged in the cities of Iran, orchestrated by supporters of Mousavi, and termed by the western media in particular as the "green revolution". There still persists a strong nationalist sentiment against the threatening postures against the country by United States and Israel and it is this sentiment that Ahmadinejad would hope to tap, to prevent the protests against the election results from spreading. The western coverage of the protests term them as a parallel to the "colour-coded revolutions" in the former east European countries of the socialist bloc. This is far from an accurate assessment having no relation to the reality of Iranian society and polity as the protestors are asking for an annulment of the election results and support reform well within the framework of the Iranian political framework and do not want any alignment of Iran with the West as of the pre-revolutionary past.

Although the ruling elite of Iran could acquiesce to a re-election if the protests gather much more momentum spreading to other areas of Iran or indeed quell these protests by violent repression, there is very little possibility of a radical transformation of Iran's polity into suddenly conceding greater civil liberties and genuine gender equality. Till the theocratic structure of Iran's polity and society remains intact and the democratic contestations are well limited to entities within the framework of the velayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurists), no major change is possible.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly.

Binayak Sen's bail and after

The Chhattisgarh government's security centric approach has resulted in unjust detentions of anyone showing even democratic dissent.

Vice president of the Peoples Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and eminent medical practitioner Binayak Sen was finally released after he was granted bail by the Vacation Bench of the Supreme Court after two years of detention in prison in the state of Chhattisgarh. The inability of the prosecutors to explain the absence of corroboration of the official charges against him, after retractions by witnesses in his ongoing trial weighed in the judgment which was given almost immediately after the case began to be heard by the Vacation Bench. It is indeed a matter of relief for several activists, intellectuals, members of the civil society and the general public that the good doctor is finally out of jail after detention over the flimsiest of charges. It is now imperative to continue to point at the draconian laws and extra-constitutional executive policies and actions that are in sway in the state of Chhattisgarh, specifically - the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2006 and the detention of many people under this act.The PUCL has stated that 178 persons of various occupational backgrounds have been detained by the Chattisgarh state taking recourse to the Public Security Act or the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (2004).

The Chattisgarh state of affairs today is a pointer toward what is termed a "security centric approach" - to address the insurgency situation in some districts in the state.This approach has resulted in a horrific humanitarian problem in the South Bastar/Dantewada district in particular, with tribals displaced from villages, and armed "special police officers" pitted against Maoist insurgents - both mostly from the tribal community. The state government's Salwa Judum campaign - the vigilante programme that uses ordinary citizens as "security" personnel against the Maoists - has only exacerbated the lives of thousands of people who have been caught in the spiral of violence in the conflict. Estimates point out to 600 villages from where tribals were forcibly evacuated since the beginning of the Salwa Judum and who are still housed in makeshift relief camps.

The Supreme Court instructed the state government through its interim pronouncements to wind up this unconstitutional campaign in 2008, but the government's response has been to dilly-dally and there has been no let up in the tribal versus tribal war. The only sane voices that are coming about to halt the lawlessness are those from civil society demanding a halt to the military campaign, disbanding of the Salwa Judum, and for addressing the major societal, social and livelihood problems in the region.

The Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, passed by the Chhattisgarh state assembly in December 2005 broadens the ambit of existing laws on what is to be deemed "unlawful". "Unlawful" acts have been defined to include any such act which "create risk or danger for public order, peace and public tranquillity" or "create an impediment in the administration of law or institutions". Such a loose definition has enabled the government to stifle any dissent over its policies in "countering insurgency" or to frame charges against anyone who is critical of the government's actions. This is expressed in the manner in which Binayak Sen was kept in detention for two years over charges that were never corroborated and was denied bail for reasons that were evidently irrational. Or in the manner film-maker Ajay T.G. was arrested and detained on the basis of the Act. Even appeals from eminent persona such as Nobel Prize winners attesting to the impeccable humanitarian work of Sen, were rejected by the various agencies of the state who deemed Sen as a "risk to the state" and irrationally refused to grant him bail.

