On the crisis in Nepal

A crisis has been precipitated in the republic of Nepal. The prime minister Pushpa Kumar "Prachanda" Dahal of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has resigned, following presidential actions rejecting a cabinet decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff, Rukmangad Katuwal from his post. Earlier, the government was reduced to a minority after withdrawal of support from the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). This article will strive to comment on the developments and put things in perspective. 

The Peace accord between various political actors in Nepal in 2005 paved the way for the transformation of the country into a republic. The integration of the Maoists within the political mainstream was the most important step in this culmination, as it were the Maoists who had concretely addressed the demand for the formation of a new republic with a new Constitution to go along with it. Other parties, inevitably fell in line judging the public and civic mood and the currency of the demand. Following this was constituent assembly elections, where the Maoists emerged as the single largest party and eventually after the declaration of a republic, a coalition government involving all major actors except the Nepal Congress was formed. 

Complex Issues

Two of the issues that were seen to be the most complex in the run-up to the writing of the Constitution were the integration of the Maoist armed cadre into the Nepali Army and the resolution of the federal question with all the major actors having varying positions on these issues. Having said that, vis-a-vis the former, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Nepal government and the Maoists in 2006 laid the scope for control over the Nepali army and on the integration of the Maoist combatants (of the People's Liberation Army - PLA) within the Nepali army (Article 5.1 and sections). A special committee has already been given the task of going about this process, which is still on. Yet Rukmangad Katuwal, seen as a loyal supporter of the erstwhile monarchy, decided to violate this agreement (Article 5.12) by going on for recruitment into the Nepali army, unilaterally extending the tenure of senior army officials and also withdrawing the Nepali army's participation from the National Games because of the PLA's participation. 

Civilian supremacy over the army is a sine qua non in all democracies and the blatant violation of the CPA was not surely going to be condoned by the Maoist led government. The government therefore sought Katuwal's explanation, and his response was that of defiance. Added to these incidents were rumours of a soft coup in the making, engineered by the Army. The government therefore decided to terminate Katuwal's posting, an action that was opposed to by the opposition NC which possibly sees the defiant army chief as a power centre stolidly opposed to the Maoists. As does, the Indian establishment, which sees a formal balance of power that keeps the Maoists in check necessary to continue its hegemony in Nepali affairs and to blunt any growing proximity between the Nepali nation and China strategically.

Unconstitutional actions

Questions have been raised by some commentators as to whether the Maoists acted in the manner that could be construed as"extreme". Prominent Indian analyst on Nepal affairs S.D.Muni, while calling into question the Chief of Army staff's actions, in the same breath suggests that the Maoists' action of removing the CoAS is "extreme". He writes that the CoAS's actions were in violation of the CPA and the civilian government was within its rights to demand an explanation from Katuwal for his actions. But, he stops at that and suggests that the Maoists were immature in removing the CoAS. This writer finds such an argument untenable. For the smooth transition of the infant republic into a Constitutional democracy, feudal remnants such as Katuwal had to be removed, as threats such as "soft coups" and other dangers were imminent and harmful. 

Even more problematic was the Nepali president Ram Baran Yadav's decision to overturn the cabinet's decision to remove the CoAS. The correct constitutional position for the president to take was to reply back to the cabinet to re-think the decision, but the actions by Yadav smacks of yet another violation of correct parliamentary procedure.

The UML

The UML found the action to remove the CoAS as non-consensual and has even suggested that the president's actions were necessitated. This writer finds the UML's positions egregious. For one, Katuwal has been in the habit of asserting the Nepali army's "independence" from civilian control, thereby showing no regard to the concept of civilian supremacy over the army. This reminds one of the just overthrown era of monarchy where the army was subordinate only to the royalty and not to the elected civilian government. For the infant republic the continuation of such feudal remnants was untenable and therefore the action by the Maoist led Government cabinet to remove Katuwal from his post was democratic and true to republican ethos. As an analogy one could point out the US head of state whenever elected to power has the prerogative to remove the Army Chief of Staff. 

