On the crisis in Nepal

A crisis has been precipitated in the republic of Nepal. The prime minister Pushpa Kumar "Prachanda" Dahal of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has resigned, following presidential actions rejecting a cabinet decision to remove the Chief of Army Staff, Rukmangad Katuwal from his post. Earlier, the government was reduced to a minority after withdrawal of support from the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist). This article will strive to comment on the developments and put things in perspective. 

The Peace accord between various political actors in Nepal in 2005 paved the way for the transformation of the country into a republic. The integration of the Maoists within the political mainstream was the most important step in this culmination, as it were the Maoists who had concretely addressed the demand for the formation of a new republic with a new Constitution to go along with it. Other parties, inevitably fell in line judging the public and civic mood and the currency of the demand. Following this was constituent assembly elections, where the Maoists emerged as the single largest party and eventually after the declaration of a republic, a coalition government involving all major actors except the Nepal Congress was formed. 

Complex Issues

Two of the issues that were seen to be the most complex in the run-up to the writing of the Constitution were the integration of the Maoist armed cadre into the Nepali Army and the resolution of the federal question with all the major actors having varying positions on these issues. Having said that, vis-a-vis the former, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Nepal government and the Maoists in 2006 laid the scope for control over the Nepali army and on the integration of the Maoist combatants (of the People's Liberation Army - PLA) within the Nepali army (Article 5.1 and sections). A special committee has already been given the task of going about this process, which is still on. Yet Rukmangad Katuwal, seen as a loyal supporter of the erstwhile monarchy, decided to violate this agreement (Article 5.12) by going on for recruitment into the Nepali army, unilaterally extending the tenure of senior army officials and also withdrawing the Nepali army's participation from the National Games because of the PLA's participation. 

Civilian supremacy over the army is a sine qua non in all democracies and the blatant violation of the CPA was not surely going to be condoned by the Maoist led government. The government therefore sought Katuwal's explanation, and his response was that of defiance. Added to these incidents were rumours of a soft coup in the making, engineered by the Army. The government therefore decided to terminate Katuwal's posting, an action that was opposed to by the opposition NC which possibly sees the defiant army chief as a power centre stolidly opposed to the Maoists. As does, the Indian establishment, which sees a formal balance of power that keeps the Maoists in check necessary to continue its hegemony in Nepali affairs and to blunt any growing proximity between the Nepali nation and China strategically.

Unconstitutional actions

Questions have been raised by some commentators as to whether the Maoists acted in the manner that could be construed as"extreme". Prominent Indian analyst on Nepal affairs S.D.Muni, while calling into question the Chief of Army staff's actions, in the same breath suggests that the Maoists' action of removing the CoAS is "extreme". He writes that the CoAS's actions were in violation of the CPA and the civilian government was within its rights to demand an explanation from Katuwal for his actions. But, he stops at that and suggests that the Maoists were immature in removing the CoAS. This writer finds such an argument untenable. For the smooth transition of the infant republic into a Constitutional democracy, feudal remnants such as Katuwal had to be removed, as threats such as "soft coups" and other dangers were imminent and harmful. 

Even more problematic was the Nepali president Ram Baran Yadav's decision to overturn the cabinet's decision to remove the CoAS. The correct constitutional position for the president to take was to reply back to the cabinet to re-think the decision, but the actions by Yadav smacks of yet another violation of correct parliamentary procedure.

The UML

The UML found the action to remove the CoAS as non-consensual and has even suggested that the president's actions were necessitated. This writer finds the UML's positions egregious. For one, Katuwal has been in the habit of asserting the Nepali army's "independence" from civilian control, thereby showing no regard to the concept of civilian supremacy over the army. This reminds one of the just overthrown era of monarchy where the army was subordinate only to the royalty and not to the elected civilian government. For the infant republic the continuation of such feudal remnants was untenable and therefore the action by the Maoist led Government cabinet to remove Katuwal from his post was democratic and true to republican ethos. As an analogy one could point out the US head of state whenever elected to power has the prerogative to remove the Army Chief of Staff. 

The UML by not acquiescing to this decision was acting in a sectarian and juvenile manner. One can ask a question as to whose interest the UML was representing when it decided to withdraw support to the government over the issue of removal of the CoAS. The further moves by the UML to try to form a government with the Nepali Congress (strictly on the basis of an anti-Maoist position) and to endorse the president's actions make it amply clear that the UML has lost the plot completely. 

A counter argument could be made that the Maoist, in the name of left unity, could have tried to build a consensus with the UML before the removal of the CoAS. But this argument seems petty because the removal of the CoAS` was a matter of principle, and required no coaxing of the UML to achieve it. It is evident that the UML had other considerations in mind. Was the party pressurised by Indian authorities to go ahead with their folly? Atleast that is what is being alleged by some sections of the Maoists. 

One of the chief grouses that the UML had with the Maoist was that the latter was unable to control and stop the high-handedness exhibited by its youth organisation, the YCL. The YCL has been repeatedly accused and rightly so, of intimidation, violence against UML cadre. This was seen by UML leaders such as senior communist Madhav Kumar Nepal as one of the biggest roadblocks for left unity. To a certain extent these grievances were legitimate. But the action to withdraw support to the Maoist led government when the easiest thing to do for an avowed left party was to act on principle suggests that this action by the UML was cynical and lame.

Indian role

Coming back to the Indian role in this whole issue: the Indian ambassador's moves to pressurise the Nepali polity to retain Katuwal was a blatant expression of interference in Nepali affairs. Any self respecting Nepali, let alone a Maoist or any other leftist politician would have bristled at this interference, which however is part of a long legacy of intrusion in Nepali affairs. No wonder, the Maoists have openly accused the Indian bureaucrats of playing a meddlesome role. For this Indian, the Indian ambassador's actions are even more galling because the Indian establishment had played a positive role in the culmination of Nepal into a republic from a highly unpopular and illegitimate monarchy. 

Is this latest trend of negative influence- direct meddling, scheming with other political parties to push the Maoists into a corner and thereby endangering the peace agreement as well as the constitutional building process,related to the fact that India wants to retain its levers of influence? In other words the current Indian establishment is uncomfortable with the Maoists' stated intent of asserting a sovereign and a truly independent domestic and foreign policy. While, on the other hand during the time when the Left Front supported the Indian government the stated intent was not to meddle with the Nepali polity but to maintain healthy relations with whichever political dispensation which was in power.

This writer after his visit to Nepal just after the constituent assembly elections had warned that a derailment of the republican process of constitutional building and overcoming of some challenges such as the Army-PLA integration could be possible because bad habits such as treating Nepal as part of a geopolitical game between neighboring powers were still in place in the strategic calculuses of India and China. This fear seems to not have been misplaced.

It is imperative that the unconstitutional move of the Nepali president has to be overturned. The independent civil society in Nepal has reacted to the president's moves by demanding a judicial decision on the actions, both by the Nepali president as well as by the CoAS. Prominent civil society activists including Shyam Shrestha, Devender Raj Pandey and Krishna Pahadi who were involved in the anti-monarchy protests in Kathmandu in 2005, have now been arrested for protesting against the president's actions. This suggests that the Maoists have gained sympathy of independent and republican voices in the country. 

What needs to be done

By resigning from government on moral grounds, the Maoists made a gesture that has been appreciated by several sections of the Nepali populace. Even though the performance of the Maoist led government in various spheres of governance has been below expectations, the many challenges before the writing of the Constitution were being whittled down one by one, before the series of actions by Katuwal. 