Beyond instruments of such laws, the state government has also resolved to physically intimidate any agency - NGOs or civil society activists or dissenters - who have taken positions antithetical to the government's in its "war" against insurgency. A case in point is the demolition by the state's police officers on 17th May of the Vanvasi Chetna Ashram run by Himanshu Kumar in the insurgency affected Dantewada district. Kumar's work had focussed on return of displaced tribal villagers to their homes, exposing the crimes committed in the course of Salwa Judum vigilantism and that has made the state government to consider his work as so "hostile" to act in the manner they did. Kumar was later harassed by Salwa Judum members as a retaliation to an abduction of two local government officials by the Maoists.

Binayak Sen's release on bail must trigger a surge of activism that should demand an end to the lawlessness in the state. The state government must be forced to effect a real end to the Salwa Judum campaign and not just pay lip-service about this, repeal the Public Security Act, acknowledge and be open to dissent and criticism and to adopt a different approach to the insurgency. And efforts must be made by the government to deliver social, health and other welfare services to the affected tribals in the region. That is a more viable and lawful response to the Maoist insurgency.The repression of voices asking for a shift from this "security approach" and the cynical use of citizens as vigilante law enforcement adjuncts must be halted.

The state government can use legal instruments without having to take recourse to "special" acts such as the Public Security Act to tackle law and order problems related to the insurgency. But will Chief Minister Raman Singh who belongs to the Bharatiya Janata Party, which has willed to implement this flawed "Chhattisgarh model" - encompassing the above - in states affected by Maoist violence elsewhere, pay heed? Especially when even the union home minister P.Chidambaram of the Congress party has termed the Salwa Judum to be "useful"?

Preliminary Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly. A completely changed final version exists here.

Understanding the mandate of 2009

This is an updated and modified version of the earlier article (A decisive mandate) written for the Naked Punch Asia.

Belying expectations of a fragmented verdict at the national level, the mandate of the 15th Lok Sabha elections has been decisive in favour of the Congress party led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The alliance has managed to win 261 seats, with the Congress itself winning 206 seats, its best tally since the 1991 elections when the party had won 244 seats. A mix of local state-level factors and a preference for the UPA alliance nationally can be seen as responsible for the victory, from initial observations. The UPA managed the win defeating not only the Left anchored "Third Front- TF" coalition of regional parties and the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) emphatically, but despite the breaking away of several partners (who formed the Fourth front -FF) from the alliance before elections.

The UPA alliance won the most number of seats in 17 out of 29 (including the National Capital Territory of Delhi) states. Excepting the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa, the performance of the regional and left parties in the Third Front ranged from underwhelming to disastrous. The NDA won overwhelmingly in Bihar, Karnataka and Chattisgarh but was defeated in many a major state by the UPA in direct fights.

The broad geographical distribution of mandate for the UPA points toward an undercurrent favouring the Congress party in general, but local issues have also mattered significantly. It is also important to point out that there is no reversal of the political trend in India over time – national elections being decided as a derivative of individual state contests across the country (Yadav, Palshikar 2009). This election is also in a way conforming to the trend.

Mix of factors for UPA victory

The Congress, in its manifesto as well as during its campaigning emphasised the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Bharat Nirman programme and other social and welfare measures, not to mention the farmer loan waiver scheme. From the indications available, this has elicited a favourable response, which has played out well in different states, irrespective of whether the Congress party (or the UPA) has been in power. Also, minorities have voted for the UPA enthusiastically, explaining the wins for the Congress party and its allies in states such as West Bengal, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. The performance of the party in states such as Gujarat - the Congress won 43% of the vote as compared to the 39% it garnered in the 2007 assembly elections– and in Madhya Pradesh – 40% as compared to 32% in the assembly elections in 2008) suggests the resonance of its national agenda. But having said that, the Congress benefitted immensely from the political dynamics of the state level contests.

