Trouble in Xinjiang

Pent up frustrations result in violent riots in Uyghur capital in China

Incidents of ethnic violence involving deaths of more than 190 people, rocked Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China on the 5th of July, when rioters belonging to the predominantly Sunni Islamic Uyghur ethnic denomination attacked members of the Han Chinese community in the city. The immediate trigger for the incidents in Urumqi was the violent targetting of Uyghur migrants by Han workers in a toy factory in the southern China province of Guangdong on June 26th. Miffed by what some Uyghurs felt as Chinese government inaction in bringing the guilty Han workers to justice, protests were staged in Urumqi, which further transformed into a bloody ethnic riot with Uyghurs attacking the migrant Han Chinese population. While Xinjiang has been rocked by sporadic incidents of violence for quite some time, including terrorist bombing and other riots, the incidents of July 5th were of such an alarming order that the Chinese President Hu Jintao had to shorten his visit to the G8 summit in Rome to return back to his country.

The official reaction of the Chinese government was to blame external forces for these incidents, pointing fingers at an Uyghur separatist leader (of the World Uyghur Congress) based in the United States. But just as in the Tibetan set of events last year, the riots in Urumqi must be attributed to resentment among the minority ethnic groups of China's population and umbrage against some of its government's policies. One such policy is the "Western development" initiative launched in the later half of the 1990s which involved the large scale capital investment in utilisation and extraction of natural resources in an endeavour to economically develop the western regions of China. Simultaneously there was also an influx of ethnic Han Chinese to partake in the economic benefits of the growth process in these regions, including Xinjiang. What has been resulted is the garnering of a large share of the employment opportunities by the Han migrants. This combined with measures such as teaching of Mandarin in schools in Xinjiang has not gone down well with the local Uyghur speaking people. While the Chinese government insists that these policies are meant to give better opportunities to the Uyghurs, that perception is not shared by the local indigenous population in Xinjiang. Thus despite certain concessions to minorities such as the relaxation of the One-Child policy or other social measures, resentment against Han in-migration, corruption among the ruling elite, lopsided development and employment opportunities plus perceptions of cultural suppression has seen Uyghurs increasingly getting antipathetic to the Chinese government. This resentment also resonates with the perceptions of rising inequality and government corruption elsewhere in China.

China's Constitution and its instituted 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provides for ethnic minorities the right to protect, preserve and promote their cultures. Apparently the intent to respect and provide for diversity in the Constitution and in the autonomy law has not translated fully in its implementation in Xinjiang (as in Tibet), giving rise to grievances. In the medium and long term, the Chinese government has to bring make a paradigm shift from its current policy of conflating all forms of Uyghur dissent and grievances within "separatism, extremism and terrorism" to adopt a far more accommodative approach basing itself on the stated aims of the Constitution. The relative restraint with which the Chinese government handled the aftermath of the July 5th incidents could be a starting point. Merely blaming the separatist elements in the Uyghur diaspora for "fomenting" the riots is not going to help resolve the situation that resulted in the incidents in the first place.

The danger of a Han chauvinist and nationalist reprisal and consequent repression of Xinjiang remains, but thus far the Chinese government both at the national and at the local levels have tried to restore normalcy by appealing for calm while engaging in bringing those engaged in murder and violence to justice. The relative freedom and access given to the press (both local and foreign) in covering the events after the July 5th incidents suggests a marked change from the Chinese government response to the Tibetan incidents last year.

Beyond the political measures, the Chinese have to revisit the capital intensive growth paradigm as well, not just in the western regions but elsewhere in the mainland as well. Due to objective conditions - the global financial crisis and the structural problems in the Chinese economy, the Hu Jintao regime has instituted a more populist set of policies than its predecessor, but that is still not enough to mitigate the socio-economic troubles faced by the nation.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly.

Tragedy in the Vanni

Tragedy in the Vanni

The Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government push the Tamils of the Vanni to a fate worse than death.

Scores of dead civilians, many limbless survivors, starving and homeless people, makeshift hospitals that have been bombed and “human shields”. These are the images from the military confrontation between the Sri Lankan army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Vanni region in the north-east of the island. The Sri Lankan government’s campaign to destroy the LTTE has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that was foretold when the military solution was initiated two years ago. The government, however, shows no let-up since it is sensing victory as the LTTE is now confined to a patch of 10 square kilometres adjoining the Indian Ocean. Until earlier this week, the Sri Lankan army was shelling and bombing the territory, while the LTTE used the civilian population as a shield against the military onslaught. Nearly 2,00,000 people have fled the area and are being kept in internment camps in shabby conditions while tens of thousands are hostages in the small area under LTTE control.

Both sides to the conflict, intractable in their military aims, have remained impervious to the human tragedy they have scripted. The LTTE refuses to give up and apart from issuing one unilateral ceasefire declaration earlier this week, which was rejected by the Lankan army, it continues to use the people it professes to fight for as fodder in its military resistance. Despite appeals from the international community, the Sri Lankan government too shows no indication of halting the military campaign to ensure safety of the civilians. The government has been emboldened by the euphoric support it has received from the Sinhala populace and from the Sinhala polity’s refusal to consider any course apart from military action to resolve the ethnic conflict.