The Maoists have to realise that the building of the constitution and the regaining of the momentum for the same is an imperative that cannot be foregone. By mobilising public opinion against the actions of the president, the army chief, the erstwhile coaliton partner UML, the Maoists can achieve an overturning of the unconstitutional actions by the chief executive as also convince the other prominent left party, the UML to fall in line on the path of propreity and left unity. The onus is on the UML to take a stance regarding this. Otherwise the party, with its recent history of poor political posturing and incorrect decisions, would be on the path to self-destruction, by having lost its leftist moorings and by opening the possibility of a rupture in its ranks. 

A massive show of public antipathy toward Indian (or for that matter Chinese or American) interference in Nepali political affairs should be re-assuring for the polity to adopt sovereignty and independence as guiding principles as partners in the republican polity and also act as a bulwark against continued meddling of the sort that transpired over the issue of the army chief's removal. In India too, the Indian people and intelligentsia should caution against debilitating actions of the kind that the Indian ambassador indulged in and the Indian establishment must be forced to let the Nepali polity take its own course of actions. Nepal can be a vital conduit for trade between India and China and a cordial relationship with the newly growing up republic is in the best interests of both ordinary Nepalis and ordinary Indians, especially living close to the borders of the country. It makes no sense for the Indian establishment to act in cahoots with feudal remnants in Nepal giving an ostensible reason of "stability". The examples of military over-reach in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the preponderance of the Sri Lankan army in Sri Lanka is enough to caution the Indian state from endorsing a similar denouement in Nepal. And that too, when the popular mood in the country is for a federal democratic republic and where a social revolution is being played out democratically.

Tragedy in the Vanni

Tragedy in the Vanni

The Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government push the Tamils of the Vanni to a fate worse than death.

Scores of dead civilians, many limbless survivors, starving and homeless people, makeshift hospitals that have been bombed and “human shields”. These are the images from the military confrontation between the Sri Lankan army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Vanni region in the north-east of the island. The Sri Lankan government’s campaign to destroy the LTTE has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe that was foretold when the military solution was initiated two years ago. The government, however, shows no let-up since it is sensing victory as the LTTE is now confined to a patch of 10 square kilometres adjoining the Indian Ocean. Until earlier this week, the Sri Lankan army was shelling and bombing the territory, while the LTTE used the civilian population as a shield against the military onslaught. Nearly 2,00,000 people have fled the area and are being kept in internment camps in shabby conditions while tens of thousands are hostages in the small area under LTTE control.

Both sides to the conflict, intractable in their military aims, have remained impervious to the human tragedy they have scripted. The LTTE refuses to give up and apart from issuing one unilateral ceasefire declaration earlier this week, which was rejected by the Lankan army, it continues to use the people it professes to fight for as fodder in its military resistance. Despite appeals from the international community, the Sri Lankan government too shows no indication of halting the military campaign to ensure safety of the civilians. The government has been emboldened by the euphoric support it has received from the Sinhala populace and from the Sinhala polity’s refusal to consider any course apart from military action to resolve the ethnic conflict.

The conflict now looms over the Lok Sabha elections in Tamil Nadu as well. The Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam has suddenly declared its support for an independent “Eelam” and in response, the Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (briefly) went on an “indefinite” hunger strike to demand cessation of hostilities in the island. Eelam, until now restricted to the fringe political sections of the state’s polity, has become an election issue. The government of India responded to the clamour in Tamil Nadu for intervention in Sri Lanka by sending its national security advisor and foreign secretary to Colombo and calling for a truce, but it is evident that the Indian response is not intended to go beyond tokenism. New Delhi perceives the conflict in Sri Lanka from a competitive geopolitical perspective as China is a big supplier of weapons and ammunition to the Sri Lankan government and Beijing is unwilling to pressure the Lankan government to stop its military campaign.

The efforts by the Sri Lankan government to paint the ethnic conflict as a “war on terror” have paid off because of the increasing global animus to all forms of “terror” since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. There had been a crackdown on overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting the Tamil diaspora and this has helped the Sri Lankan government isolate the rebel group and move to the verge of a military victory. The Sri Lankan government led by its president Mahinda Rajapaksa has managed to withstand criticism of its actions by promising a simultaneous political solution to the conflict involving other Tamil representatives, but this too is tokenism as no genuine effort towards a federal devolution seems to be in the offing. The tired tactic of co-option of a few ex-Tamil militants, and the adoption of draconian measures to curb any criticism of the government’s military approach in the media, civil society and the polity belie the promises made by Rajapaksa.

It is evident that a bloodbath is going to happen if the Lankan army continues on its course of wanting to obliterate the LTTE. Will a physically and emotionally traumatised Tamil citizenry really trust a government that promises an undefined political solution after its military victory? The current antipathy in the Sinhala polity towards a federal solution tells the Tamils what is in store after a Sri Lankan army victory. As for the LTTE, its strategy of dragging the remaining thousands of Tamil civilians in their area of control to mutilation and death is genocide of its own kind. It is evident that the LTTE top leadership will continue with its resistance because it fears trials for its past actions such as assassinations and indiscriminate attacks on civilian institutions. But if the LTTE wants to live up to its claim of acting on behalf of the Tamil people of the island, surrender is the only way to prevent more casualties in the Vanni. It would then be up to the international community to drive a just bargain for the Tamils if the Sri Lankan government fails to live up to its words.

Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The Lankan conflict – as is; and the way out

The civil war in Sri Lanka is drawing to a bloody closure, with the rout of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) imminent. The LTTE is holed up in a small area on a beachfront adjoining the Indian Ocean. The outfit's leader is still believed to be dissolved among the thousands of residents boxed in the area. A sea of Tamils had just fled the area (called ironically the "No Fire zone") and left to the safety of "internment camps" in Sri Lankan Army (SLA) controlled territory. The LTTE remains defiant despite the impossible odds it faces while the SLA sensing and smelling victory has kept at the effort disregarding the consequences of the final bloodbath. Even as I was writing this, the LTTE declared an unilateral ceasefire, keeping in mind the humanitarian crisis in the area.

Journalists have been kept away from the Vanni and other regions of north Sri Lanka for long now, and one is therefore forced to sift through the coloured reports from the Sri Lankan Defence Ministry releases and the pro-LTTE Tamilnet to get an idea of what is really going on. While the former portrays the sequence of events as if they are engaged in a "liberation" battle, points to nearly every civilian casualty as a result of LTTE hitting the very people it is claiming to represent and using them as human shields, the latter portrays the war as genocide, suggesting that the SLA is targeting the citizenry deliberately and killing them in droves. The truth lies somewhere in between. Yes, its cliched, but that is how it is. 

The truth

Rohini Hensman writes this piece based on a visit to Colombo. She suggests that there is truth in the fact that the LTTE is cynically and rabidly using the Tamil casualties as a prop to pressurise the "international community" to force the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to call a ceasefire. She also writes that the SLA is retaliating at LTTE fire from behind the civilians and shelling at LTTE positions within civilian areas, unmindful of the consequences. In some ways, this was expected. I wrote this editorial when the conflict was taking a turn for the worse, in humanitarian terms. Independent journalist DBS Jeyaraj has been cautioning about the humanitarian catastrophe for some months now. 

What in essence is happening is that the GoSL understands that it has the upper hand not only in the military battle as it has gone on till now, but also in the soft power status across the world because of the changed international reckoning vis-a-vis the "war against terror". And hence the SLA is marching on its way to a military end to the conflict, knowing fully that the "collateral damage" is only expected, and can be managed diplomatically. The LTTE on the other hand, knows that it is militarily over-matched and the only recourse it has is to change the perception of civil war in the international community to "genocide" and no wonder the diaspora and the pro-LTTE media on the internet is desperately trying to proffer this message with tragic imagery of the conflict. The consequences of this portrayal is that ironically, both the sides have only strengthened their resolve to go through the same motions, rather than trying to minimise casualties or work out a work-around. 