The UML by not acquiescing to this decision was acting in a sectarian and juvenile manner. One can ask a question as to whose interest the UML was representing when it decided to withdraw support to the government over the issue of removal of the CoAS. The further moves by the UML to try to form a government with the Nepali Congress (strictly on the basis of an anti-Maoist position) and to endorse the president's actions make it amply clear that the UML has lost the plot completely. 

A counter argument could be made that the Maoist, in the name of left unity, could have tried to build a consensus with the UML before the removal of the CoAS. But this argument seems petty because the removal of the CoAS` was a matter of principle, and required no coaxing of the UML to achieve it. It is evident that the UML had other considerations in mind. Was the party pressurised by Indian authorities to go ahead with their folly? Atleast that is what is being alleged by some sections of the Maoists. 

One of the chief grouses that the UML had with the Maoist was that the latter was unable to control and stop the high-handedness exhibited by its youth organisation, the YCL. The YCL has been repeatedly accused and rightly so, of intimidation, violence against UML cadre. This was seen by UML leaders such as senior communist Madhav Kumar Nepal as one of the biggest roadblocks for left unity. To a certain extent these grievances were legitimate. But the action to withdraw support to the Maoist led government when the easiest thing to do for an avowed left party was to act on principle suggests that this action by the UML was cynical and lame.

Indian role

Coming back to the Indian role in this whole issue: the Indian ambassador's moves to pressurise the Nepali polity to retain Katuwal was a blatant expression of interference in Nepali affairs. Any self respecting Nepali, let alone a Maoist or any other leftist politician would have bristled at this interference, which however is part of a long legacy of intrusion in Nepali affairs. No wonder, the Maoists have openly accused the Indian bureaucrats of playing a meddlesome role. For this Indian, the Indian ambassador's actions are even more galling because the Indian establishment had played a positive role in the culmination of Nepal into a republic from a highly unpopular and illegitimate monarchy. 

Is this latest trend of negative influence- direct meddling, scheming with other political parties to push the Maoists into a corner and thereby endangering the peace agreement as well as the constitutional building process,related to the fact that India wants to retain its levers of influence? In other words the current Indian establishment is uncomfortable with the Maoists' stated intent of asserting a sovereign and a truly independent domestic and foreign policy. While, on the other hand during the time when the Left Front supported the Indian government the stated intent was not to meddle with the Nepali polity but to maintain healthy relations with whichever political dispensation which was in power.

This writer after his visit to Nepal just after the constituent assembly elections had warned that a derailment of the republican process of constitutional building and overcoming of some challenges such as the Army-PLA integration could be possible because bad habits such as treating Nepal as part of a geopolitical game between neighboring powers were still in place in the strategic calculuses of India and China. This fear seems to not have been misplaced.

It is imperative that the unconstitutional move of the Nepali president has to be overturned. The independent civil society in Nepal has reacted to the president's moves by demanding a judicial decision on the actions, both by the Nepali president as well as by the CoAS. Prominent civil society activists including Shyam Shrestha, Devender Raj Pandey and Krishna Pahadi who were involved in the anti-monarchy protests in Kathmandu in 2005, have now been arrested for protesting against the president's actions. This suggests that the Maoists have gained sympathy of independent and republican voices in the country. 

What needs to be done

By resigning from government on moral grounds, the Maoists made a gesture that has been appreciated by several sections of the Nepali populace. Even though the performance of the Maoist led government in various spheres of governance has been below expectations, the many challenges before the writing of the Constitution were being whittled down one by one, before the series of actions by Katuwal. 