In Andhra Pradesh, for example, the implementation of populist and welfare measures by the state government has meant that the alliance has been victorious for a second consecutive Lok Sabha election. The state assembly elections' results has given a majority mandate for the Congress party. The Congress party was also helped by the greater fragmentation of the popular vote in the state, with the presence of the newly formed Praja Rajyam Party led by film actor Chiranjeevi. The PRP managed to win nearly 16% of the votes in both the state and Lok Sabha elections thwarting the “Grand Alliance” of the opposition Telugu Desam, the left parties and the Telangana Rashtra Samiti, in its bid to topple the Congress.

In the left ruled states, high-handedness in administration, the unpopular industrialisation and subsequent land acquisition drive, and the unity of the opposition in West Bengal, and the perception of inadequate levels of governance by the state government and factionalism in the ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Kerala has helped the UPA. In Tamil Nadu, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has done particularly well, on the might of its populist schemes while the incidents in northern Sri Lanka have complicated the verdict – resulting in some losses to senior Congress candidates. Also significantly, the presence of the Desiya Murpoku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK), a political party led by another actor Vijayakanth dented the opposition's hopes significantly, by garnering 10% of the vote share.

The presence of the Maharashtra Navanirman Sena acted to the detriment of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance, particularly in the saffron and chauvinist parties' urban strongholds in Mumbai and its neighbourhoods. This helped the UPA in Maharashtra, which managed to win despite being in power for a very long time and to overcome anti-incumbency as well.

Fragmentation also helped the Congress defeat the opposition in Haryana in a more rousing fashion than expected. Here too, the presence of the Haryana Jan-hit Congress (which won 10% of the vote) helped divide the opposition enough to let the Congress win 9 out of 10 seats in the state.

In other states, the "honeymoon period" (Ravishankar 2009) enjoyed by the Congress governments in Rajasthan and Delhi has meant big wins for the party. In Uttarakhand and Punjab, the Congress has managed to defeat the ruling BJP and Shiromani Akali Dal(SAD)-BJP alliance (possibly facing anti-incumbency) respectively, garnering the majority of the votes.

The most surprising results in favour of the Congress Party was in the major state of Uttar Pradesh. The Congress party's decision to go it alone in Uttar Pradesh after being unable to arrive at a seat-sharing understanding with the Samajwadi Party paid unexpected dividends. The party was able to cache in not only on the popularity of the UPA government in the state, but also on the withering away of the solid aggregate social base that the ruling Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) had attained in the 2007 assembly elections. The Congress party has garnered 21 seats (vote share of 18%), its highest tally for years in the state. Preliminary estimates from the National Election Survey of the Centre for Study of Developing Societiesⁱ (CSDS) suggest that the underwhelming performance of the (BSP) is due to a shift of some of its targeted social base - particularly the upper castes and the Muslims - to the Congress Party.

Overall, the Congress party managed to increase its vote share from 26.4% in 2004 to 28.5% nationally in 2009 and a seat increase from 145 to 206. The UPA presented its credentials to the electorate as a alliance focussing on welfarist policies related to the livelihoods of peasants, ordinary workers and the poor. Nowhere were issues related to “economic reforms” - the liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation agenda – or that related to the new foreign policy aligning India closer to the western bloc (such as the Indo-US nuclear deal), presented prominently to the electorate to gain its mandate. The verdict, even if complicated by the aggregation of state-level factors and fragmentation, is indeed for a social democratic and welfarist orientation of the government.

State wise Seats Tally (source: www.eciresults.nic.in)

	UPA	NDA	TF	FF	Others
Andhra Pradesh	34		8
Arunachal Pradesh	2
Assam	8	5			1
Bihar	2	32		4	2
Chattisgarh	1	10
NCT of Delhi	7
Goa	1	1
Gujarat	11	15
Haryana	9				1
Himachal Pradesh	1	3
Jammu & Kashmir	5				1
Jharkhand	1	8			5
Karnataka	6	19	3
Kerala	16		4
Madhya Pradesh	12	16	1
Maharashtra	25	20			3
Manipur	2
Meghalaya	2
Mizoram	1
Nagaland					1
Orissa	6		15
Punjab	8	5
Rajasthan	20	4			1
Sikkim					1
Tamil Nadu	27		12
Tripura			2
Uttar Pradesh	21	15	20	23	1
Uttarakhand	5
West Bengal	25	1	15		1
Andaman & Nicobar		1
Daman & Diu		1
Chandigarh	1
Puducherry	1
Lakshadweep	1
Dadra & Nagar Haveli		1
Total	261	157	80	27	18