The conflict now looms over the Lok Sabha elections in Tamil Nadu as well. The Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has suddenly declared its support for an independent “Eelam” and in response, the Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (briefly) went on an “indefinite” hunger strike to demand cessation of hostilities in the island. Eelam, until now restricted to the fringe political sections of the state’s polity, has become an election issue. The government of India responded to the clamour in Tamil Nadu for intervention in Sri Lanka by sending its national security advisor and foreign secretary to Colombo and calling for a truce, but it is evident that the Indian response is not intended to go beyond tokenism. New Delhi perceives the conflict in Sri Lanka from a competitive geopolitical perspective as China is a big supplier of weapons and ammunition to the Sri Lankan government and Beijing is unwilling to pressure the Lankan government to stop its military campaign.

The efforts by the Sri Lankan government to paint the ethnic conflict as a “war on terror” have paid off because of the increasing global animus to all forms of “terror” since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. There had been a crackdown on overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting the Tamil diaspora and this has helped the Sri Lankan government isolate the rebel group and move to the verge of a military victory. The Sri Lankan government led by its president Mahinda Rajapaksa has managed to withstand criticism of its actions by promising a simultaneous political solution to the conflict involving other Tamil representatives, but this too is tokenism as no genuine effort towards a federal devolution seems to be in the offing. The tired tactic of co-option of a few ex-Tamil militants, and the adoption of draconian measures to curb any criticism of the government’s military approach in the media, civil society and the polity belie the promises made by Rajapaksa.

It is evident that a bloodbath is going to happen if the Lankan army continues on its course of wanting to obliterate the LTTE. Will a physically and emotionally traumatised Tamil citizenry really trust a government that promises an undefined political solution after its military victory? The current antipathy in the Sinhala polity towards a federal solution tells the Tamils what is in store after a Sri Lankan army victory. As for the LTTE, its strategy of dragging the remaining thousands of Tamil civilians in their area of control to mutilation and death is genocide of its own kind. It is evident that the LTTE top leadership will continue with its resistance because it fears trials for its past actions such as assassinations and indiscriminate attacks on civilian institutions. But if the LTTE wants to live up to its claim of acting on behalf of the Tamil people of the island, surrender is the only way to prevent more casualties in the Vanni. It would then be up to the international community to drive a just bargain for the Tamils if the Sri Lankan government fails to live up to its words.

Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The Lankan conflict – as is; and the way out

The civil war in Sri Lanka is drawing to a bloody closure, with the rout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) imminent. The LTTE is holed up in a small area on a beachfront adjoining the Indian Ocean. The outfit's leader is still believed to be dissolved among the thousands of residents boxed in the area. A sea of Tamils had just fled the area (called ironically the "No Fire zone") and left to the safety of "internment camps" in Sri Lankan Army (SLA) controlled territory. The LTTE remains defiant despite the impossible odds it faces while the SLA sensing and smelling victory has kept at the effort disregarding the consequences of the final bloodbath. Even as I was writing this, the LTTE declared an unilateral ceasefire, keeping in mind the humanitarian crisis in the area.

Journalists have been kept away from the Vanni and other regions of north Sri Lanka for long now, and one is therefore forced to sift through the coloured reports from the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry releases and the pro-LTTE Tamilnet to get an idea of what is really going on. While the former portrays the sequence of events as if they are engaged in a "liberation" battle, points to nearly every civilian casualty as a result of LTTE hitting the very people it is claiming to represent and using them as human shields, the latter portrays the war as genocide, suggesting that the SLA is targeting the citizenry deliberately and killing them in droves. The truth lies somewhere in between. Yes, its cliched, but that is how it is. 

The truth

Rohini Hensman writes this piece based on a visit to Colombo. She suggests that there is truth in the fact that the LTTE is cynically and rabidly using the Tamil casualties as a prop to pressurise the "international community" to force the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to call a ceasefire. She also writes that the SLA is retaliating at LTTE fire from behind the civilians and shelling at LTTE positions within civilian areas, unmindful of the consequences. In some ways, this was expected. I wrote this editorial when the conflict was taking a turn for the worse, in humanitarian terms. Independent journalist DBS Jeyaraj has been cautioning about the humanitarian catastrophe for some months now. 

What in essence is happening is that the GoSL understands that it has the upper hand not only in the military battle as it has gone on till now, but also in the soft power status across the world because of the changed international reckoning vis-a-vis the "war against terror". And hence the SLA is marching on its way to a military end to the conflict, knowing fully that the "collateral damage" is only expected, and can be managed diplomatically. The LTTE on the other hand, knows that it is militarily over-matched and the only recourse it has is to change the perception of civil war in the international community to "genocide" and no wonder the diaspora and the pro-LTTE media on the internet is desperately trying to proffer this message with tragic imagery of the conflict. The consequences of this portrayal is that ironically, both the sides have only strengthened their resolve to go through the same motions, rather than trying to minimise casualties or work out a work-around. 