The high degree of polarisation of opinion has only strengthened the ethnic differences that already exist. The GoSL apart from the war, is also becoming a illiberal, draconian regime punishing any kind of dissent, attacking the media, and maintaining illicit contractors who do the dirty job of pulverising and muscling any voice of dissidence with the war effort in the capital and beyond. Witness, the murder of prominent journalist Lasantha Wickrematunga, who had questioned the war strategies of the GoSL, to get a feel of this. For all the talk of a simultaneous political devolution of powers to the Tamil minority, and thus exploring a political solution to the "ethnic" issue while engaging in the military defeat of the LTTE, the progress on this front is negligible. The GoSL is essentially adopting a good cop, bad cop routine, with the former playing out in the statements and gestures made by president Mahinda Rajapakse such as the offer of talks with the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance leaders for e.g. The bad cop routine is diligently acted out by the president's uncouth brother, Gotabhaya Rajapakse, the defence minister who is tasked with the unpleasant duties of handling any oppositional voice against the war efforts. The GoSL has also successfully co-opted former militants such as ex-LTTE commander, Vinayagamurthy "Karuna" Muralitharan and the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party leader Douglas Devananda, both of whom are now ministers in the cabinet. These leaders might have made the jump from being leaders articulating "Tamil independence" and a "free Eelam" to now asking for a united Sri Lanka that has been rid of "fascists" of the LTTE. But it is anybody's guess, whether they have any legitimate support of the Tamil people. These former militants had done the same despicable things and engaged in the same terror acts that the GoSL has traditionally called the LTTE for. 

Broadly, there has not been much resonance for a federal solution to the conflict (after the military defeat of the LTTE), as the Sinhalese polity is pretty much prey to communalism and a sense of majoritarianism. Very little of progressivism and indeed liberal attitudes vis-a-vis the Tamil minority issue is left in the Sinhala polity, as the opposition United National Party (UNP) is opportunist, the "leftist" Janata Vimukthi Peramuna is plainly Sinhala chauvinist and the communal (Buddhist!) Jathika Hela Urumaya's policies and outlook is rabidly Sinhala supremacist. So, any expectations of a honourable political solution to the long suffering Tamil minority in the country is belied by the state of affairs as it exists now. Even a provincial delimitation of the north and the east in Sri Lanka is turning out to be a difficult proposition considering the positions of the broad Lankan polity.

India & Tamil Nadu

What of the international community? Lets start with India first. Any tremors in the northern part of Sri Lanka have always had mini-tsunami effects in the state of Tamil Nadu. But what about now? The last year or so, since the latest phase of civil war erupted, much grandstanding on Tamil solidarity has taken place in the state involving the various political actors. A supporter of the Eelam cause at one point of time, the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) now takes a position that is pretty much the same as the Congress' even though now and then, the chief minister and DMK supremo M.Karunanidhi waxes poetic about his friendship with Vellupillai Prabhakaran (accused No 1 in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case). While the DMK's current position is quite politically correct - they are concerned about the humanitarian tragedy that has engulfed the Sri Lankan Tamil population and they blame the LTTE equally for the travails of the people - how it arrived at such a position is altogether different proposition. That the current positioning is related to the fact that the DMK is dependent on Congress support for the survival of its government is quite understandable considering the trajectory of the DMK's positions on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. The main opposition party the AIADMK's positions are even more interesting. The party , a historical baiter of the LTTE or of the "Eelam cause" itself, now wants a separate Eelam! That the change in positions of the both these "Dravidian" parties has got little to do with the ground situation in Lanka but more to do with their perceptions of political expediency is apparent. 

Much of the support base for the LTTE, admittedly "fringe", as S.V.Rajadurai points out in this letter, ( alternately hosted here) is engulfed in the same language of Tamil nationalism as articulated by the Dravidian parties in the 1960s. "Tamil nationalism" is a good slogan to arouse sentiments. The Dravidian parties (the DMK & ADMK) have less use for this now, for they are well integrated in the power set up both in the centre and in the state, their regional bourgeoisie and rural elite base's interests being well helped out by the parties' involvement in power structures at the centre for about 2 decades now. Yet, even in a fast urbanising Tamil Nadu, there are various sections which have grievances that have remained unfulfilled in the "silent revolution" orchestrated by the Dravidian parties. The political forces that represent these sections, such as the party purporting to represent the Vanniyars, the Pattali Makkal Katchi of S. Ramadoss or the one claiming to represent the Dalits, the Viduthalai Siruthaigal Katchi, have taken recourse to that lingua franca of "protecting Tamil" and "Tamil interests". Yet, these two parties are in opposite fronts, for the instrumentality of being relevant in the electoral arena overcomes their unity on the Eelam issue. And there is the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of firebrand speaker Vaiko, who sees his diminishing fortunes as a leader of a fading outfit, having only one crutch to stand on - uncompromising support to the Eelam cause. 

The Left in Tamil Nadu has different positions as well. The CPI has suddenly discovered a rallying point for its fortunes in the state and they were the first to articulate opposition to the war situation in Lanka. They have scrupulously avoided taking a pro-LTTE stance, but that does not mean that they wouldn't rent and share their platforms to LTTE apologist Pazha Nedumaran or the pro-LTTE parties. The CPI(M) has consistently advocated a federal solution to the Lankan issue, have always denounced the LTTE and the military solution, but somewhere among the cacophony of voices and the gaggle of alliance building, the party's position remains unheard. 

All said, the events in the Vanni has indeed evoked a response from the Tamil people in India, but that response has found itself mired in the grotesque polity that is Tamil Nadu's today. The Indian government has reacted to this gaggle of voices from TN's polity in its own measure - keeping away from the affairs of Sri Lanka understandably but providing tacit support to the cause of defeating the LTTE. Then there is also the geopolitical factor that looms over the issue. 

China & India

Much of the arms,ammunition and military hardware that the GoSL has used against its own people and its civil war adversaries have been sourced from China. It need not be reiterated that the foreign policy of the Chinese is driven by its own "pragmatic" calculations, be it its relative silence on the unjust occupation of Iraq, or in its closeness with such regimes as in Myanmar and many others in Africa. It is the same "pragmatic" calculation that drives its policy of helping the GoSL with generous arms supply, and that certainly tilted the military balance in the SLA's favour, no doubt. The Indian reaction has been a mix of "realist" alarm and "realist" angst (check Indian Home Minister P.Chidambaram's statement on the issue).

India's meddling in the northern parts of Sri Lanka has had a deleterious effect on the conflict, as was played out in the disastrous Indian Peace Keeping Force intervention or in the earlier covert training provided to the various rebel outfits. Since Rajiv Gandhi's assassination by the LTTE, the Indian establishment has understandably taken a hands-off approach vis-a-vis Sri Lanka, which had paid some dividends – good relations with the country and lessening the complications a bit in the conflict. But that doesn't mean that the bad habits of the earlier “Indian supremacy in the sub-continent” endorsers have been wiped off.

Check this from an ex-secret service officer - look at the advocacy (Point No 10 in article) for further mischief in Sri Lanka not because of genuine solidarity to the much suffering Tamil populace, but for the domination of Indian interests in the sub continent. For these elements, the China factor is alarming; it confirms their suspicion that China is engaged in a "string of pearls" strategy to engulf India and their reaction has to be cut from the same "pragmatist/realist" fold.  