The Maoists have to realise that the building of the constitution and the regaining of the momentum for the same is an imperative that cannot be foregone. By mobilising public opinion against the actions of the president, the army chief, the erstwhile coaliton partner UML, the Maoists can achieve an overturning of the unconstitutional actions by the chief executive as also convince the other prominent left party, the UML to fall in line on the path of propreity and left unity. The onus is on the UML to take a stance regarding this. Otherwise the party, with its recent history of poor political posturing and incorrect decisions, would be on the path to self-destruction, by having lost its leftist moorings and by opening the possibility of a rupture in its ranks. 

A massive show of public antipathy toward Indian (or for that matter Chinese or American) interference in Nepali political affairs should be re-assuring for the polity to adopt sovereignty and independence as guiding principles as partners in the republican polity and also act as a bulwark against continued meddling of the sort that transpired over the issue of the army chief's removal. In India too, the Indian people and intelligentsia should caution against debilitating actions of the kind that the Indian ambassador indulged in and the Indian establishment must be forced to let the Nepali polity take its own course of actions. Nepal can be a vital conduit for trade between India and China and a cordial relationship with the newly growing up republic is in the best interests of both ordinary Nepalis and ordinary Indians, especially living close to the borders of the country. It makes no sense for the Indian establishment to act in cahoots with feudal remnants in Nepal giving an ostensible reason of "stability". The examples of military over-reach in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the preponderance of the Sri Lankan army in Sri Lanka is enough to caution the Indian state from endorsing a similar denouement in Nepal. And that too, when the popular mood in the country is for a federal democratic republic and where a social revolution is being played out democratically.

Maoists attack Himal media

The Maoists in Nepal came to power by winning an outright (constituent assembly) election, defeating discredited parliamentary opponents and helping in the overthrow of the hated monarchy. They did this by graduating from a guerilla struggle and by debating their every move to enter into a multi-party democratic system. They opened up to the media, built international bridges with civil society and solidarity organisations in south Asia, who were equally enthralled about the removal of a feudal autocratic institution - the monarchy as much as the ordinary Nepali citizen.

There has indeed been a lot of goodwill for the Maoists and for the democratic community to build a fresh, egalitarian constitution. No one expected that process to be smooth as the contradictions between the polity was bound to be laid out to the fore and each of the parties were to undergo a certain transformation in the new political game. If the UML had to adjust to the presence of a larger left party which was slowly but surely hegemonising their constituency, the Nepali Congress had to accommodate sections of the erstwhile monarchist right among its already hotch-potch coalition of liberal, social democrats and feudal sections. The Maoists, on the other hand had some catching up to do in a new liberal polity, where it had to subordinate itself to the rules of the "competitive game". They had "suffered birth pangs", as was seen in the way there was a disconnect between an accommodative leadership which was keen on fostering a broad coalition of democracy, and an assertive and confrontational mass organisation such as the YCL which was intent on building and retaining the hegemonic space, not to mention the more difficult transformation from a guerilla outfit involved in a people's war to a democratic political party.

At times, this disconnect created a rift between the Maoists and other political parties - in particular, the UML. But for the sake of a longer vision of a constitutional republic, these were in a way sorted out. Even then, time and again, the illiberal character of the mass organisations of the Maoists (admittedly in a chaotic socio-political system) has raised heads. One such incident is the simply unacceptable attack of the Himal media premises in Kathmandu where journalists affiliated to the weekly Nepalitimes, the Himal Khabarpatrika and others in Himalmedia were attacked by people who were identified as Maoist members of their restaurant workers union and others related to YCL (again).

As a report by Prashant Jha who writes a weekly column with Nepalitimes and is a consulting editor with Himal Magazine points out, it is not the case that the magazines have covered the Maoists favourably or indeed they have been objective about reporting on issues that are dear to the Maoists. But that is not a "grievance" to be addressed in this manner - violent targetting of the media offices and their journalists. Or is any other greivance enough to justify or legitimise a violent attack. After all, the modus operandi reminds this Indian journalist about the fascist attack by Hindu right wing groups in India - the Shiv Sena attack on Outlook magazine or the NCP goons' attack on Marathi journalists.