The high degree of polarisation of opinion has only strengthened the ethnic differences that already exist. The GoSL apart from the war, is also becoming a illiberal, draconian regime punishing any kind of dissent, attacking the media, and maintaining illicit contractors who do the dirty job of pulverising and muscling any voice of dissidence with the war effort in the capital and beyond. Witness, the murder of prominent journalist Lasantha Wickrematunga, who had questioned the war strategies of the GoSL, to get a feel of this. For all the talk of a simultaneous political devolution of powers to the Tamil minority, and thus exploring a political solution to the "ethnic" issue while engaging in the military defeat of the LTTE, the progress on this front is negligible. The GoSL is essentially adopting a good cop, bad cop routine, with the former playing out in the statements and gestures made by president Mahinda Rajapakse such as the offer of talks with the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance leaders for e.g. The bad cop routine is diligently acted out by the president's uncouth brother, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, the defence minister who is tasked with the unpleasant duties of handling any oppositional voice against the war efforts. The GoSL has also successfully co-opted former militants such as ex-LTTE commander, Vinayagamurthy "Karuna" Muralitharan and the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party leader Douglas Devananda, both of whom are now ministers in the cabinet. These leaders might have made the jump from being leaders articulating "Tamil independence" and a "free Eelam" to now asking for a united Sri Lanka that has been rid of "fascists" of the LTTE. But it is anybody's guess, whether they have any legitimate support of the Tamil people. These former militants had done the same despicable things and engaged in the same terror acts that the GoSL has traditionally called the LTTE for. 

Broadly, there has not been much resonance for a federal solution to the conflict (after the military defeat of the LTTE), as the Sinhalese polity is pretty much prey to communalism and a sense of majoritarianism. Very little of progressivism and indeed liberal attitudes vis-a-vis the Tamil minority issue is left in the Sinhala polity, as the opposition United National Party (UNP) is opportunist, the "leftist" Janata Vimukthi Peramuna is plainly Sinhala chauvinist and the communal (Buddhist!) Jathika Hela Urumaya's policies and outlook is rabidly Sinhala supremacist. So, any expectations of a honourable political solution to the long suffering Tamil minority in the country is belied by the state of affairs as it exists now. Even a provincial delimitation of the north and the east in Sri Lanka is turning out to be a difficult proposition considering the positions of the broad Lankan polity.

India & Tamil Nadu

What of the international community? Lets start with India first. Any tremors in the northern part of Sri Lanka have always had mini-tsunami effects in the state of Tamil Nadu. But what about now? The last year or so, since the latest phase of civil war erupted, much grandstanding on Tamil solidarity has taken place in the state involving the various political actors. A supporter of the Eelam cause at one point of time, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) now takes a position that is pretty much the same as the Congress' even though now and then, the chief minister and DMK supremo M.Karunanidhi waxes poetic about his friendship with Vellupillai Prabhakaran (accused No 1 in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case). While the DMK's current position is quite politically correct - they are concerned about the humanitarian tragedy that has engulfed the Sri Lankan Tamil population and they blame the LTTE equally for the travails of the people - how it arrived at such a position is altogether different proposition. That the current positioning is related to the fact that the DMK is dependent on Congress support for the survival of its government is quite understandable considering the trajectory of the DMK's positions on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. The main opposition party the AIADMK's positions are even more interesting. The party , a historical baiter of the LTTE or of the "Eelam cause" itself, now wants a separate Eelam! That the change in positions of the both these "Dravidian" parties has got little to do with the ground situation in Lanka but more to do with their perceptions of political expediency is apparent. 

Much of the support base for the LTTE, admittedly "fringe", as S.V.Rajadurai points out in this letter, ( alternately hosted here) is engulfed in the same language of Tamil nationalism as articulated by the Dravidian parties in the 1960s. "Tamil nationalism" is a good slogan to arouse sentiments. The Dravidian parties (the DMK & ADMK) have less use for this now, for they are well integrated in the power set up both in the centre and in the state, their regional bourgeoisie and rural elite base's interests being well helped out by the parties' involvement in power structures at the centre for about 2 decades now. Yet, even in a fast urbanising Tamil Nadu, there are various sections which have grievances that have remained unfulfilled in the "silent revolution" orchestrated by the Dravidian parties. The political forces that represent these sections, such as the party purporting to represent the Vanniyars, the Pattali Makkal Katchi of S. Ramadoss or the one claiming to represent the Dalits, the Viduthalai Siruthaigal Katchi, have taken recourse to that lingua franca of "protecting Tamil" and "Tamil interests". Yet, these two parties are in opposite fronts, for the instrumentality of being relevant in the electoral arena overcomes their unity on the Eelam issue. And there is the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of firebrand speaker Vaiko, who sees his diminishing fortunes as a leader of a fading outfit, having only one crutch to stand on - uncompromising support to the Eelam cause. 