International Community

The rest of the international community has took to this issue with more rigour than in the near past. Since the international animus to all forms of terror was substantiated after the 9/11 events, there had been a crackdown of overt and covert material support to the LTTE in the various countries of the world hosting Tamil diaspora. That was the first bugle that sounded the death-knell of the LTTE.

Today, the large turn out of protesters among the Tamil diaspora in New York, London, Ottawa and elsewhere, many of them distraught with the slaughter of their brethren has indeed touch a chord. The UN security council in an informal session condemned the LTTE's actions and asked for the organisation to lay down arms, and in the same breath asked for the GoSL to stop the conflict that has resulted in this humanitarian catastrophe. An informal session of the UN asked for the LTTE to disarm itself and for the Sri Lankan government to address the catastrophe with the highest priority.

The gist of this write up so far is that domestically and internationally, the stress on political expediency or on “pragmatism” and realism has meant that the humanitarian crisis in the Vanni region goes on unabated with the main protagonists – the LTTE and the SLA going about their ways with impunity. Caught in the crossfire, the Tamil people of the Vanni have been either slaughtered or have been rendered limbless, homeless and much traumatised.

What is to be done?

What does this writer think is needed to be done? Domestically, the GoSL must stress an non-military end to the conflict, even if it has the upper hand, simply to avoid a major human bloodbath of remaining citizenry in the area. And the government should stop its nonsensical rhetoric of “war on terror” which has drawn a loose and very visible veil over the real ethnic problem. A very simple question can be asked that will call the Lankan bluff on the issue. Does its Lankan Army have a single Tamil officer of note fighting against the LTTE? The answer is a plain no. And that affirmatively means that this is indeed a civil war involving two ethnicities. And therefore the primary issue of a deepening ethnic divide and a long un-addressed issue of minority rights, federal powers has to be the first basis of concern. Which cannot be addressed right-away if the essence is on a “muzzle the dissent”, “crush the opposition no matter what” approach. A ceasefire and an ordered disarming of the LTTE is still feasible if the government decides to do that when it is still ahead of the military game. This should follow a massive humanitarian operation to provide shelter, medical aid to the traumatised residents of the Vanni and a plan to quickly resettle the inhabitants in their original domiciles following an armistice with the LTTE.

As for the LTTE, its bluff was already called by its many a disastrous course of action. Years of acts of terror orchestrated by its megalomaniac leader, and reliance on methods that do not have any legitimate currency in a world that is tired of “terror” have ensured that the organisation is now irrelevant to the present and the future of the Tamils if it continues to exist as it does today. That doesn't mean that the acres of support that the organisation enjoys among the diaspora who have been still peeved by the injustices of the past will wither away suddenly. The LTTE has to now, utilise that support to first address the humanitarian issue in the Vanni, and next go in for a political solution that involves other Tamil representatives. It can possibly do that, by accepting an armistice and disarming itself rather than keep the quixotic fight and driving more of the Tamil citizenry to starvation and doom. The LTTE's more sinister leaders such as Prabhakaran and intelligence chief Pottu Amman can then be tried under international law for their many actions considering their surrenders sympathetically. The culmination of such a trajectory of actions is possible if the diaspora acts responsibly, in solidarity with their suffering brethren.

Other Tamil leaders who have been antagonistic to the LTTE can press for the GoSL to go about this humanely and to politically address the federal solution. International pressure can be used to bring about this culmination as well. India should play a lead role in this in dialogue with UNSC P-5. Unlike other nations, Sri Lanka has nary a strategic value for imperialism to play a debilitating role over here. India and China can open a channel of talks and play a more positive role with the already involved set of international actors such as Norway and Japan to bring this possibility of a lasting federal solution. And the position on a federal solution has to be well laid domestically within Tamil Nadu, defeating any irredentist tendency. Fortunately, the bulk of public opinion in Tamil Nadu is still rooted in such a solution, rather than any support for the Eelam cause.

Progressivism in the 21st century has to consider solutions to various complications such as “ethnic divide” and “irredentism” through means that are not arms and weapon-dependent. There remains no currency in struggles that are based exclusively on the demands of the barrel of guns, ostensibly acting for the demands of humanity and terming it battles for “self-determination” or “unity of the nation”. “Liberation through war” and “peace through war” are both oxymorons. It is high time that the LTTE and the GoSL realise this. The LTTE in this respect can learn some lessons from the Nepali Maoists for e.g and the GoSL from the Indian example of federalism as it came out in the 1950s and 60s.

Anarchic Somalia's piracy problem

The anarchic situation in Somalia has resulted in sea piracy seen as a legitimised enterprise among its coastal citizenry

Ever since the collapse of the central government led by Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, the nation of Somalia in east Africa has been subjected to lawlessness and anarchy that has ripped the nation and its society apart. The phenomenon of sea piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in coastal regions of the country is related to this breakdown as well as other factors.

The Gulf of Aden is a busy trade route for various international ships, and pirates have seized upon the traffic here to earn money through hijacking and winning ransoms or by looting ships that carry food grains or livestock. The modus operandi for pirates across the Somalian coast involves groups of armed men disembarking from “mother ships” on speed boats and taking hostages of crew members of other ships in the vicinity. Incidences of piracy in 2008 was particularly high, as big tankers such as the Saudi ship Sirius Star, or large arms carriers such as the Ukrainian Faina were hijacked. The pirates have shown increasing sophistication in their actions – through the use of global positioning systems, satellite communications, military hardware and other know-how.

The sudden surge in the incidence of piracy nearby the Somalian coast resulted in an unanimous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in December 2008 authorising nations to cooperate in their fight against piracy and to deploy naval vessels and military aircraft to interdict vessels engaged in piracy. The UNSC authorised the entry by nations' ships into Somalian territorial waters to punish those engaged in piracy activities when needed. Such an express approval for action, saw a relative decline in successful hijackings of vessels in the region, but the dramatic hijacking of an American vessel followed by an US navy rescue operation has brought back focus on the issue.

The basic rationale for the acts of piracy has been pinned down to the lucrative returns from hijacking – an estimate suggests income from piracy is higher than the entire GDP of the autonomous region of Puntland in north-eastern Somalia, where piracy is most rampant. The sophistication and brazen-ness of the actions are seen as possible only because of the lack of a central authority in control over law and order in the Somalian nation. The perennial civil war since 1991 has seen multiple authorities; warlords have controlled the capital at various times, there has been an invasion by Ethiopian armed forces and the internationally recognised transitional federal government in Somalia has been unable to establish any semblance of rule. The absence of any central rule has resulted in a complete deterioration in the economy and in the livelihoods of the already impoverished nation.

The lack of a central authority governing Somalia has also meant that the nation's coast has been used as a dumping ground of toxic waste and a source of uncontrolled fishing by international corporations with impunity. Reports and even the United Nations Environment Programme have pointed out that tonnes of toxic waste have accumulated in the Somalian coast, a process that was exacerbated by the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004. Fishing trawlers operated by European firms have systematically emptied the fishing zones, resulting in resentment among local fishing communities in the region. The pirates were believed to have started their acts on the seas as a means of dissuading international ships – particularly off the coast of Puntland – from being in the vicinity of their shores. And it is no wonder that the pirates' actions have been supported by the local public concerned about the effects of toxic dumping (including nuclear waste) on their shores and about the unauthorised and bulk fishing in their zones. Many of the locals view piracy as acts of self-defense against commercial ships entering sovereign Somalian territory.

In essence, the “piracy problem” in the Somalian coast and in the Gulf of Aden seems more than merely a lucrative enterprise. The continuing use of the Somalian territorial waters for illegal dumping and fishing by international firms– a practice that has legitimised piracy in the eyes of the locals - is a crime that has to be monitored and stopped immediately by the international community.

