Modifying the Terms of Compensation

The Uttar Pradesh government makes compensation for land acquisition more generous, but is that enough?

Intense protests by farmers agitating in the Greater Noida region of Gautam Budh Nagar district of Uttar Pradesh (up) against acquisition of lush agricultural land for the “Yamuna Expressway” project finally compelled the Bahujan Samaj Party government last month to announce a new land acquisition policy. The ruling government’s hand was also forced by the support to the agitations from various opposition parties, whose representatives landed in droves to “lead” the protests. In an attempt to mollify anger about unfair compensation rates currently in place, the new policy sees the government playing a less prominent role and more generous terms of compensation for farmers whose lands are acquired, but the policy is not based on any holistic framework on land use and acquisition.

An EPW Editorial. Read more here.

Misplaced Symbolism

The politics of symbolism is taken too far by the Mayawati led government in Uttar Pradesh.

Symbolism has always played a important part in the Bahujan Samaj Party's (BSP) politics. The essence of the symbolism used by the party is the propagation and prominence given to Dalit and social reform leaders of the past and present - from Jyotiba Phule to Bhimrao Ambedkar to E.V. "Periyar" Ramaswamy to Kanshi Ram by constructing murals, statues and other media. The Mayawati led BSP government in Uttar Pradesh (UP) has taken this symbolism to a garguantan extent - budgeted at nearly Rs 2,000 crores - to build statues and memoriums to not only the aforementioned Dalit icons but also to the chief minister herself. By no means is the UP government's usage of public expenditure for this endeavour exclusive - symbolism in Indian politics and governance across states is replete with examples of iconography and hagiography. To that extent, the exclusive negative attention in the media and derision for Mayawati's symbolism obsession is unjustified and smacks of hypocrisy. But again, the scale of grandeur and the thin line between symbolism and personality cult that the Mayawati led government has traversed calls into question the priorities of the two year old government and indeed the ever-evolving politics of the BSP.

Much of the surprising success in 2007 by the BSP in Uttar Pradesh owes to the astute political strategising and hard work done by its supremo, Mayawati. In winning the assembly elections by a clear majority in India's largest state, Mayawati turned Indian politics on its head - for the first time an avowedly Dalit party had come to power on its own. The major reason for the victory was the strategy of forging a multi-caste alliance with the strings of power in the hands of the Dalit chief minister. The victory in 2007 catapulted the chief minister into national reckoning and it was expected that her government's performance and organisational work by her party would inspire similar successes elsewhere atleast in North India. But the parliamentary elections in 2009 was a dampener, with the BSP unable to consolidate its successes of 2007. One primary reason for this lack of success was the weakening of the broad social coalition - sarvajan as the BSP calls it - in the state, partly because of inability by the Mayawati led government to keep it intact through dedicated governance and also partly because of misplaced priorities. Very little dent has been made in issues that have plagued governance in UP - criminalisation, ineffectiveness, etc and the ostentatious spending on symbolism by Mayawati has certainly not helped her recapture public minds.

Why then has Mayawati embarked upon this mega-project? For one, Dalit symbolism has its efficacy in propping up the issue of self-respect and dignity privileged by the BSP as primary issues for Dalits. The history of the BSP's politics and its political movement suggests how much symbols, visual imagery of leaders have been used to demolish the myth of caste hierarchy. The establishment of memorials and statues continues in this vein. Only Mayawati's own vainglorious attempt to place herself within the "pantheon" of Dalit symbolism, takes the politics of such symbolism too far. Also the scale of such grandeur suggests that the excess is merely an attempt to gloss over the failures of implementation of policies that strike at the very heart of the enduring hierarchy and exploitation - measures such as land reforms for one which are clearly lacking as an emphases for the UP government.