The Left in Tamil Nadu has different positions as well. The CPI has suddenly discovered a rallying point for its fortunes in the state and they were the first to articulate opposition to the war situation in Lanka. They have scrupulously avoided taking a pro-LTTE stance, but that does not mean that they wouldn't rent and share their platforms to LTTE apologist Pazha Nedumaran or the pro-LTTE parties. The CPI(M) has consistently advocated a federal solution to the Lankan issue, have always denounced the LTTE and the military solution, but somewhere among the cacophony of voices and the gaggle of alliance building, the party's position remains unheard. 

All said, the events in the Vanni has indeed evoked a response from the Tamil people in India, but that response has found itself mired in the grotesque polity that is Tamil Nadu's today. The Indian government has reacted to this gaggle of voices from TN's polity in its own measure - keeping away from the affairs of Sri Lanka understandably but providing tacit support to the cause of defeating the LTTE. Then there is also the geopolitical factor that looms over the issue. 

China & India

Much of the arms,ammunition and military hardware that the GoSL has used against its own people and its civil war adversaries have been sourced from China. It need not be reiterated that the foreign policy of the Chinese is driven by its own "pragmatic" calculations, be it its relative silence on the unjust occupation of Iraq, or in its closeness with such regimes as in Myanmar and many others in Africa. It is the same "pragmatic" calculation that drives its policy of helping the GoSL with generous arms supply, and that certainly tilted the military balance in the SLA's favour, no doubt. The Indian reaction has been a mix of "realist" alarm and "realist" angst (check Indian Home Minister P.Chidambaram's statement on the issue).

India's meddling in the northern parts of Sri Lanka has had a deleterious effect on the conflict, as was played out in the disastrous Indian Peace Keeping Force intervention or in the earlier covert training provided to the various rebel outfits. Since Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by the LTTE, the Indian establishment has understandably taken a hands-off approach vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, which had paid some dividends – good relations with the country and lessening the complications a bit in the conflict. But that doesn't mean that the bad habits of the earlier “Indian supremacy in the sub-continent” endorsers have been wiped off.

Check this from an ex-secret service officer - look at the advocacy (Point No 10 in article) for further mischief in Sri Lanka not because of genuine solidarity to the much suffering Tamil populace, but for the domination of Indian interests in the sub continent. For these elements, the China factor is alarming; it confirms their suspicion that China is engaged in a "string of pearls" strategy to engulf India and their reaction has to be cut from the same "pragmatist/realist" fold.  

International Community

The rest of the international community has took to this issue with more rigour than in the near past. Since the international animus to all forms of terror was substantiated after the 9/11 events, there had been a crackdown of overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting Tamil diaspora. That was the first bugle that sounded the death-knell of the LTTE.

Today, the large turn out of protesters among the Tamil diaspora in New York, London, Ottawa and elsewhere, many of them distraught with the slaughter of their brethren has indeed touch a chord. The UN security council in an informal session condemned the LTTE's actions and asked for the organisation to lay down arms, and in the same breath asked for the GoSL to stop the conflict that has resulted in this humanitarian catastrophe. An informal session of the UN asked for the LTTE to disarm itself and for the Sri Lankan government to address the catastrophe with the highest priority.

The gist of this write up so far is that domestically and internationally, the stress on political expediency or on “pragmatism” and realism has meant that the humanitarian crisis in the Vanni region goes on unabated with the main protagonists – the LTTE and the SLA going about their ways with impunity. Caught in the crossfire, the Tamil people of the Vanni have been either slaughtered or have been rendered limbless, homeless and much traumatised.

What is to be done?

What does this writer think is needed to be done? Domestically, the GoSL must stress an non-military end to the conflict, even if it has the upper hand, simply to avoid a major human bloodbath of remaining citizenry in the area. And the government should stop its nonsensical rhetoric of “war on terror” which has drawn a loose and very visible veil over the real ethnic problem. A very simple question can be asked that will call the Lankan bluff on the issue. Does its Lankan Army have a single Tamil officer of note fighting against the LTTE? The answer is a plain no. And that affirmatively means that this is indeed a civil war involving two ethnicities. And therefore the primary issue of a deepening ethnic divide and a long un-addressed issue of minority rights, federal powers has to be the first basis of concern. Which cannot be addressed right-away if the essence is on a “muzzle the dissent”, “crush the opposition no matter what” approach. A ceasefire and an ordered disarming of the LTTE is still feasible if the government decides to do that when it is still ahead of the military game. This should follow a massive humanitarian operation to provide shelter, medical aid to the traumatised residents of the Vanni and a plan to quickly resettle the inhabitants in their original domiciles following an armistice with the LTTE.