The security council's insistence on a security/military based solution will not solve the problem in its entirety, as the larger issue of the continuing anarchy in the country would only force the citizenry to adopt desperate measures for their livelihoods. It is untenable that 18 years have passed since a functional national government was in place in the country. Concerted efforts by the United Nations to bring in civil rule and law by engaging the warlords and various groups in talks have gone ahead nowhere, as powers such as the United States, have bedevilled such processes in Somalia driven by their own strategic concerns – for exploiting energy resources in the country or the “war on terror”. In sum, the downward spiral into further anarchy and the piracy problem are to be addressed not just by a security response by the international community, but through a different form of intervention keeping in the mind the plight of the Somalian population.

Draft of an editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Shifting Allegiances

Whichever Dravidian party led coalition wins the most in the Lok Sabha elections; they will have a major role to play in the centre 

Yet another round of switching of allegiances, alliance building and seat sharing has taken place, as has been the norm for the past few elections – both state and national – in the state of Tamil Nadu prior to the 15^th Lok Sabha elections. The defection of the left parties and the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK) from the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) led Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA) which includes the Congress has changed the political “equations” in the state. The opposition Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) has now become the new lynchpin for the “grand alliance” which includes the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) apart from the aforementioned parties. 

What drove the left parties to the ADMK led front was their perception that they had to be part of an oppositional alliance to be with a chance to defeat the Congress – their “national” imperative to form an non-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), non-Congress government. As for the PMK- the party purportedly representing Vanniyar caste interests, its propensity to flow with the political wind by shifting allegiances was aided by the uncomfortable relationship it held with the DMK over the past year, despite being part of the Congress led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) at the centre. The MDMK had already joined hands with the ADMK before the 2006 elections. Only the more recently formed outfit – the Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam led by actor Vijaykanth has decided to go it alone, willing to test the popularity of its leader in all constituencies in the state. 

Tamil Nadu’s case resembles other north Indian states, where the main national parties – the Congress and the BJP – have been bumped by stronger regional parties to junior or insignificant roles. What characterises Tamil Nadu’s polity as being unique is that the major regional parties, the DMK and the ADMK have had no qualms about reaching an alliance with either national party to suit their ends and to add to this mockery of coalitions is the sheer desperation of other outfits in the state to fit in as partners with the more dominant of the two at any particular “election moment”. Thus the DMK as well as the PMK have now achieved a stay in the centre through being part of both the National Democratic Alliance led by the BJP as well as the UPA, while the ADMK has been in coalition with both the Congress and the BJP and now, the Left. Such a reliance on the state’s regional parties has given a greater federal hue to the centre’s functioning, but beyond this formalism, hardly much has been attributed to these outfits’ role in the centre apart from widely held views about corruption and high-handedness of their representatives in government. 

The logic of alliance building is intended to win from a simple arithmetic addition of caste/social base support enjoyed by the various parties. To an extent, the intent has indeed delivered in the near past in both the Lok Sabha and the state assembly elections; but social bases over the years are no longer set in stone in the much urbanised and socio-economically changing state. 

The political discourse during campaigning has thrived not so much on performance of the ruling/ oppositional parties as on the ability of the two main parties (and others) to use their money power and patronage networks built during days in power (at the Centre or in the state). The political contestations between the main Dravidian parties are aimed at hitting the other with charges of corruption, nepotism and campaigns against each other are greatly personalised. The ADMK aims its criticism against the DMK leader M.Karunanidhi’s all powerful family, while the DMK does the same pointing its finger toward J.Jayalalithaa’s leadership and familial misgivings. Even issues of development – material necessities of the people of the state, health, education etc – are debated through personalised vitriolic attacks aimed at each other by the leaders of these Dravidian parties and including the MDMK and the PMK. 

What has emerged as an additional issue in this election is the situation in Sri Lanka, where there is a humanitarian crisis in the Vanni region. Partly due to the peoples’ empathy for the plight of the affected people in the region and partly due to mobilisations for “support to the Tamil cause” by both ruling and oppositional sections in the Tamil polity, this issue now sees very engaged grandstanding by most political outfits. Interestingly the strongest voices demanding intervention by the Indian government in Sri Lanka are positioned in oppositional fronts – the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi is part of the DMK led alliance, while the pro-Tamil-rebels parties, the PMK and the MDMK are with the ADMK led alliance. 

The political story is even more complicated by the fact that there is no guarantee that pre-poll alliances will hold after elections, with the ADMK for example giving no indications of a steadfast anti-BJP, anti-Congress stance, much to the discomfort of the left parties. In the case of the latter, their lamentable dependence on the two highly personalised and patronage based Dravidian parties every election season raises questions about these parties’ limited praxis in the state.   

National elections are still being contested from regional platforms in this state and whatever might be the outcome, it is guaranteed that the winning set of regional parties will have a major role to play in the centre. Whether that role is progressive and addresses real issues that face the people of Tamil Nadu is questionable and that is the discomforting feature about the Lok Sabha elections in the state. 

Draft of the editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

The die is caste

“Social engineering” remains the main theme in Bihar's polity as the 15^th Lok Sabha elections in the state beckon.

Bihar's elected representatives have had an important part to play in the national legislature for long. True to its recent legacy of “Mandal politics”, the state promises to deliver yet another verdict that is reliant on the correlation of various caste and community based alliances. The main political parties in the state hope to construct a winning alliance of the right combination of caste and community alliances – in other words, “social engineering”.

The performance of the major parties have depended upon their ability to maintain their respective social bases among various castes. Thus, the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) led by Lalu Prasad is seen as a Yadav and other backward classes dominated party deriving support also from Muslims. The Loktantrik Janata Party (LJP) led by Ram Vilas Paswan has a primary social base that comprises of dalit communities such as the Paswans and the Dhobis. The Janata Dal (United)'s support base is rooted in the Kurmi and Koeri community, and the Bharatiya Janata Party is seen as the party of the upper castes. There has not been much of a shift in the respective social bases of these parties in the state since the last held assembly elections in 2005. The rise of the aforementioned parties in the state has coincided with the historical decline of the catch-all Congress party, which has been reduced to a near irrelevant force now.

To the further detriment of the Congress party, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in Bihar unravelled as the RJD and LJP decided to keep the bulk of Lok Sabha constituencies for themselves resulting in the Congress deciding to go it alone. The ruling National Democratic Alliance of the JD(U) and BJP have also finalised a seat sharing arrangement making the elections in the state a battle between between these two alliances even as the parliamentary left parties in the state have come together to form a cohesive United Left Bloc (ULB).

Considering that the LJP fought separately against both the JD(U) and the RJD in the 2005 elections, the coming together of the LJP and the RJD promises to shore up support for the alliance. If the combined vote share (38.9%) of these parties in 2005 is an indicator, the LJP-RJD alliance seems to be on a better footing compared to the ruling NDA (36.9%).

While the JD(U) has harped upon governance and performance of its chief minister, Nitish Kumar as talking points in the elections, the party realises the primal importance of social engineering and has embarked upon it with gusto. The party in government has addressed concerns of some communities such as backward Muslims to garner their support. At the same time, other communities, such as the Koeris and the Brahmins have had causes of resentment with the way Nitish Kumar has ruled – he is seen to be authoritarian and being too reliant on the bureaucracy. The BJP's support base among the upper castes is quite substantial and it has also managed to garner support in the relatively urban pockets of the state. “Social engineering” thus remains the operational strategy for the NDA alliance as it has fielded candidates based on caste equations, even resulting in the dropping of several sitting members of parliament .