In other words, Mayawati's venture - the provision of immense public space in memoria to Dalit icons (including herself in the process) might be justified on the grounds of providing alternative iconography for subaltern and Dalit achievers. But the primacy given to such symbolism at the cost of other administrative and governance measures to address the concerns of those very subaltern and exploited peoples of the state point toward the co-option of Dalit politics within the broad feudal canvas in many parts of India that privileges the politics of symbolism over actualities of proper governance. This also explains the excessive ostentation displayed by the UP chief minister in events such as her "birthday parties", in the naming of her successor through an envelope and in the highly centralised and authoritative character of her leadership - all belying her humble beginnings and remarkable rise to her current position, attributed to the affinity shown by the Dalit people towards her and her party. The rise of the BSP in Indian politics was a great leap in progressivism and a major event in the so called "silent revolution" orchestrated by the underclasses of Indian society. The sad recourse to excessive symbolism and hagiography suggests that the BSP has taken a few steps backward. It is incumbent upon the "Dalit ki beti" (Daughter of Dalits) and the "behenji" to chart her party and movement back to its original course and a change of priorities in governance would be a good starting point.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The BJP Worsted

There may have been no clear overall victor in the recent elections to five state assemblies, but there was certainly one clear loser, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The BJP having worsted the Congress in a series of state elections over the past two years was confident that it had the latter on the mat, and saw the elections as a dress rehearsal for its return to power in New Delhi in the Lok Sabha polls that are to be held in the first half of 2009. Inflation and the year-long terror attacks across the country that culminated in the Mumbai horrors appeared to the BJP as the Congress having handed victory on a platter. In the end, the BJP has had to perforce turn humble. It won in only two states while the Congress came on top in three. (The results for a sixth state, Jammu and Kashmir, will be known on 28 December.) More important, the electorate has wisely not fallen for the BJP’s campaign that whipped up the issue of terrorist violence.

The BJP had been in power in three of these six states and it had comfortable majorities in the previous elections, while the Congress was seeking a third term in Delhi. The Congress was able to retain power in Delhi, triumphed in Mizoram and snatched victory in Rajasthan by coming ahead of an unpopular Vasundhara Raje-led BJP. The saffron party retained power comfortably in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh.

The Congress won in Mizoram by defeating the Mizo National Front (MNF), which had been in office for 10 years. The MNF’s unpopularity stemmed from its poor handling of the food and famine situation (related to the flowering of bamboo) and the Congress was able to win a two-thirds majority by stressing widespread corruption and mal-governance in the state.

Polling in Rajasthan, Delhi and Madhya Pradesh was held after the terror attacks between 26 and 28 November in Mumbai. The BJP had made terrorism and security a major plank in the polls and had expected to gain leverage in at least Delhi and Rajasthan (states which had suffered terrorist violence over the past year). Yet, the success of the Congress in both these states revealed the failure of the BJP strategy, with the electorate possibly seeing this as a collective problem rather than one that could be put at the doorstep of the Congress.

The perception of Sheila Dikshit’s government in mostly metropolitan Delhi as focusing on development and good governance helped the Congress trump the BJP. In Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje’s government was seen to have been a failure, hopping from one controversy to another (the handling of the peasant movement for water in northern Rajasthan, the Gujjar agitation, widespread corruption and communalisation of governance). The Congress benefited from this strong antipathy towards the BJP government, which faced criticism from within the BJP as well for Vasundhara Raje’s disastrous leadership.

In Madhya Pradesh, the BJP had to force three changes over the past five years in the chief ministership of the government, after a revolt by Hindutva leader Uma Bharati, who then left the party to start her own Hindutva organisation. Intelligently shifting emphasis from Hindutva to development and giving the appearance of (if not actual) better governance, the low profile Shivraj Chauhan has taken the BJP to victory. Chief Minister Chauhan’s projection of an everyday and down to earth image helped the BJP resist anti-incumbency, even as Uma Bharati’s party tasted heavy defeat with its leader herself biting the dust in the assembly elections. The Congress, divided as is its wont and unable to offer a steady alternative, was not able to narrow the huge gap in the electoral vote in the previous elections.

In Chhattisgarh a populist Raman Singh-led BJP won again on the back of such measures as the subsidised rice scheme for the poor. That the Congress offered no better alternative on the other prominent issue – Maoism in the state – and that both the Congress and the BJP have supported the unpopular Salwa Judum exercise ensured that the opposition party could not supplant the BJP.