As for the LTTE, its bluff was already called by its many a disastrous course of action. Years of acts of terror orchestrated by its megalomaniac leader, and reliance on methods that do not have any legitimate currency in a world that is tired of “terror” have ensured that the organisation is now irrelevant to the present and the future of the Tamils if it continues to exist as it does today. That doesn't mean that the acres of support that the organisation enjoys among the diaspora who have been still peeved by the injustices of the past will wither away suddenly. The LTTE has to now, utilise that support to first address the humanitarian issue in the Vanni, and next go in for a political solution that involves other Tamil representatives. It can possibly do that, by accepting an armistice and disarming itself rather than keep the quixotic fight and driving more of the Tamil citizenry to starvation and doom. The LTTE's more sinister leaders such as Prabhakaran and intelligence chief Pottu Amman can then be tried under international law for their many actions considering their surrenders sympathetically. The culmination of such a trajectory of actions is possible if the diaspora acts responsibly, in solidarity with their suffering brethren.

Other Tamil leaders who have been antagonistic to the LTTE can press for the GoSL to go about this humanely and to politically address the federal solution. International pressure can be used to bring about this culmination as well. India should play a lead role in this in dialogue with UNSC P-5. Unlike other nations, Sri Lanka has nary a strategic value for imperialism to play a debilitating role over here. India and China can open a channel of talks and play a more positive role with the already involved set of international actors such as Norway and Japan to bring this possibility of a lasting federal solution. And the position on a federal solution has to be well laid domestically within Tamil Nadu, defeating any irredentist tendency. Fortunately, the bulk of public opinion in Tamil Nadu is still rooted in such a solution, rather than any support for the Eelam cause.

Progressivism in the 21st century has to consider solutions to various complications such as “ethnic divide” and “irredentism” through means that are not arms and weapon-dependent. There remains no currency in struggles that are based exclusively on the demands of the barrel of guns, ostensibly acting for the demands of humanity and terming it battles for “self-determination” or “unity of the nation”. “Liberation through war” and “peace through war” are both oxymorons. It is high time that the LTTE and the GoSL realise this. The LTTE in this respect can learn some lessons from the Nepali Maoists for e.g and the GoSL from the Indian example of federalism as it came out in the 1950s and 60s.

Humanitarian Crisis in Sri Lanka’s “Final battle”

The Sri Lankan army and the Tamil Tigers may be waging their final battle but the suffering of the civilians worsens.

The Sri Lankan government's two-year long strategy of a “military solution” has led it to a situation where it has more or less cornered the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Wanni region in the northern part of the country. But the tactics of an “all out” military operation and the LTTE’s own strategy of using the population of Wanni as cover has resulted in a terrible humanitarian situation for the Tamils in the region, a human crisis that the rest of the world, let along neighbouring India, cannot ignore.

The people of Wanni, caught in the vortex of this “final battle”, have been forced into moving from one war-affected zone to another, even as the Sri Lankan government has turned out aid agencies from the area. At the same time, the LTTE’s desperate tactics has resulted in numerous civilian deaths and the internal displacement of more than 200,000 people according to United Nations agencies. The Sri Lankan government's defence is that the situation is unavoidable and that the Tamil people have no option but to suffer until the LTTE is defeated. Yet, this “military” argument ignores the fact that the Sri Lankan government has been showing no great concern for the hundreds and thousands now on the verge of starvation. Earlier this week UN convoys of food had to turn back because neither side was willing to temporarily end the fighting to allow relief to reach civilians.

It is against this background that the near-entire polity of Tamil Nadu has pressed the government of India to take a strong stance against the government of Sri Lanka's military operations in the Wanni. The threat of the members of Tamil Nadu to resign from Parliament should not be interpreted as merely a chauvinist response to the fact that the LTTE is on the verge of a military defeat. The LTTE has been isolated internationally for its many acts of indiscriminate violence and its failure to be serious about a peaceful settlement, but the Sri Lankan government for its own part has shown its chauvinist face in the events following the end of a lame-duck ceasefire two years ago. For all its rhetoric of building an inclusive Sri Lanka after defeating the LTTE, the Lankan government today hardly pays even lip service to the idea of a multi-ethnic society. The ruling political class openly talks of a “Sinhala” country and the military, given a free hand by the government, has been making unacceptable political statements about the minorities having no right to an equal status. The government, in a mood of triumphalism, has shown an increasingly intolerant face: it has prevented media access to the war-affected areas, sent humanitarian agencies out of the Wanni and rejected all international criticism of military excesses.

Ever since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, with the repeated incidents of violence perpetrated by the LTTE and its rejection of a democratic solution to the ethnic crisis, support for this self-styled Tamil representative organisation has waned among political party actors in Tamil Nadu, but for some fringe elements. India's foreign policy toward Sri Lanka, after the disastrous Indian Peace Keeping Force effort, has also been one of non-intervention, something that has been gradually accepted by the mainstream sections of the Tamil Nadu polity as well. Yet it is not surprising that the Tamil Nadu polity has felt a need to express its strong anger against the Sri Lankan action in the Wanni. The current humanitarian crisis in the north of Sri Lanka could well worsen. That would mean a spurt of refugees to India and an even greater expression in Tamil Nadu about the need for the Indian government to intervene, a course of action that is fraught with great danger.