The Muslim-Yadav base of the RJD and the dalit base of the LJP is indeed formidable and this factor is seen to favour the RJD-LJP alliance. Lalu Prasad's party might have lost the assembly elections in 2005 after 15 years of rule, but his support base had endured and so is the case before these elections. The alliance was weakened by the exit of the Congress from the seat sharing strategy, but in any case the traditional support base of the Congress, particularly the Muslims (ever since the demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992) have gravitated toward the RJD. After the break up of the Congress' alliance with the RJD – the RJD has put up candidates in the seats that it had offered to Congress, ensuring the further marginalisation of the latter. The RJD and the LJP however assure that they are firmly with the UPA and along with the Samajwadi Party have formed a bloc of parties in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

The fledgling alliance between the parliamentary left parties strives to provide a promising alternative to the identity-based mobilisations of the other main parties in the state. The Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the strongest left outfit in the state -the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)- Liberation have finally found common ground and have formed an United Left Bloc, which fancies its chances in some traditional left strongholds in the state.

Unlike other parties, the left Bloc has tried to mobilise people on the basis of issues such as relief to people affected by the Kosi floods, problems faced by public sector employees and other livelihood related issues in the lowly developed state. While the parties in the Bloc play down expectations for the upcoming Lok Sabha elections, they are confident of building an issues-based alternative to the mainstream political parties in the state and are keen on positioning themselves well for the next assembly elections. The performance of this left Bloc would ultimately determine the shift from the primordial identity based politics that has dominated the state.

Draft of editorial written in the Economic & Political Weekly . The final version can be read here. 

Fishy Tharoor

A blog post cross-posted from www.pragoti.org

Among the "high profile" candidates in the upcoming Lok Sabha elections, much touted and vaunted by the media is the former career diplomat, Shashi Tharoor. Tharoor, a prolific writer of fiction and commentaries, spent nearly three decades in the United Nations; infact his final "claim to fame" vis-a-vis the UN was his bid to become the secretary general of the organisation. He lost the bid to Ban Ki Moon of South Korea.

It is clear that the suave and articulate former diplomat has been fielded by the Congress to present an educated and "modern" representative for the United Democratic Front in an urban constituency -the capital of India's most literate state, Kerala. It is the "modern" part that is going to come under some scrutiny in this blog write-up. Called into question would be some of Shashi Tharoor's own writing - most of which qualifies as "Indo-nostalgic" - a term that I borrowed from good old Wikipedia.

About seven years ago, Tharoor wrote an article in the International Herald Tribune describing his visit to two high profile places in South India - Puttaparthi in Andhra Pradesh and Bangalore. In the former, Tharoor visits the complex hosted by that godman, "Satya Sai Baba". In the latter, Tharoor pays a visit to the uber-modern campus of Infosys Technologies at Electronics City.

Tharoor is impressed by both visits - about the former, he writes glowingly about the "miracles" conjured by the host baba, who "materialises" a ring from thin air for his guest. About the latter, he is impressed at the swanky structures built in Bangalore by the Infosys proprietors. He goes on to call these "facets of 21st century India", suggesting the juxtaposition of tradition and modernity, applauding the baba for his spiritual and material public service and Infosys for its efforts to bring high end technology to India.

Lets delve on the Baba story a bit. Tharoor was rightly upbraided by rationalists for his glowing terms of reference to the charlatan at Puttaparthi. Tharoor's later response was to suggest that he was skeptical about the "conjuring acts" and that goes without saying within the article. I will try to give him the benefit of doubt. But a similar bit of writing elsewhere by him, makes it difficult for me to do so.

Tharoor, in his book, India - from midnight to millennium ( a rather second grade book, if you ask me), writes about the "Ganesha drinking milk" "phenomenon". Diligent recent affairs followers would remember the national frenzy that this "thing" (for want of a better word) created - scores of idols of the Hindu god Ganesh "drinking milk" poured in through teaspoons by devotees. Tharoor was witness to one such "demonstration" in Houston, Texas, right about the same time when the frenzy was being whipped up in India. He notices a terra-cotta statue of Ganesh drinking milk through the capillary way and points at the devotion of those engaged in this exercise. The quotable bit is his conclusions, this: "Ganesh drank willingly from her extended spoon" - lets say he was waxing poetic here and this: "I was prepared to believe a fully rational explanation for the event, but i was equally willing to accept that a miracle might have occured, one not readily susceptible to the demystification of scientists" - uh oh.

In other words, Tharoor is willing to let obscurantism co-exist with rationalism, as hey, 'cos what harm does it do, eh (in Manhattan lingo)? Lets get back to that charlatan bit. Tharoor emphatically says that the baba should not be reduced to a "conjuror", as "he has channeled the hopes and energies of his followers into constructive directions, both spiritual and philanthropic". And then he juxtaposes the charlatan with India's new economy giant, as "emblematic of an India that somehow manages to live in several centuries at once". In other words, Tharoor is willing to accept the legerdemain of the charlatan for his side effects - his "channeling" and thus continues in the same vein as his book - the co-existence of obscurantism and rationalism (surely which brought about the birth of computers, IT and indeed, India's new economy boom).

I need not go into the gobbledygook that the charlatan baba generates. He is a cheap trickster, there is no doubt. But importantly one has to question this nonsensical assertion of the charlatan's piety which is brought out by the gushing praise of the public services "work" of him and his followers. It is true that the followers of the trickster have helped build hospitals and bring in drinking water to parched areas of south India. But isn't it also true that these are services that are essentially to be brought about by the state? Isn't that what Article 37 of the Constitution (the directive principles of State Policy) for e.g. suggests - "The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purpose of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health."

The Constitution, that affirms in the preamble that India is a "secular" republic is itself an incarnation of modernity which mid-wived through enlightenment overcomes obscurantism and fosters rationalism. But that is not the main point I am driving at. The point is that by channeling the energies of citizens - guileless gullible miracle-worshippers and many guileful folks who seek an instrumental reason in association with other "high and mighty" - through obscurantist techniques and usurping the place of the state in delivering services, the charlatan is only furthering the gullibility of the people and the cause of the "high and mighty" who follow him. He ensures that these citizens who are equal partakers of the state, do not question the laxity of its custodians and consequently reduce the efficacy of its functioning as they are satisfied by the services rendered by a fake miracle-monger and ascribe the benefits of such services to divinity.

A modern secular, rational human being will in no way endorse obscurantism even if it has an instrumental value. In the case of the Baba,this instrumental value - provision of essential services - only furthers ignorance and further obscurantism, as the believers refuse to get out of their ignorance because of the benefits that they receive out of it. A sensitised public who are aware of the "domain of rights" and the "rule of law" in a democracy would assure those services through the aegis of the state and would not be subject to the whimsical bogus miracle-mongering of a con artist.

In essence, Shashi Tharoor's effusive praise of the juxtaposing of obscurantism and rationalism will only be a curse on and an impediment to the eventual filtering of rationality and modernity, two important features that translate into a greater civic consciousness.

Moving on to more Tharoorism. Tharoor is widely acclaimed for his "precocious" work as a diplomat, who became one at a fairly early age and after a quick PhD at Tufts School of Diplomacy. The case for having an accomplished diplomat in parliament is obvious, especially in a context, where diplomatic skills are a premium in these days of attacks of terrorism such as the Mumbai incidents on 26th November, 2008. It is therefore apt to study what our diplomat-candidate had to offer during those days of public discourse on the response to the incidents from India. Lets have a look at what Tharoor wrote in the Haaretz in the aftermath of the incidents. Tharoor uses false equivalence, comparing the attacks on Mumbai by terrorists originating from Pakistan with rocket attacks from the Hamas based in Gaza (note Tharoor never mentions the "beleaguered" Hamas and the "blockaded Gaza). He suggests that the Indian establishment (and I suspect himself) is envious of the abilities of the Isrealis to take punitive action against its adversaries, while it is not able to do so. And in making that argument, Tharoor blissfully ignores the contours of the conflict in Palestine, the history of Israeli aggression, the torment faced by the Palestinians and the continuing illegal occupation of Palestinian territories. In effect, as journalist focusing on West Asia, Marian Houk argues in his blogpost,

"One of Shashi Tharoor’s main flaws is that he never understood what is going on in the Middle East, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And he saw it to his advantage, in the interest of his career advancement, to pander to one side, the one with the most power and influence … and that is a classic, though profoundly immoral, way to behave."