Clearly the "birth pangs" for the democratic Maoist party in a liberal polity, have continued. And this is untenable. Hegemonising public space by violence and intimidation will only backfire as the international community will obviously react with disgust and so too would other members of the media fraternity in the fledgling constitutional republic.

This writer, who has been sympathetic and supportive of the Nepali Maoist project in Nepal to achieve an egalitarian, developed and constitutional republic of Nepal, free from exploitation and international meddling, unequivocally condemns the violent attacks on the press, orchestrated by elements affilated to the Maoists.

Setback for the left in Nepal

Article written for The Post, Lahore

Just as the trust vote in India saw dramatic intrigue featuring some dubious moves that ultimately mattered in the result (the government won the vote), the presidential election in post-monarchy Nepal came about with a thrilling climax. There was equal intrigue, deceit and backstabbing, sudden friends and instant enemies made in the presidential elections story, which saw the Maoists outsmarted, just as the leftists in India were unable to stop the nuclear deal’s operationalisation.

The Maoists had won the elections in April but the win was nowhere decisive. This resulted in a situation where the formation of a new government was put off till alliances were created that would ensure a numerical surety for whomsoever who had the majority claim. Initially there were attempts to generate consensus among the seven party alliance for the major executive posts (president, vice-president, prime minister and speaker). That consensus was elusive. The main losing parties in the constituent assembly elections, the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified-Marxist-Leninist (UML) – were nowhere willing to partake in a consensual understanding with the Maoists. So after much haggling and drawn out processes of talking between every political party, some kind of understanding was worked out between the two largest leftist forces in the country, the Maoists and the UML. The idea was for the UML to get the post of president while the Maoists would retain the chief executive post of prime minister. It all looked hunky dory at this point of time till the UML announced its preferred choice for president.

Madhav Kumar Nepal is one of the senior-most communist leaders of not only Nepal, but the subcontinent. Coming of age in the Jhapa movement, he had steadily grown in the ranks of the party before eventually becoming the main leader of the UML in the mid- and late 1990s. He had however lost out in the recently held CA elections in both the constituencies where he had been fielded by his party. That in one stroke meant that he had lost moral authority to lead his party and he promptly resigned from the general secretaryship of the UML. Over the past few months since the elections, he had been replaced from the leadership by other leaders such as Jhalanath Khanal and had gradually faded away from the limelight, before the decision by his party to suddenly pitchfork his name for the post of president.

The Maoists were deeply uncomfortable with the idea of Madhav Nepal as the president for many reasons. For starters, they perhaps wanted someone who was not part of the old political guard that dominated Nepali politics in the 1990s and the 2000s; which ruled out Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress and Madhav Nepal for the largely ceremonial post. The Maoists were also keen on pitching a Madhesi face for president, to mark a symbolic break in the history of Nepal with a name from the plains for the highest (if purely ceremonial) constitutional post in the country. They were also thinking of arranging the executive posts (president, vice-president, prime minister and speaker) in a manner that various identities were represented in them; a Madeshi, a person from the hills, a janajati (roughly translating to a tribal identity) and a woman. And this idea was what motivated the Maoists to suggest the name of Sahana Pradhan, a senior UML woman leader for the post of president, but the UML were adamant on getting Madhav Nepal the post.

When the understanding between the UML and the Maoists led to a deadlock, the latter thought it best to propose a new understanding with the largest Madhesi party, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) and get a Madhesi face elected as president. And the candidate was Ram Raja Prasad Singh, a veteran and militant republican from the plains. It seemed that the Maoists’ new coup wrought out with the alliance with the MJF would catapult Singh to president, but it was not to be.