This suggests that the Indian government must, along with other international actors, compel the Sri Lankan government that steps have to be taken to address the humanitarian concerns of the people of Wanni. The silence of India and the rest of the world so far has been interpreted by the Sri Lankan government that it can implement its military solution without any fear of international reprimand and condemnation. There must be a commitment by the Lankan government to enter into a ceasefire with the LTTE which would allow humanitarian aid agencies to provide relief to the beleaguered. The greatest hitch to such a course of action would remain the LTTE's determination to keep the battlefront in the heart of the areas inhabited by civilians. But a besieged LTTE can be pressured by the international community and the global Tamil diaspora to think first of the survival of the hundreds of thousands of Tamils that it claims to represent.

The Sri Lankan government is wrong to assume that the defeat of the LTTE will end the “ethnic problem” as it sees it. The war weary people in the many Tamil speaking areas of the nation may passively accept a final confrontation between the government and the LTTE, but that does not translate into an acceptance of Sri Lanka as primarily a “Sinhala nation”, as the army commander recently claimed. It has been clear for longer than the 25-year-long civil war that a permanent solution can only be one that provides genuine devolution of federal power in an inclusive manner to the Tamils and other ethnic minorities. If this as not happened so far the blame lies as much on the Sri Lankan government and its Sinhala chauvinist supporters as on the intransigence of the LTTE.

Upcoming editorial for Economic and Political Weekly

Violence in Bodoland

Unresolved ethnic tensions continue to plague the state of Assam.

Map of Bodoland

For a state that has been mired in recurring forms of violent ethnic conflict, the recent set of incidents in Udalguri and Darrang districts of Assam which resulted in widespread arson and the deaths of 40 people do not come as a surprise.These districts, apart from two other, are part of the Bodoland Territorial Areas District (BTAD) administered by the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The BTAD consists of a majority of tribal people (most of whom belong to the ethnic Bodo community) and was created after protracted struggles and negotiations between Bodo groups and the Indian state.

The recent violent clashes in Udalguri and Darrang have pitted the Bodo-speaking scheduled tribe (ST) community against the Muslims, who have been perceived as “illegal migrants from Bangladesh”, even though many of them are settled migrants born in this region after 1947. Although the brutality was said to be triggered by a case of cattle theft, the root cause of the recurring violence in this region of Assam cannot be grasped unless the problems that the carving of an autonomous district for the Bodos created for the others residing in the BTAD are acknowledged.

The trouble lies in the fact that the ethnic mix of the people living in the area makes it impossible for the Bodo groups to declare the autonomous district an exclusive “Bodo zone”. The population of the Bodo STs in the district accounts for just more than half, but the non-tribal population is substantial. The tribal Bodo speakers have distanced themselves from the others, who have always been perceived as “outsiders”, a feeling accentuated by the allegation that Congress governments at the state and the union levels have “opportunistically allowed large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims into Assam” in order to build a “captive vote bank”. The situation has led to simmering communal tension, creating deeply adversarial relations, eventually resulting in incidents of violence. In the BTAD there has been a campaign by the Bodos to “save” their “exclusive” areas from the “illegal migrants”. Of course, the illegal migrants issue has not yet been tackled effectively by any of the political stakeholders in the state and it is no wonder that this issue afflicts the BTAD as well.

The granting of the BTC-administered BTAD was effected after amending the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to make such a concession for “plains-dwellers” as well. This move had gradually integrated the various Bodo groups into the political mainstream of the state. The lone dissenting voice, the militant National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) had also agreed to a ceasefire with the state government and has signalled that it is ready to work within the framework of the Indian Constitution. Yet, rivalry among the various Bodo groups for primacy has also been a factor in the incidents during the course of the violence. Reports emanate that the NDFB has a role to play in the acts of violence and one-upmanship involving their members and other Bodo legislators, even though the NDFB has denied a hand in the violence.

The failure of the political stakeholders in articulating an inclusive agenda, which stems from their utter insensitivity to the multicultural differences among various ethnic populations in the state is to be blamed for the recurring incidents of violence that have sprouted time and again. The formation of the BtC with exclusive autonomous rights for the Bodos along with provisions of sharing of political power with non-tribal groups was supposed to promote cultural assimilation. Yet, the lack of an agenda of inclusion, an exacerbation of ethnic divisions, the utter failure of the established political leadership, combined with the campaign to “save” the Bodos from the “illegal migrants” have continued to hamper normality in the BtaD and other parts of Assam as well.

Editorial written for Economic and Political Weekly

Full Blown Conflict -IV

Final part of the Series on Sri Lanka from The Post

Civil wars, especially those arising cantankerously from ethnic divides, create impasses from which the process of extricating peace is the most difficult. The Sri Lankan problem involving the ethnic Sinhalese and minority Tamils is not a one-off case without precedent or parallel in the world. Kurds spread across Turkey and Iraq have fought for an independent Kurdistan; Basques in Spain speaking Euskadi have demanded a separate Basque state carved out of Spain and France; the Portuguese speaking East Timorese achieved independence after a protracted and bloody phase in a fight for independence; and the intra-tribal rivalries that has engulfed Africa are legion.