How about Tharoor's other credentials? Tharoor, is an advisor to the Coca Cola India Foundation Yatn, a corporate social responsibility project of the Coca Cola company. Yes, the very same Coca Cola company whose plant in Plachimada in Kerala is currently shut down because the Kerala State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB ) has refused to issue the "Consent to Operate" to the company, owing to the high levels of polluting content (cadmium) in Coca Cola's sludge and in the groundwater in and around the water plant. An argument can be made that Tharoor is not to be blamed for the company itself, as his associations are only to the effect of advising on social responsibility projects by the company. But interestingly, Tharoor responding to critics who questioned this association, went on to whitewash the charges against the Plachimada plant by suggesting that he is "unable to understand the scientific basis for your continued charges against the company, and can only conclude that they are politically-motivated". Funnily, he quotes the reports on Plachimada by KSPCB which has indeed shut down the plant because of its findings. As this rather dubious letter by Tharoor suggests, he is willing to juxtapose corporate pollution of natural resources with corporate generated employment.

We surely don't want a obscurantist who clothes himself in modernity, do we? We surely don't want a diplomat in the legislature who is a careerist pandering to the influential, do we? We don't want an apologist for corporate damage to natural resources, do we?

Shashi Tharoor might see reason in juxtaposing obscurantism with modernity or Israel with India or corporate environmental pillage with corporate generated employment. This writer sees no reason in juxtaposing a former diplomat with mediocre views and a tendency to "pander to the influential", with the image of a member of parliament in India's most literate state.

A significant break

The victory of the left in El Salvador after years of conservative and right wing rule is significant.

The victory of the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the recently concluded presidential elections in El Salvador marks an end to an era – of conservative rule, a guerilla war, of direct and “silent” US intervention and years of failures by opposition to an entrenched elite to come to power. For some, the FMLN victory signifies a break from nearly 130 years of dictatorial and elite rule in the tiny central American nation, ravaged by widespread poverty ,endemic crime and unemployment.

FMLN, an erstwhile revolutionary guerilla organisation that took part in the civil war in the country between 1980 and 1992 managed to finally win the presidential elections by pitching Mauricio Funes, an erstwhile journalist as the candidate. Funes who presented a moderate image and belongs to the social democrat section of the party, managed to win despite being vilified by the opponent right wing party, Arena for being an “acolyte” of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who is seen as one of the leading voices against US hegemony in Latin America. The slander campaign against Funes and against the FMLN in general did result in a much closer contest, with Funes winning about 51% of the vote after all along being the favourite in the run-up to the polls. The FMLN's presidential face for the previous elections was the dynamic guerilla leader and Marxist, Schafik Handal who died recently.

The FMLN's victory was a consolidation of the steady rise of the party at the mayoral and legislative levels; currently the FMLN is the single largest party in the legislature. The victory was achieved despite tremendous odds – the ruling Arena had a huge advantage in resources including the media and the bogey of a “hardline” image that had endured since the civil war years in the polarised nation. The choice of Funes, a former investigative journalist who was popularly known for his work pointing at the systemic failings of the Salvadoran government and bureaucracy, helped in mitigating that “image”. But more importantly, the FMLN agenda had a clear resonance for a nation that has a peculiar economy which depends heavily on remittances from citizens currently working in the US and which has now been affected because of the economic recession in that country. Funes promises that he would attempt to reverse the out-migration by improving living conditions within the country.

The FMLN has promised a greater diversification of the economy, with increased impetus on productive resources within the country and for a more participative approach in solving much of the socio-economic problems. The FMLN also plans to reverse years of rampant privatisation and pandering to big business which has only increased inequality and a skewed utilisation of resources. Having said that, Funes has reiterated that he believes in continuity vis-a-vis relations with the US, especially since the change of regime from the Republican Party's George Bush to the Democrats' Barack Obama.

Much of this emphasis on continuity is very much instrumental – nearly a quarter of El Salvador's population now works in the US. And Funes suggests that there would be no change in foreign policy that would mean a reversal of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) or any direct opposition to US hegemony as entailed by countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba among others. These utterances signify an attempt to mould public opinion on a FLMN regime in the US, but it remains to be seen how Funes would be able to diversify, utilise and nurture productive capacities and resources in El Salvador while continuing to adhere to the CAFTA or without repealing - which the FMLN is committed to - the neoliberal model adopted by the earlier regimes in the country.

The FMLN presidential election victory thus conforms to a “pinker” version of the leftward transition in many of the countries; in order words, Funes is seen to be a moderate resembling the likes of Brazilian president Luis Inacio Silva or Chilean president Michelle Bachelet in outlook and policymaking. Yet, his victory also ensures a closer relationship with other central and Latin American countries in terms of foreign policy, as the Arena party had curtailed relations with nations such as Cuba and Venezuela in the past. The challenge that FMLN faces in achieving a more egalitarian model of governance and economic policy making in El Salvador now remains in the way it utilises its executive power (the presidency) and how it effects a working coalition in the legislature (the party has 35 members in the 84 member assembly).

Draft of the editorial written for Economic and Political Weekly

Amorphous Alliance

The electoral alliance of regional parties and the Left Front promises no more than a spoiler to the Congress and the BJP's unilateral hopes.

Twelve years after the fall of the United Front government, which was a coalition of regional parties (the Communist Party of India being the only national party in that government), a similar conglomeration of regional and left parties has forged a non-Congress, non-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) pre-electoral seat sharing arrangement before the 15^th Lok Sabha elections.

Broadly termed as the “third front” by observers, the common refrain of the parties in this amorphous alliance, is their anti-Congress and anti-BJP stance. While the Left Front constituents, have a decided alternate agenda vis-a-vis socio-economic and foreign policies, the other parties are part of a coalition that only shares a vision of opposing the two largest national parties, owing to their local political equations. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)- avowedly the party of dalit leadership- has been non-committal about its relationship with this “third front” but has also sounded interested in this alternative to the BJP and the Congress.

The Left Front – primarily restricted to its stronghold states of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura -- have played a role in the Centre in the near past, punching above their stated weight worth 60 seats in parliament by utilising the expedient circumstances that made the United Progressive Alliance dependent on the Left for survival in the first four years of government. It's understanding is that a clear left and secular alternative to the communal BJP and the neoliberalism friendly Congress, has to be built programmatically and through popular mobilisation.

Effectively, the left as a cohesive ideological force is fighting winnable battles only in West Bengal and Tripura as the Left Front, in Kerala as the Left Democratic Front and in Bihar as the newly constituted and promising United Left Bloc, which includes the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)-Liberation. In Kerala, factionalism has severely dented the image of the main left party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), while in West Bengal, a series of administrative mishaps has seen an erosion of support even among its rural mainstays. The left therefore expects to shore up its parliamentary strength by stitching up electoral alliances with parties such as the Telugu Desam and others in Andhra Pradesh and the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) in Tamil Nadu, where the left parties are relevant as a political force.