Vote Share of major parties, Lok Sabha Elections 2009

Party Contested	Seats	Won	Vote %
Congress allies	526	261	36.22
Congress	440	206	28.56
JKNC	3	3	0.12
MUL	2	2	0.2
KCM	1	1	0.1
NCP	23	9	1.78
DMK	22	18	1.83
Trinamool Cong	27	19	3.19
JMM	5	2	0.21
RPI	2	0	0.12
IND(Congress)	1	1	0.11
NDA	512	159	24.11
BJP	433	116	18.81
AGP	6	1	0.43
JD(U)	27	20	1.42
INLD	5	0	0.31
Shiv Sena	22	11	1.51
NPF	1	1	0.2
SDF	1	1	0.04
RLD	7	5	0.43
Akali Dal	10	4	0.96
Left	175	24	7.61
CPI	56	4	1.43
CPI(M)	80	16	5.33
FBL	21	2	0.32
RSP	16	2	0.38
KEC	1	0	0.08
IND(Left)	1	0	0.07
BSP	500	21	6.17
Fourth Front	343	27	5.15
SP	193	23	3.43
RJD	44	4	1.27
LJNSP	106	0	0.45
Others	6021	51	20.74
Total	8070	543	100

Source: Source: Computations by CSDS, Delhi, based on Election Commission data. Obtained from Palshikar (2009). Abbreviations – JKNC- Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, MUL- Muslim League, KCM- Kerala Congress (Mani), NCP – Nationalist Congress Party, DMK- Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, JMM- Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, RPI- Republican Party of India, IND- Independent, AGP – Asom Gana Parishad, INLD- Indian National Lok Dal, NPF- Naga People's Front, SDF- Sikkim Democratic Front, RLD- Rashtriya Lok Dal, FBL- Forward Bloc, RSP – Revolutionary Socialist Party, KEC- Kerala Congress, SP- Samajwadi Party, RJD- Rashtirya Janata Dal, LJNSP – Lok Janshakti Party

The BJP thwarted again

The BJP tried to focus on “national security” as its core issue and attempted to make the elections a referendum between personalities pitting its prime ministerial candidate L.K.Advani against the UPA leadership and prime minister Manmohan Singh. The NDA since 2004 had shrunk and the BJP was left only with the Janata Dal- United (JDU), the Shiv Sena the SAD and other minor parties as its allies. The erstwhile NDA allies - the Telugu Desam Party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) had all left the NDA citing the communal politics of the BJP. This had made the NDA's prospects dimmer even before the elections and expectedly, the NDA managed a tally of only 159 seats, way behind in second place to the UPA. The BJP's overall tally was reduced to 116 (18.8%) from 138 (22.2%) in 2004. Both the defection of erstwhile partners as well as the reduction in the party's overall vote share is indicative of the lesser resonance of the party's communal Hindutva agenda, which came again to the fore in the run up to the elections.

The “Third front” was unable to implement its stated aim of forming a non-Congress, non-BJP government but it did ruin the chances of the BJP presenting a credible and winnable alliance before elections. The BJP was a non-factor in several of the states where the contests were limited to parties in the Third front and the Congress, such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. With this tremendous disadvantage, the only hope for the BJP to form a government post elections was through the weaning away of regional parties from the third front. In any case, the dismal performance of the parties in the “third front” in general rendered that option moot.

The BJP managed to win with reduced margins in its “saffron” strongholds such as Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, but won handsomely in Chattisgarh and Karnataka. The performance of the BJP's coalition partner JDU was most significant as Lalu Prasad's Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) and Ram Vilas Paswan's Lok Janshakti Party were trounced badly. It is too early however to suggest that the politics and efficacy of caste alliances in the state has been overcome, as many claim to be the reason for the JDU-BJP alliance which pitched its state government's “development record” as the agenda for the elections. Having said that, the JDU managed to enlarge its aggregate social base to include disaffected sections of other backward classes (OBCs) and dalits.