The formation of a nation is to be determined not merely on the basis of simple identity demarcation, but through the lens of imagination of the constituent masses. In other words, the question to be asked is whether the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sinhalese have a common imagination of their histories and shared interests within a geographical limit. The presence of substantial intermingling among these communities despite linguistic differences and shared common interests in the form of common professions mean that there indeed is a shared history for the ethnic Sinhalese and the ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka. It is definitely true that there are regions where ethnicities predominate in their numbers; as in the East and the North that are dominated by the Tamils and the inner parts of the island as well as the south that are constituted mainly of the Sinhalese. But there is also a wide scattering of other minorities as well as the intermingling of either community.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claims a separate nation out of the north and the east on the basis of the incompatibility of the Tamils in a Sri Lankan nation dominated by the Sinhalese. LTTE chief Prabhakaran makes this evocative statement to his followers often that a homeland for the Tamils, which co-exists with a Sinhala state, is due. Central to the argument is that the LTTE imagines a Tamil nation distinct culturally and ethnically from that of the existing Sri Lankan state. The behaviour of the LTTE in negotiations over the past few years has tended to emphasise that they are the sole representatives of not just the Tamil community, but a de facto Tamil state, dealing with the Sri Lankan government. Tamil nationalism for the LTTE is no longer about ‘sharing the Sri Lankan state pie’, but carving a new pie for the community. The LTTE envisages the Eelam to be the homeland of Sri Lankan Tamils in the island and demarcates the geography to cover the north and the east parts of the country. These areas are also home to Muslims who are uncomfortable with the narrow Tamil nationalism and who have been at the receiving end of governance in areas controlled by the LTTE.

Therefore, as such there exists three forms of nationalism in the conflict: Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim. The substantial Muslim population in the east and the north have been lukewarm to the separatist struggle of the Tamils and this lack of enthusiasm has even gone on to take the form of hostility, particularly towards the LTTE. Essentially, the LTTE project of a separate territorial nation-state for the Tamils is hindered by this emphasis on a narrow linguistic nationalism that does not accord the space to minorities such as the Muslims. More or less, this nationalism suffers from the same majoritarian impulses that created enough grievances for the Tamil community to estrange itself substantially from the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan political system.

Added to this is the question of how would the Tamil plantation workers (migrants from India in the 20th century) fit within the scheme of Eelam. These workers, based in interior and mainland Sri Lanka, have won political and economic rights after years of trade union struggle represented by the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) whose deceased leader S. Thondaman is regarded as one of the strongest working class leaders in the country. This section of the Tamils has participated in the political processes of the Sri Lankan state and has not acceded to the principle of separatism for all Sri Lankan Tamils. Again this means that the narrow Tamil nationalism project envisaged by the likes of the LTTE for an Eelam would not include the Tamils of recent Indian origin, thereby complicating the claims for statehood for all Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Again, it is essentially clear that basing the idea of a new Tamil nation merely on ‘ethnic nationalism’ obscures the real problem in Sri Lanka: the absence of a legitimate civic nationalism that accords a sharing principle to all minorities and is not tied to the interests of the majority. Added to this problem is the fact that there exists a federal state for the Tamils in India in the north. Despite initial demands for an independent ‘Dravida-nadu’ in the early 1950s, the integration of Tamils within India under the principle of linguistic reorganisation of units (states) in a federal union is complete. The Tamilian identity is sufficiently subsumed and integrated within a civic Indian identity. The Tamilians have been successful in instituting their native tongue as one of the nationally official languages and the federal system of governance has ensured that Tamils have equal rights as much as any other linguistic group within the nation. The Indian government is very chary, therefore, about the prospect of an independent Eelam carved out of Sri Lanka based on linguistic ethnic nationalism.

In essence, this author repudiates the fact that the Tamils in Sri Lanka are better off with their own nation-state. The very basis of this nation-state is the same rationale that drove the ethnic conflict in the first place: chauvinist nationalism that was and is still being espoused by many sections of the Sinhala majority. It is, therefore, imperative that the political centre in Sri Lanka makes all efforts to ensure federal rights for the minority Tamils and provide them with large doses of autonomy in several aspects of governance to assure a “shared political future” (as analyst Jayadeva Uyangoda points out). In other words, the plurality of the Sri Lankan state must not only be token, but be real, vibrant and inclusive.

The trouble is to incorporate this rationale in the current political miasma that Sri Lanka is in. As seen in the preceding sections, both the sides in the conflict have now taken intractable positions and hardened military stances ruling out the possibility of reasoned opinion pointing toward a solution to the conflict on the lines argued above. The civil war that has re-erupted with increased hostilities (bombings by the government, guerrilla attacks by the LTTE) has dashed all hopes for a protracted political solution. The government is being naïve in assuming that the LTTE can be destroyed militarily and then peace can be established followed by a political settlement, without considering the psychological impact on the Tamils of the military process. With the absence of a realisation of an inclusive nationalism that does not peter down to a ‘unitary’ state among the Sinhala polity, it is impossible to create an environment for a lasting settlement, even if the LTTE is demolished completely.