While the regional parties are now formally opposed to the Congress led United Progressive Alliance and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance, there remains the question whether post-elections, the antagonism would continue. Most parties, such as the Telugu Desam, the ADMK and the Janata Dal (secular) have in the near past been part of the NDA. Their electoral strategy now is governed by the fact that any alliance before elections with the increasingly reactionary and communal BJP would fetch them diminishing and negative returns and some of these parties are in direction opposition to the Congress or other parties in the UPA in their respective states. This precise reason has seen the Biju Janata Dal coming out of a 11 year alliance with the BJP and its dalliances with the “third front”. And the BSP's non-committal attitude is evidence that it is keeping options open after elections.Programmatically, little is different between these parties and the Congress and the BJP, even though they have articulated a regional nationalism and a circulation of elites that has seen greater federalisation and decentralisation of power from the all powerful centre. Structurally, these single leader-driven parties are very similar to the Congress as well.

As currently constituted, the “third front” offers a major electoral impediment to both the UPA and the NDA, as strictly bipolar contests between these two alliances are now restricted to about one third of the total number of states. The “third front” makes it quite difficult for the Congress and the BJP as individual parties to win enough seats so as to dominate a future coalition government. On the other hand, the success of the “third front” in constituting a coalition government on its own is dependent on the both the Congress and the BJP getting much less seats individually than before. While in the years gone by, there indeed has been a drop in the electoral returns of these two parties, it is not expected that the electoral tally of the parties outside the UPA and the NDA would garner more seats than the halfway mark.

Even if the 2009 “third front” experiment does end by an extraordinary set of circumstances in the formation of a non-Congress, non-BJP majority/minority government, it would be difficult to expect such a government would base its programmes on a substantial alternative. The experience of the erstwhile and short lived United Front (UF) government in the mid-1990s is enough to suggest this. The UF government, beyond a few noises and moves towards greater federal transfer of power or a more compassionate foreign policy, offered no real change from the neoliberal trajectory of the erstwhile government – it was after all the government, in which the then finance minister P.Chidambaram presented the much discussed neoliberal “dream budget” that contributed so much to a further widening of inequalities.

Indeed, the flux in the polity today as it stands is likely to continue after elections and many of the aforementioned parties can be expected to change their antagonistic pre-electoral positions vis-a-vis the Congress (and the BJP for some parties) if required to construct fresh alliances in government or in opposition. In that sense, the amorphousness of the “third front” precludes the possibility of a strong “third pole”, distinguished and separated from the UPA and the NDA in India's national polity. Unless of course, the alternative is constructed programmatically post-elections or in the long term and gathers critical support for its agenda nationally.

Draft of the Editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly

Oneupmanship versus realism

The Congress party's very nature and arrogance precludes a cohesive United Progressive Alliance before the elections

The upcoming elections to the 15th Lok Sabha promises to yet another fragmented mandate, ensuring that the era of coalitions is intact. The aspect significant about this set of elections is that, the coalitions are no way set in stone. Whether pre-polls or post-polls, the coalitions being formed are still fluid, most of the regional parties that have aligned with one national party or the other or vice versa, have done so only with instrumental reasons and there are others that have kept their final decision (whether to be in the ruling coalition or in opposition) practically in abeyance, even if they have committed to one front or the other for the time being. This is surprising as the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress has more or less stayed intact since the withdrawal of support from the left parties in July 2008 over the differences vis-a-vis the Indo-US nuclear deal.

The UPA government survived a trust vote in July 2008 (albeit in an engineered manner) and the alliance was also able to add a new winning partner in the National Conference from Kashmir. The Congress party had nimbly maintained some of the most important cabinet portfolios - finance, home, external affairs, defence, commerce and of course the prime ministerial post for themselves, and had broadly kept the major policy making positions. Most of the hostile criticism, unsurprisingly emanating out of a great degree of difference of opinion on policy making from the left parties during the phase when they were supporting the government, were directed at the Congress controlled ministeries. The Congress had handed over posts that provided a populist edge, coveted by the regional parties - agriculture, railways, transport, heavy industry, telecommunications to their mostly regional allies. Such a disbursal of ministeries was also achieved due to the arithmetic of the seats won by the Congress in comparison to the other parties in the coalition whose seats were confined in specific states.This ensured that the levers of policy making was fairly controlled by the Congress party while the allies were given full rein over ministries which gave them leeway to satisfy their constituents.

Though the UPA rule for five years seems to have demonstrated an understanding by the Congress of working with coalitions explained by a survival instinct, the persistent tendencies of oneupmanship by the party have yet again raised their head. That is visible from the statements of some of its leaders which have suggested that they are loath to ceding ground to coalition partners during seat-sharing or treating them as enduring allies in a post-poll scenario and in their assertions of having a Congress-only manifesto for the elections. Some allies themselves on the other hand, want to go beyond their regionally confined boundaries, as they sense the effectiveness of being in central positions of power and therefore the necessity of having a broader national presence. That explains the greater degree of bargaining for seats and influence beyond their present confines by the Samajwadi Party-SP (primarily based in Uttar Pradesh) and the Nationalist Congress Party led by Sharad Pawar (whose influence is highest in Maharashtra). As a pressure tactic, the two parties have kept their lines of communication with other coalitions -the National Democratic Alliance led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the case of the former and the loosely knit "third front" anchored by the Left in the case of the latter. In the same vein, sensing that no option should remain unexplored, other regional parties formally committed to these coalitions or otherwise have also kept their lines of communication with the UPA intact. That explains the sudden "overture" to the Congress by the J.Jayalalithaa led All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (formally part of the third front) and the Bahujan Samaj Party's non-commital stance toward any alliance before the elections.

Some senior leaders of the Congress understand that coalitions are inevitable, and they also want to retain the broad policy making sway without restraint that they have had in the UPA government particularly after the withdrawal of support from the left. This has made them realise that the most preferable post poll situation would be one where they form a majority with other UPA partners without having to rely upon support from the left parties. This has seen the Congress up the ante in West Bengal and Kerala, allying with the recalcitrant Trinamul Congress (TMC) in the former to undercut the Left as much as possible. But again, the Congress "political culture" which thrives upon dynastic succession, sycophancy as also a degree of arrogance and oneupmanship in functioning - all legacies drawn from the days of Indira Gandhi, makes it difficult for them to enact a smooth pre-poll coalition with other UPA allies. Many Congressmen prefer a return of the one party era, with yet another of the Nehru-Gandhi family - Rahul Gandhi is the much touted name- as prime minister. The retention of policy level control does not satisfy them, they need control over ministeries that help them partake in the system of patronage. And this explains the fluidity of coalition building which has characterised the polity before elections. Thus, even if the Congress has demonstrated that it is no less proficient in the art of surviving in power within coalitions- something that the BJP showed that it was adept in, the party's very nature acts as an impediment to a smooth retention of the coalition.

The fragmentation of India's polity over time since independence is a function of the greater inclusion of marginalised sections into ruling classes, federalisation owing to the nature of India's Constitution and most importantly the weakening of the over-centralised Congress party which dominated national politics for decades. The positive aspect of this fragmentation is the presence of a plurality of voices representing a greater number of local (and parochial) interests and which has forced national parties to adopt states-specific strategies. The quicker the Congress party sheds its pretensions of forming an one party government that is a return to its centralised past, the easier it would be to retain a cohesive UPA which presents itself to the electorate on a common platform of policies, promises and ideas. From all indications of the arrogant nature of the party and the very parochial interests of some of its allies such as the TMC and the SP, such a culmination seems to be difficult in the offing.

Draft of the editorial written for the Economic and Political Weekly