The rug was pulled out from the Maoists’ feet by last minute machinations worked out by the NC, UML and surprisingly by the Madhesi parties too, as all these players ganged up and rejected the primary Maoist candidate by putting up Ram Baran Yadav, a veteran Nepali Congress leader from the plains. And the MJF got the vice presidential post nomination, with Parmanand Jha named as the joint candidate of the newly formed front of these parties. In one sweep, two Madhesis were elected president and vice-president and although the Maoists’ idea of ensuring representation of a prominent name from the plains succeeded, the persons finally elected were a “soft” monarchist from the Nepali Congress and a former judge from the plains representing the MJF. Surprisingly, neither of these posts were occupied by anyone closer to the Left, even though the Left parties in Nepal had enjoyed nearly two-thirds majority together in the constituent assembly.

Eventually, the Maoists were checkmated in the plain old game of Kathmandu power politics. They were still determining whether or not to join the government and to take the prime minister’s post, which according to the mandate was rightly theirs. A unity government with Left domination had proven to be a mirage, with the UML and the Maoists unable to get over their differences, much of which were got to do with their leaders’ ego, in this writer’s opinion. The UML was not able to think beyond minor considerations of getting their senior-most leader accorded a ceremonial post, while the Maoists were being too calculating in their approach to get a configuration of executive posts to their liking.

The machinations wrought out by the various parties against the Maoists could be used by the latter to get more support from the people who are already tired with the shenanigans that have accompanied government formation since the elections and declaration of a republic. To get more popular support from the people by pointing out the machinations, would require the Maoists to sit in opposition. But that would mean that the levers that the Maoists would hold in the creation of an egalitarian and progressive constitution will be considerably weakened.

It is a new dilemma for the newly entered force into mainstream polity. The Maoists had a lot at stake while they were entering the mainstream. They had to pacify their radical constituency which had sacrificed a lot in ensuring power for the radical party, whose armed wing was barracked and is still awaiting a decision to either integrate with the armed forces or accept a new “security” role. Criticisms have emanated about their tactics to integrate completely into mainstream polity at the cost of their stated aim to achieve a revolution in Nepal immediately. But so far, the Maoists were consistent in manoeuvring the various political steps to be taken in Kathmandu toward achieving a progressive constitution and toward laying the foundations of a radical democracy, before this new setback that they received. Lack of consensus, primarily with the UML has been the main reason for the setback to not just the Maoists but to the Left in Nepal.

It is high time that the Maoists sat down and had long and elaborate talks with the UML about their vision and the need for unity. Or else all gains made so far in constructing an agenda for genuine change from the discredited parliamentary and unitary system in the newly declared republic will come to nought.

The beginning of a real revolution

As speculated in these columns some time ago, the impending collapse of the Nepali monarchy now seems a surety. The Nepali people, frustrated by years of a non-performing semi-feudal order, disenchanted with a polity that refused to stand up against the monarchy and could not manage to transfer sovereignty to the people, elected the Communist Party of Nepal(Maoist) in large numbers enough to control a substantial number in a new Constituent Assembly.


The CPN(Maoist) was an a-systemic party, a rebel outfit and an insurgent organisation not very long ago. They had formulated their ‘people’s war’ line based out of the fact that the mainstream polity was not willing to address the basic problem that bothered ‘democratic’ Nepal since 1990, the subordination of the standing army to the royalty instead of the elected representatives in parliament. The CPN(Maoist) used the strategy adopted by the Chinese revolution led by Mao Tse Tung to formulate a path of insurrection that would gain them power in semi-feudal Nepal.

This path was to capture the countryside and encircle the urban areas and gradually smash the state apparatus and gain power overthrowing the existing order. Even though they achieved the former, they were not able to defeat the Royal Nepalese Army convincingly enough to get to power. They were held in check as the mainstream polity still had a relevance and power in the urban areas and also because of the fact that international opinion was widely against them. It was very clear that the path of armed confrontation to capture power had led to a deadlock not just strategically or logistically but also it had gained only so much support from the people. Ergo, the Maoists called for a ceasefire and acknowledged mistakes committed by them during the ‘war phase’ where civilians were also killed in the crossfire and due to some anarchic handling. They even dropped the parallel institutions of governance in the areas they controlled.