The LTTE on the other hand holds on quixotically to a one-point agenda of complete secession, trying to rely upon eventual international sympathy to their project. The political praxis adopted by the LTTE (suicide bombings, terror attacks, political assassinations) is not going to allot it any legitimacy in an increasingly terror-weary international political order. This organisation must give up its irrational emphasis on a one-point agenda and return to talks and ceasefire and agree to a political settlement by involving other sections of the Tamil polity as well. The LTTE can use the internal differences among the Sinhala polity to argue for a civic, shared and integrated nationhood as a first priority and it could take a leaf from the book of the political methods used of late in Nepal by the ex-insurgent Maoists.

To the extent of pushing the Lankan government to stop the military attacks and assure a federal settlement, convincing the Tamil representatives to eschew rebel violence, the international community, especially India can play a pressure group/facilitating role. For the sake of humanity in Sri Lanka and in South Asia, one hopes that such a culmination takes place sooner rather than later.

(Concluded)

Kenya erupts in violence

Editorial written for Economic & Political Weekly

Rival tribes engage in killings over presidential election results.

Incidents of internecine killings and violence have rocked the east African nation Kenya ever since the results of the December 27th presidential elections had been announced. The decision of the election commission in Kenya to declare the victory of incumbent president Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) has been the spur for these incidents, in which around 600 people have been reported to be killed.

It was widely believed that the results to the elections would have been extremely close with the opposition leader Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) mounting a strong challenge to Kibaki's rule. However with reports of rigging and electoral malpractices coming in, the declared victory of Kibaki is seen to a dubious one by several independent observers. The fact that the prominent candidates belong to different tribes; Odinga from the Luo tribe and Kibaki from the Kiyuki tribe is mentioned as the reason for violence against the Kiyuki tribe members by disenchanted voters belonging to the Luo and other tribes. The most prominent incident of violence involved the burning of a church which had provided refuge to Kikuyu tribe members in a small town about 185 miles away from the capital, Nairobi, in the process, killing a number of people trapped inside.

It is however too simplistic to term this violence as motivated by just another case of inter-tribe rivalry in Africa. The political rivalry between Kibaki and Raila has been very intense and both accuse the other of personal corruption. During the Kibaki regime, formed since the demise of the Daniel Arap Moi dictatorship, Kenya has seen significant foreign investment led economic growth (about 6 percent according to latest figures) but concurrently widening regional and economic disparities in the predominantly agriculture based country. While prosperity has been accrued to sections in and around central Kenya (Nairobi and some other urban centres), regions in the west has seen continuation and accentuation of poverty (a national average of 79 percent) that has characterised the nation for quite long. Raila Odinga derives a lot of support from these regions, while the Kikuyu tribe dominated central Kenyan regions have affirmed support to Mwai Kibaki.

Mwai Kibaki, when first elected to power in 2002 was able to defeat Arap Moi's designated nominee Uhuru Kenyatta of the Kenya African National Unity (KANU) with the support of Raila Odinga. Kibaki's legacy was to devolve power in a federated system for Kenya, but the problems of corruption had continued to plague his regime. Odinga, a prosperous industrialist became part of the ODM along with other politicians and launched a movement to oppose Kibaki's rule. A much touted move for a new constitutional draft through a referendum by the government in 2005 was defeated resoundingly by the opposition, particularly because of a powerful grass roots mobilisation by Odinga. Odinga therefore emerged as a powerful candidate to replace Kibaki in the recent December 2007 elections and opinion polls pointed out that he would win by a narrow margin over the incumbent president.

Fundamentally however, Raila Odinga does not offer any substantial change in the economic policy (Odinga belongs to the Liberal Democratic Party faction of the ODM) and his elevation would have been yet another case of circulation of elites, common to African post-colonial nations. As it is however, the doubts raised over the legitimacy of the election verdict, fuelled the current spate of violence as Odinga refused to accept the verdict and called for a re-count and resignation of the new government.

Supporters of Kibaki have alleged that rigging occurred in ODM strongholds as well and Kibaki has refused an official recount or resignation, conceding however that the allegations about the election verdict have to be fought in the courts. Kibaki has also suggested a national unity government with portfolios for members from the opposition; the idea having been refused by Odinga however. A presidential candidate Kalonzo Musyoka who came third in the elections (also from the ODM), has been named as the vice president in the newly installed government.

Representatives of the African Union have offered to mediate between the warring politicians in Kenya to bring about a conciliation, which could stop the internecine violence. An official and accurate recount seems to be the best way out of the impasse. But the prevention of internecine violence of this nature in the future can only happen if the structural problems of the Kenyan political economy are sufficiently addressed by a democratically elected non-corrupt government.