In many ways, the results of these elections put paid to the “anti-incumbency” theory, which has been the chant of commentators who are unable to explain the voting out of governments that are unpopular everywhere other than in the TV studios and the editorial pages of newspapers. Development and grass roots work have helped ruling parties overcome the opposition, particularly when the other side is divided, does not offer a credible alternative, is plainly communal or is opportunistic. However, voting behaviour and outcomes are far too complex to be explained even in terms of “good governance”.As the result in Madhya Pradesh shows, even an intelligent packaging of a government that seems to care can swing voters away from the opposition, even if there is no true improvement in people’s welfare. A better understanding is needed of how local, regional and national factors affect election outcomes at all levels.

The Congress and the United Progressive Alliance need not now suddenly turn over-optimistic of their chances in their 2009 Lok Sabha polls. Exactly five years ago, in the same states, the Congress was routed everywhere other than in Delhi. That emboldened the National Democratic Alliance to launch its “India Shining” campaign and call elections a few months earlier than scheduled. The assembly election results of 2003 were no harbinger of the Lok Sabha elections of 2004.

Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

BJP wins in Himachal Pradesh

Editorial written for Economic & Political Weekly

Himachal Pradesh keeps faith with its voting history by ejecting the incumbent government

Since the creation of Himachal Pradesh in 1971, assembly elections in the state have usually followed the pattern of removal of incumbent governments from power. The recent elections conformed to the trend with the main opposition party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), winning a comfortable majority (41 out of 68 seats), defeating the incumbent Congress Party. The BJP's victory was significant as it followed up its success in Gujarat.

The BJP has gone on to claim that the national mood was turning in the party's favour and against the ruling coalition in the centre. The Congress, on the other hand, has dismissed the electoral loss as having no impact at the national level and has blamed the anti-incumbency factor for the loss. The party had hoped to break this trend by trying to announce welfare schemes in the later stages of the Virbhadra Singh-led government just before the election schedule was to be announced. That game plan came a cropper with the Election Commission announcing the poll schedule ahead of the expected date due to reasons of logistics.

The primary reason for anti-incumbency voting in the recent elections was the non-fulfilment of promises the Congress government had made after its victory in the 2002 assembly elections. The party had promised one job for every family in the state just after coming to power. Himachal Pradesh remains a state where agriculture, outside the apple orchards, is mostly subsistence based and the primary means of employment outside agriculture has traditionally been government provided. The problem of unemployment is chronic and the downsizing of government in this state too, a characteristic of neo-liberal reforms across India, has meant that newer jobs were left to be created primarily in the private sector through private investment. The Congress government had formulated that 70 per cent of all new jobs created in the private sector must be for Himachal residents, but this was not properly implemented on the ground. Unemployment therefore remained a burning issue that turned the voter mood against the Congress. Perennial issues such as corruption and patronage were other reasons for the grouse against the Congress as much as these were reasons that militated against the BJP in earlier elections.

The BJP victory in this election was qualitatively different from its earlier victories in the state. It was for the first time that the BJP won an overwhelming majority without help from parties such as the erstwhile Himachal Vikas Congress. This points to the effective management of the regional contradictions in Himachal Pradesh. The BJP, seen as strong in the Kangra region (termed New Himachal, as it merged into the old Himachal formed in 1966), was able to win substantially in the seats in the old Himachal region too. The BJP was also able to neutralise earlier perceptions and misgivings about the party on the issues of corruption and mismanagement as the electorate held the Congress government guilty of the same phenomena. The large margins of victory and the increase in vote percentage for the BJP are testimony to the disenchantment with the Congress government. Unlike Gujarat and other states, the politics of “hindutva” and communalism have mattered little in Himachal Pradesh, a state that has a very low concentration of religious minorities.

Another factor that was talked about in this election was the presence of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which contested most of the seats and threatened to make an impact by bringing disgruntled elements from the BJP and the Congress into its fold. The presence of a sizeable dalit population and the resounding success of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh raised hopes of the party making an impact in Himachal, but that was not to be. The BSP won only one seat, won by a Congress dissident and could only act as a spoiler in some constituencies.

Himachal Pradesh has always seen high levels of political participation, reflected in good voter turnouts. The fact that the politics of patronage, bad governance and the presence of corruption have ruled the roost in the state has forced the electorate to reject incumbent governments. The recently concluded election is validation of this pattern. Can the new Prem Kumar Dhumal-led BJP government buck the trend by providing an alternative to such politics?