The new war was now to be waged to capture the people’s minds and especially of those who were supporting the mainstream political parties, the CPN(UML) and the Nepali Congress (NC). This was bound to be a difficult task, but it was made easier because of the acts of the monarch, Gyanendra. By proclaiming emergency, suspending parliament, usurping all power for himself and trying to set Nepal back to the days of the ‘panchayati’ system, Gyanendra only brought the entire political spectrum against him. This in addition to the fact that he was viewed with wide scorn and anger because of the events that led to the earlier monarch, Birendra and his family’s death, ensured that there was popular mobilisation behind the entire political spectrum.

This opened a vista for the Maoists to gain a foothold in areas not controlled by them. By tying up with the mainstream political parties after a prolonged internal discussion, which led to the acceptance of a multiparty democracy, the Maoists gradually came aboard into the stream of legitimacy. The monarch’s obtuse steps in restoring autocracy alienated him not only from the masses, but made it untenable for even the international community to support him, despite the ‘Maoist bogey’ that he used to garner all powers for himself. Thus Nepal’s powerful neighbour, India, distanced itself from the monarch and lent support to the restoration of democracy.

At this precise time, the Maoists took the lead in arguing for a new constituent assembly that would throw the remnants of monarchy and identified the primary contradiction correctly to the general polity: the fact that the Nepal Army was under the thrall of the monarchy and not the elected political powers. Flowing from this was the logic that it was necessary to transfer the sovereign in entirety to the public and that would entail the creation of a republic that will be governed by a new constitution, itself a product of the deliberations of the representatives of the people themselves. Armed with this strong thesis for change, the Maoists were able to convince the entire political spectrum to unite for a new constituent assembly. These parties together launched a civilian protest for the restoration of democracy and were aided in this by representatives of civil society too.

Buckling under the pressure of the entire mainstream polity as well as the loss of international support because of a series of egregious steps, the monarch had to restore democracy yet again. This time, the government formed was in the nature of a national unity apparatus with all major political parties participating based on a common understanding. A leading role was played by representatives from the Indian polity too in forging this common understanding. The Maoists were now very much coagulated into the ‘liberal democratic setting’ and were even offered positions in government. They pledged simultaneously to keep their militias under lock with UN supervision and agreed to an interim constitution.

Inherent as it is with ‘noisy democracy’, the Maoists had to come down from several positions for example to provide guaranteed representation to all hitherto neglected sections and minorities in Nepal, including those of the plains region (the Terai) in Nepal while getting the interim constitution passed. This resulted in a widespread protest and alienation in the Terai region, which was also stoked by forces close to the monarch and saboteurs in the international community apprehensive of the growing clout of the Maoists. Over a year and a half, many little turmoils characterised the eight party alliance-led government; elections to the constituent assembly were postponed twice and the Maoists themselves were bogged down by the Terai issue and the complications created because of being part in a multi-class/party-based government.

They responded by retaining their powers of threat and persuasion by refusing to rule out a return to the ‘people’s war’ phase and ratcheted up their opposition to all forms of monarchy (constitutional or otherwise). Despite being part of government, they engaged in constant mobilisation and interaction with the masses through a strong network of activists who branched into the remotest part of Nepal and kept making headlines with their demands and arguments. The policy of containment played by other parties (the UML and the NC) did play out initially, but in the end, the Nepali people proved that they need genuine and radical change from the state of affairs that was commanded by the mainstream political parties since 1990.

In essence, this has resulted in the major victory for the hitherto a-systemic communist party of the Maoists in the recently concluded constituent assembly elections. The people have given them a resounding mandate expecting them to harness Nepal’s potential in natural resources for inclusive welfare and to honour political representation for vast teeming masses who were left out in the days of autocracy and controlled democracy. A herculean task still remains for the Maoists as the embers of anger in the Terai have not yet been contained as also the fact that there are seemingly insurmountable challenges to overcome in a predominantly poor and underdeveloped Nepal. They would still have to utilise their popular alliance with the entire political spectrum in formulating the new institutions, which would bring about the process of change and development. The real revolution for them has just begun.