The Left's worst performance in years

The “third front” - an assorted set of regional parties, and anchored by the Left Front (LF) performed dismally. Though the BJD shrugged off its alliance with the BJP and managed to win the majority of seats both in the Assembly as well as in the Lok Sabha elections in Orissa and the AIADMK managed to improve its tally (from zero previously) in Tamil Nadu, the defeat of the left parties in Kerala, West Bengal and the underwhelming performance of the BSP dragged the TF's tally down. The TF contested directly against the Congress and its allies in most of the states where the front was “viable”.

In West Bengal, the left suffered a historic defeat, polling much fewer votes than in the 2006 Assembly elections and wilting against the united opposition of the Congress and the Trinamul Congress. Reduced to merely 15 seats (43.3%) from a previous tally of 35 (50.7%), the left's loss could be attributed much to its state government's series of policy and governance disasters since 2006 as the opposition fought the elections considering it as a referendum against the long standing Left Front government. Issues such as the land acquisition for industrialisation, high handedness of the administration, minority angst after the Sachar committee findings are the discernible reasons, apart from the fact that the idea of a “third front” did not really appeal to voters. The Lok Sabha election results point to a possible defeat of the left front for the first time in 35 years in the upcoming assembly elections in 2011.

Infighting in the left and governance issues resulted in a UPA victory which was also bolstered by minority support in Kerala. The BSP was not able to replicate its 2007 assembly election performance managing a reduced vote tally, suggesting the non-realisation of the “wider castes and minority support” that the party hoped to garner.

The idea of a “third front” before elections was pressed by the left parties to halt the trend of the two largest parties – the Congress and the BJP heading the national governments over the past 11 years. This flowed from the fact that both the Congress and the BJP had a consensus on major economic and foreign policy issues, which was supported by the big bourgeoisie and richer sections of the population. Yet, in its endeavour to forge a “third alternative”, the left only managed to stitch an amorphous alliance of motley regional and left parties without a common agenda beyond an anti-Congress, anti-BJP position. This expediency driven approach did not help the left or the parties in the third front in substantial transfer of votes through social/electoral bases to each other. Also in states such as Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, vote fragmentation by newer parties such as the PRP and the DMDK frustrated the third front's chances.

This idea of a “third front” did not cut much ice even in left strongholds, leave alone in states such as Andhra Pradesh or Tamil Nadu, where the third front's expectation was for a victory for grand alliances against ruling parties part of the UPA. In hindsight, the left could have focussed on an independent or at-least a more coherent programme-based alliance, consolidating its electoral bases and looking for building a viable opposition to the Congress and the BJP in the medium term. That of course depends upon the continuing popularity and efficacy of the left led governments in the country in presenting an alternate model of governance and policy regimes favouring the traditional classes that the left seeks to represent.

Conclusions

The increased tally of the UPA despite the division in “secular votes” because of the presence of the “third front” and the improved performance in the Congress even in BJP strongholds are pointers toward a good conjuncture of local and national issues favouring the UPA. The UPA contested the elections on its national record of initiating programmes such as the NREGA and other social and welfare measures and pitched its state governments' populist record. The BJP failed to inspire confidence in its national security and personality based platform among the electorate, while the alliance of convenience that forged the third front did not materialise in any gains for the parties in it.

References:

Palshikar, Suhas (2009), “Tentative emergence of a new and tentative coalition?”, Economic and Political Weekly, May 23

Ravishankar, Nirmala (2009), “The Cost of Ruling: Anti-Incumbency in Elections”, Economic and Political Weekly, March 7

Yadav, Yogendra and Palshikar, Suhas (2009), “Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices: Electoral Trends in 2004-09”, Economic and Political Weekly, February 7

iThe Hindu published a supplement, “How India voted” with the CSDS' National Election Survey 2009 information from all the major states in the country. The survey results are hosted in The Hindu's homepage at http://www.hinduonnet.com/nic/howindiavoted2009/howindiavoted2009.htm