Article written for The Post

On the Nepal turmoil..

...An editorial published in the Economic and Political Weekly

A Curious Twist

The recent withdrawal of the representatives of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) from the government has precipitated a crisis of governance and created an impasse for the “seven party alliance” (itself a misnomer, since one of its members, the United Left Front is an alliance in itself) that had taken over power from the king in November 2006. Since the formation of this government, based on a mutual pact between the representatives of the seven political parties/groups and the Maoists, several steps had been taken to steer the political process in Nepal towards the formation of a democratic republic. The institution of monarchy has lost its legitimacy; most political observers now believe that Nepal is bound to become a republic if the elections to the constituent assembly are indeed “free and fair”.

The withdrawal of the CPN(M) from the government at a time when, as is being claimed, some of the key issues raised by them were being addressed, has aroused widespread curiosity. A series of dramatic moves, such as the withdrawal of several of the powers and privileges of the monarch and the adoption of a part “majoritarian”, part proportional representation system of elections, had been initiated by the present government.

Recent events in Nepal, particularly the happenings in the Terai region, suggest a set of clues to disentangle the reasons for the political impasse. The anarchic violence in the plain regions of Nepal, led by a diverse set of groups, whose claims range from madhesi inclusion in the political mainstream and government to independence for the Terai region, has not been contained. The Maoists, who had included marginalised sections such as dalits, madhesis and minorities in their contingent of members of the interim parliament, have not been able to assuage the raging discontent in the Terai. Neither could the government, of which the Maoists were a part, relying as it did on same old patterns of containment and selective appeasement as a response to madhesi demands.

Essentially, the madhesi problem is a cauldron that involves fissures on several axes such as caste and language and not just the differences between the dominant “pahadi” and the madhesi identity. The Maoists had lent support to a madhesi regional front, the Madhesi Rashtriya Mukti Morcha, but the internal fissures in the Terai region have meant that this forum no longer commands predominant support. The Gaur incident of March 21, in which several Maoist sympathisers were massacred by other madhesi partisans, is indicative of the sharp divisions on the ground. The Maoists have blamed the forces backing the royals and foreign interference (India and the US) for this situation and have therefore demanded the declaration of a republic even before the elections to the constituent assembly.

The rapidly deteriorating support for the Maoists in the Terai region and their inability to retain their support base despite commitment to genuine devolution of power and radical economic reforms has in turn created pressures within the party, linking the setback to the party’s participation in government. In a recent party plenum, apparently dissatisfied with the performance of the Maoists in government, many members demanded a reorientation to the goals of revolution. As such, the Maoists had accepted minor ministries in the interim government, perhaps contributing to this dissatisfaction.

The Maoists’ demands for immediate declaration of a constitutional republic in Nepal and a full proportional representation system have therefore to be seen in this context. This “shifting of goalposts” (so termed because the Maoists originally insisted on the question of the republic being decided by the constituent assembly) and withdrawal from government had precipitated the present crisis. In hindsight, the Maoists should have insisted on a full PR system to be incorporated in the interim constitution itself.

The “return to open politics” by the Maoists has necessitated renewed mobilisation and readdressing of demands (as mentioned in the 22-point charter prepared by them before the formation of the government), even as they realise that the containment policy followed by the other parties towards them is limiting their influence. The Maoists still appear committed to the elections to the constituent assembly and there seems no threat of a return to “people’s war”. The political uncertainty suggests unfolding political alignments among the left in Nepal to counter the reunited and strengthened Nepali Congress. Meanwhile, as we go to press, the government has requested the Election Commission to suspend the elections to the constituent assembly (that were slated for November 22) pending a special session of the interim Parliament to consider an amendment to the interim constitution to meet the Maoists’ demands.